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AN EARTHY ENIGMA
I. Introduction
This article records my attempt to understand what localism
means in American regulation of free, over-the-air TV ("free TV")
station ownership. Although the notion is clichd, I cannot avoid
starting off by acknowledging that, compared with other sectors of the
economy, communications is constantly in flux. Conventional wisdom
holds that we are living in the midst of a communications revolution.1
Yet, technological changes in the media have been reversing
communications paradigms with a frequency and persistence that
dispels the uniqueness of our current experience. The history of
communications is a "narrative of revolution."2 This article focuses on
the ownership of free TV broadcasters. However, broadcast TV exists
among prior, current and potential functional equivalents, such as
radio, cable, satellite, Internet, fiber optic video transmission and
other yet-unknown technologies. While having a substantial impact
on media markets, the rise and fall of these technologies are not quite
the paradigm overhauls we associate with political and scientific
revolutions.3 Why? A genuine communications revolution includes,
1. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest [hereinafter Sunstein,
TV and Public Interest], 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 501 (2000) (contemplating a
communications revolution "driven by extraordinary technological change" through "the
rise of cable television, the Internet, satellite television, direcTV, and digital television").
See also Prometheus Radio Project vs. Federal Communications Commission, Nos. 03-
3388, 03-3577, 03-3578, 03-3579, 03-3580, 03-3581, 03-3582, 03-3651, 03-3665, 03-3675, 03-
3708, 03-3894, 03-3950, 03-3951, 03-4072, 03-4073 & 04-1956. 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 12720
(3d Cir. Jun. 24, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Third Circuit Review] at 179, Scirica, C.J.,
dissenting (using the words "unprecedented revolution in communications technologies"
to describe the climate of the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996). On August
6, 2004, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") filed a petition for the Third
Circuit to partially rehear the 2004 Third Circuit Review and modify its stay (Cheryl
Bolen, FCC Asks Third Circuit to Modify Stay of Media Ownership Rule, Eyes Appeal,
VOL.7, No. 32 COMPETITION LAW 633 (2004).
2. Paul Starr calls modem communications "a narrative of revolution, from the
printing revolution in early modem Europe to the electronics and computer revolutions of
the twentieth century." PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL
ORIGINS OF MODERN COMMUNICATIONS 4,4 (2004).
3. See KATHERINE BARBER ED., THE CANADIAN OXFORD DICTIONARY 1235
(1998) (defining revolution as "1. a. the forcible overthrow of a government or social
order, in favour of a new system. B. (in Marxism) the replacement of one ruling class by
another; the class struggle which is expected to lead to political change and the triumph of
communism. 2. any fundamental change or reversal of conditions (the Industrial
Revolution)."). Thomas Kuhn provides the best explanation of paradigm shifts in scientific
thought caused by generational "revolutions." See Glen 0. Robinson, The Electronic First
Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 930 (1998) (citing THOMAS S.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (Univ. Chicago Press 2d ed. 1970)
2005]
and derives from, profound social changes in addition to the
technological dimension of media delivery. Social changes "may be
slow in coming, hard to isolate from other contemporary
developments, and related less to a medium's intrinsic properties than
to constitutive choices about its design and development., 4 A genuine
''communications revolution" thus covers changes to the
"framework" of communications, including technological, political
and cultural shifts.5
The concept of revolution ties in nicely with critiques of the
American localist regulatory framework as protectionist in motive
and self-perpetuating in function. This account describes localism as
the device through which regulators and the regulated strike a
mutually beneficial bargain that disregards the public interest
legislatively entrusted to these stewards. According to this public
choice critique, whatever legitimate aim localism may have had in
promoting local content has been obfuscated by the now self-
preserving and self-justifying bargain of political influence for
monopoly rents.6 In Mancur Olson's words, the entrenched coalition
of regulators and station licensees hampers the dynamism of, and
increases the regulation, bureaucracy, and political interference with,
video distribution markets that can only be "emasculated" through
significant political upheaval.'
The upheaval that Mancur Olson contemplates is on the scale of
political occupation or revolution. I would like to extend his
conception of upheaval to include a so-called communications
revolution, on the basis that such revolution could have an impact
comparable to political upheaval, albeit confined to the actors and
relationships within the communications sector. Supposing this is
possible, the question is whether the coalition of regulators and
station licensees described above could be disbanded by a
communications revolution. We already know that a genuine
communications revolution includes both technological innovation
(1962) and comparing Kuhn's ideas about generational and paradigm revolutions in
scientific exploration with shifts in the media marketplace.).
4. STARR, supra note 2, at 4.
5. Id.
6. See Thomas W. Hazlett, All Broadcast Regulation Politics are Local: A Response
to Christopher Yoo's Model of Broadcast Regulation [hereinafter Hazlett, Response to
Yoo], 53 EMORY L.J. 233, 234 (2004) ("[E]ach policy comes to be dominated by a logic
peculiar to its historical development.").
7. MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 40, 75 (1982).
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and social change. With respect to localism, the factor of social
change that this article explores is the importance of territory to the
identity, autonomy and self-realization of communities. Despite the
diversity of opinion on free TV station ownership, there is little
controversy over the prominence of the TV medium's role in
enhancing the lives and constructing the identities of individuals, local
communities and nations. TV's influence ranges from the factual
accounts of news dissemination, the viewpoints provided in editorials,
and the aesthetic exposure offered by popular and niche
entertainment. Through these influences, the media facilitates
democracy and its institutions at the local, state/provincial and federal
levels, while providing the means to culturally define these
"imagined" communities:
8
In the eighteenth century with the birth of nationalism in Europe,
there was a deliberate attempt by cultural specialists ... to discover
and record the vernacular [, or "local,"] customs and practices,
legends and myths.. .in effect, the expanding strata of the
indigenous intelligentsia sought to pull together and weave into a
coherent form this body of popular cultural sources which could be
used to give the past a sense of direction and construct a national
identity. This can be linked to . . . a crucial factor in the
construction of nationalism: the availability of a print culture which
can interconnect people over time and space. The possibility of the
nation therefore depends upon the development of the book, the
novel, and the newspaper alongside a literate reading public
capable of using these sources throughout the territorial area and
thus able to imagine themselves as a community.
9
At the same time, the media gives individuals the means to
cultivate their own identities, affinities and associations, whether
territorial or not. In other words, the media facilitates the self-
determination of the individual, as well as local and national
communities. ° Yet we also know that "imagined" communities
8. Mike Featherstone, Localism, Globalism, Cultural Identity, in GLOBAL/LOCAL
CULTURAL PRODUCTION AND THE TRANSNATIONAL IMAGINARY 53 ( Rob Wilson &
Wimal Dissanayake, Eds., 1996) (quoting BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED
COMMUNITIES (rev. ed., London: Verso, 1991) at 6 ("[A]ll communities larger than the
primordial village of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined.")).
9. Featherstone, supra note 8, at 53-54.
10. As a much-debated right in international law, self-determination is elusive and
controversial, but it captures the broad concepts of development, autonomy, definition
and identity that I am contemplating here. See generally KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002) (surveying the discourse of self-
determination in international law and highlighting the challenge of diversity and the role
of participation, identity and interpretation in interpreting the right of self-determination).
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depend on territorial parameters for their definitions.11 This implies
that, to the extent media helps to determine our local and national
"selves," media may themselves need to be circumscribed by the
territorial parameters of these local and national communities.
As a Canadian lawyer, I tend to compare American media
regulation to that of my home-jurisdiction. Canadian and American
regimes are each founded upon norms that privilege one "self" over
the other. The Canadian broadcasting system is driven by nationalist
content and ownership rules that are meant to promote the nation-
state, while America's broadcasting system is founded on localism,
where local communities are the focus of various content and
ownership rules. The conventional explanation would be as follows.
Canada's nationalist focus originates from a perceived threat of
American cultural dominance over a fragile Canadian cultural
identity stretched over a vast, under-populated geography and gulfs
of ethnic, regional and linguistic difference. America's local focus
follows from the country's historical predilection for atomistic
economic and political structures that insure diversity, local color and
a vibrant competitive landscape in economic and democratic terms.
Although this article focuses on American localism, it suggests that
there may be something else behind American localism and Canadian
nationalism that the two regimes share. As intellectual property,
media products are easily reproduced and transported across
territorial boundaries through communications technologies, such as
satellite, cable, the Internet, phone lines, and electro-magnetic
spectrum, that range in their territorial scope but are increasingly
indifferent to territory. In contrast, territorial parameters continue to
play a profound role in local and national identity. It is this tension
between territory-defying media products and technologies and
territorially defined communities that prompts the impulse to
territorially restrict media ownership. This tension is the essence of
the localism norm in media ownership regulation.
11. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, Art. 1,
TS No. 881, 165 LNTS 19 (providing that one of the essential characteristics of an
independent state is that it has a defined territory). I acknowledge that there are examples
of nations without geographical parameters, such as Canadian First Nations and other
ethnic communities within nation-states. These raise interesting challenges to the classical
territorial associations within a community's self-determination. The definition of locality
is, obviously, also territorial: See BARBER, supra note 3, at 842 (defining locality as "an
area or district considered as the site occupied by certain people or things as the scene of
certain activities.").
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The debate on media ownership and the role of localism has
insufficiently addressed this obvious but important tension. By
surveying the current debate on media ownership, this article shows
the ways in which the debate is paralyzed by an irreconcilable
dichotomy between advocates for ownership liberalization
("liberalization proponents") and those who counter it
("liberalization critics"). This dichotomy is reinforced by the
proponents' affiliation with the marketplace model of realizing the
public interest and the critics' affiliation with the regulatory model, as
well as the vast academic and political institutions that have grown up
beneath these models. Looking at the content of localism more
closely, and finding therein a territorial impulse to control the media,
we begin to understand the public's support for localism in media
ownership regulation and why it may decline. The result is a fresh way
of looking at an otherwise predictable debate. Beyond the maze of
political, cultural and economic arguments raised by liberalization
proponents and critics, the content of localism turns out to have the
bland taste of earth. Localism and its manifestation in localist
ownership rules, like the parallel norm of Canadian nationalism and
its manifestation in foreign ownership restrictions, expresses a resolve
to impose territorial limits on ideas, knowledge and entertainment,
which by their nature and dissemination defy territory. The territorial
content of the localism norm is thus its greatest weakness, as
technology and global integration keep reminding us of the
territorially disrespectful nature of information. While it may not
offer practical policy answers, this exploration helps us understand
how far along we may be in a genuine communications revolution
where localist and nationalist regulations are losing their respective
roles.
II. Localism Today
Localism, together with diversity and competition, form a
triumvirate of principles that the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") has ascribed to its mandate for regulating
media ownership in the public interest. 2 Confusion about what
12 See FCC, Strategic Goals, Media, available at http://www.fcc.gov/mediagoals/ (last
visited Aug. 18, 2004) (describing the FCC mandate as rebuilding "the factual and
analytical foundation of its media ownership regulations and competition policies"
keeping in mind "the policy goals of competition, diversity, and localism."). See also FCC,
Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Broadcast Ownership Rules,
Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio
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localism means increases with the tendency to tie diversity and
competition in with localist concerns. And this is made more
perplexing by the fact that localism is the most enigmatic of the three
concepts. Competition is the most ascertainable because micro-
economics is able to tell us, at least in theory, what competition looks
like. An immense body of antitrust jurisprudence and regulation has
used this economic theory and its focus on price and output
manipulation to define the scope of anti-competitive practices and
market structures. In this way, we have some sense of what "anti-
competition" and its opposite look like. "Diversity" derives from the
metaphor of the marketplace of ideas, whose aim is to promote "the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources." 3 Diversity resembles competition in its focus
on the necessity for several suppliers (or voices), but because it lacks
the scientific metrics of economic theory, it is more difficult to define
than competition. Economists are able to tell us (at least
theoretically) when a market is sufficiently lacking in competition to
enable a supplier to manipulate price or output profitably, but we
have no way of knowing when a market is insufficiently diverse so
that we can say that the marketplace of ideas is malfunctioning. We
do know that diversity is a function of the number of media voices in
the market. To the extent that a less concentrated media market
means more diversity, we have some metric for assessing whether
diversity is high or low, relative to other markets. Indeed, the Third
Circuit has affirmed its support for diversity metrics based on
concentration scales from antitrust law. 4 In contrast, localism
confounds the measurement available to competition and diversity
because there are more variables that figure into the health of
localism, including control, content, local talent access, local
democracy, local culture, and local economic development.
Broadcast Stations in Local Markets, and Definition of Radio Markets, Rules and
Regulations 47 C.F.R. Part 73 (MB Docket 02-277, and MM Dockets 01-235, 01-317, and
00-244; FCC 03-127) (Aug.5, 2003)) [hereinafter 2003 Order] §80).
13. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
14. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 73-74 ("We do not object in principle
to the... reliance on the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission's antitrust
formula, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HEI"), as its starting point for measuring
diversity in local markets. . .. In converting HHi to a measure for diversity in local
markets, however, the commission gave too much weight to the Internet as a media outlet,
irrationally assigned outlets of the same media type to equal market shares, and
inconsistently derived the Cross-Media Limits from its Diversity Index results.").
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In recent regulatory documents, the FCC has explained that the
localism obligation requires free TV stations to be, and carry
programming that is, responsive to the needs and interests of their
local communities. 5 The FCC derives legal authority for the localism
feature of its public interest mandate as follows:
Title III [of the Communications Act] generally instructs the
Commission to regulate broadcasting as the public interest,
convenience, and necessity dictate, and section 307(b) explicitly
requires the Commission to "make such distribution of licenses,
frequencies, hours of operation, and of power among the several
States and communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable
distribution of radio service to each of the same." Pursuant to this
mandate, when the Commission allocates channels for a new
broadcast service, its first priority is to provide general service to an
area, but its next priority is for facilities to provide the first local
service to a community. In carrying out the mandate of Section
307(b), the Commission has long recognized that "every
community of appreciable size has a presumptive need for its own
transmission service." Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that
"[flairness to communities [in distributing radio service] is
furthered by a recognition of local needs for a community radio
mouthpiece.
16
This analysis provides authority for interpretations of localism as
local control and/or ownership; local content 17 that is responsive to the
community;18 and the potentially unlimited obligation to serve the
needs of the licensee's community. 19 Commissioners Copps' and
Adelstein's remarks at the first FCC Broadcast Field Hearing on
15. 2003 Order, supra note 12, at §74. See also FCC, In the Matter of Broadcast
Localism (MB Docket No. 04-233, FCC 04-129) Notice of Inquiry (June 7, 2004) available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-04-129Al.pdf (last visited Aug.
12, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 NOI].
16. 2004 NOI, supra note 15 § 2 (citing Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §
307(b); Revision of FM Assignment Policies and Procedures, 90 F.C.C.2d 88, 92 §11 (1982),
on recon., 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 448 (1984); Amendment of Section 3.606 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations, 41 F.C.C. 148, 167 (1952); Pacific Broadcasting of
Missouri LLC, 18 FCC Rcd 2291 (2003); and FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349
U.S. 358,362 (1955)).
17. Joy R. Butler, Recent Development: HDTV Demystified: History, Regulatory
Options, & the Role of Telephone Companies, 6 HARV. J. LAw & TEc 155, n. 50.
18. FCC, Localism Task Force, available at http://www.fcc.gov/localism/ (last visited
Oct. 28,2003).
19. CHARLES H. TILLINGHAST, AMERICAN BROADCAST REGULATION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT-ANOTHER LOOK 61 (2000). See also NBC v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 224-25 (1943) (affirming the FCC's authority to regulate network influence on
local programming and advertising through the chain broadcasting rules and to enforce
the local station's obligation to "be ready, able, and willing to serve the needs of the local
community." Id. at 203.)
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Localism in Charlotte, North Carolina, reinforce this breadth of
interpretation:2°
Every community has local needs, local elections, local news, local
talent, and local culture. While localism reflects a commitment to
local news and public affairs programming, it also means much
more. It means providing opportunities for local self-expression
and reaching out to, developing and promoting local talent. It
means making programming decisions to serve local needs. It
means allocating resources to address the needs of the community.
Localism's many virtues are hard to capture, but may get easier to
ignore as companies consolidate.2'
Are stations adding to the civic dialogue? Are they adhering to
community standards, or are they airing excessive amounts of
indecent and excessively violent programming? Are they
encouraging local talents and local genius? Are they reaching out to
minority groups within the community?e i
Traditionally, it was assumed that local owners were most
capable of meeting these broad obligations, which is why, historically,
geographically local owners were favored over remote owners. 3 So,
when the June 2003 Report and Order on media ownership ("2003
Order") raised the cap on the number of local free TV stations that
networks could own, Commissioner Adelstein lamented the sacrifice
of localism.24 A local constituent who participated in the Charlotte
hearing expressed a similar view: "any conversation about localism
20. The Localism Task Force will hold a total of six public hearings to solicit input
from consumers, industry, civic organizations and others to consider how broadcasters are
meeting local needs. FCC, Localism Task Force, supra note 18.
21. Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, dissenting, 2003 Order, supra
note 12, at 880 [hereinafter Adelstein Dissent].
22. FCC, Transcript of Field Hearing Broadcast Localism Hearing, Charlotte, North
Carolina (Oct. 22, 2003) available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs~public/attachmatch/
DOC-242307Al.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Charlotte Localism Hearing]
23. TILLINGHAST, supra note 19, at 77.
24. Adelstein Dissent, supra note 21 ("The majority has not adequately justified the
selection of a new 45% cap. It relies exclusively on evidence showing that the largest
network station owners possess no greater bargaining power, measured by prime time
preemptions, than the smallest network station. This is a thin reed on which to justify a 10-
point increase. Moreover, without access to more data, this conclusion is unconvincing. In
the end, we have yet another tradeoff between efficiencies and public interest goals such
as localism. Guess who wins. The social benefit of locally originated and oriented
programming and program selection to me outweighs the efficiencies of further vertical
integration."). Adelstein may have exaggerated the significance of the increase because
the 10-point increase would result in a network owning five more stations out of
approximately 1400. See The 4% Solution, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2003, available at http:
//online.wsj.com/article (last visited Dec. 19,2003).
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without regard to media ownership is absolutely, avoiding the heart of
this issue and certainly cannot render a sincere solution.
25
Yet the official view of the FCC suggests that ownership may not
rank equally or at all with the other factors of localism. This
skepticism is based on section 202 of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act ("1996 Act"), which requires the FCC to review, every four years,
all of its broadcast ownership rules to determine whether they
continue to be "necessary in the public interest, ' 26 as well as judicial
remands of the FCC's localist rationales for preserving ownership
regulation.27 In announcing the formation of the Localism Task Force,
Michael Powell confirmed his espousal of this skepticism:
Ownership rules have always been, at best, imprecise tools for
achieving policy goals like localism. That is why the FCC has
historically sought more direct ways of promoting localism in
broadcasting. These include things such as public interest
obligations, license renewals, and protecting the rights of local
stations to make programming decisions for their communities.
And, in its Notice of Inquiry on Broadcast Localism, the FCC
furthers this view that ownership regulation should be abandoned as
the means for promoting localism:
This Notice of Inquiry ... will address behavioral rules that
promote localism, regardless of identity of ownership. As stated by
Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain at a hearing
last summer on localism and the public interest: "This Committee
has spent considerable time examining and debating the role of
ownership limitations to achieve public interest goals.... Today's
hearing is to consider whether Congress should use other means to
achieve these goals, such as putting 'teeth' in the public interest
standard.
29
25. Panelist Tift Merritt, Charlotte Localism Hearing, supra note 22, at 38.
26. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
[hereinafter 1996 Act], §202(h), 47 U.S.C. §161 (2004).
27. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Federal Communication Commission [hereinafter
Fox 1], 280 F.3d 1027, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the following reasons that the
FCC provided in 1998 to justify retaining the National Television Ownership Rule
("NTSO rule") were insufficient: "to (1) observe the effects of recent changes in the rules
governing local ownership of television stations; (2) observe the effects of the national
ownership cap having been raised to 35%; and (3) preserve the power of local affiliates to
bargain with their networks in order to promote diversity of programming.").
28. FCC, Localism Task Force, available at http://www.fcc.gov/localism/ (last visited
Aug. 18, 2004).
29. 2004 NOI, supra note 15 § 5, citing Statement of Hon. John McCain, Chairman,
U.S. Senate Commerce Committee, available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfm?id=874&wit id=2447 (emphasis added) (last visited Aug. 18, 2004).
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Coincident with ownership concerns being dropped from the
official content of localism, localism's weighting in the public interest
may be declining relative to diversity and competition. The FCC's
Strategic Plan for 2003-2008'0 ("Strategic Plan") does not include
localism in its list of objectives,31 which is striking given the
fundamental role attributed to localism since the inception of
communications regulation.32
However, ownership's irrelevance to localism and localism's
relative decline in importance are inconsistent with the public's views.
Michael Powell pointed out that in the proceedings leading up to the
2003 Order, "and in the months that followed. . . we heard the voice
of public concern about the media loud and clear. Localism is at the
core of these concerns," Powell said, "and we are going to tackle it
head on. 33 In the summary of public comments section of the FCC
Strategic Plan, 61% of the comments focused on some aspect of the
FCC's role in protecting the public interest. Within this subset, one of
the primary focal points was the "need to ensure diversity by
requiring local control of media." 4 With this in mind, the 2003 Order
"strongly reaffirmed [the FCC's] goal of promoting localism through
limits on ownership of broadcast outlets." 35 It is therefore difficult to
30. See FCC, Strategic Plan FY 2003-FY 2008 [hereinafter Strategic Plan], available at
http://www.fcc.gov/omd/strategicplan/strategicplan2003-2008.pdf (last visited Aug. 18,
2004)
31. Id. (listing the priorities as follows: "Enforce compliance with rules that foster
competition and diversity;... Build and continually update a solid factual and analytic
foundation for-media ownership regulation.").
32 See 2004 NOI, supra note 15, § 1 ("[T]he concept of localism was part and parcel
of broadcast regulation virtually from its inception.").
33. News Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Launches "Localism in Broadcasting
Initiative" (August 20, 2003) available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/
attachmatch/DOC-238057Al.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2004)).
34. Strategic Plan, supra note 30, at 26.
35. News Release, FCC, FCC Sets Limits on Media Concentration (June 2, 2003)
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-publiclattachmatch/DOC-235047Al.doc (last
visited Aug. 18, 2004) ("[T]he FCC has sought to promote localism to the greatest extent
possible through its broadcast ownership limits that are aligned with stations' incentives to
serve the needs and interests of their local communities . . . To analyze localism in
broadcasting markets, the FCC relied on two measures: local stations' selection of
programming that is responsive to local needs and interests, and local news quantity and
quality. Program selection is an important function of broadcast television licensees and
the record contains data on how different types of station owners perform. A second
measure of localism is the quantity and quality of local news and public affairs
programming by different types of television station owners. This data helped the FCC
assess which ownership structures will ensure the strongest local focus by station owners to
the needs of their communities.").
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determine the official view on localism and ownership rules'
relevance to tackling the issue of localism-"ambivalence" is
probably the best word here. Stepping back for a moment, it is
necessary to consider the elements of localism within the broader
context of the debate on media ownership. The debate grew into
controversy covered by the popular media when the FCC attempted
to liberalize ownership rules in June 2003. I turn now to examine this
controversy in detail.
III. The American Media Ownership Debate
Twelve voices were shouting in anger, and they were all alike. No
question, now, what had happened to the faces of the pigs. The
creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from man to pig, and
from pig to man again; but already it was impossible to say which
was which.36
In the late summer of 2003, newspapers, cable news shows and
TV broadcasts reported that Capitol Hill and a federal appeals court
in Philadelphia had blocked the FCC's deregulation of five of six
media ownership rules37 through its 2003 Order.38 The voices of the
media were reporting on the current and future status of the voices of
the media. Within this content about content, the distinction between
the story and the storyteller (or, in Orwellian terms, pig and man) fell
away. Behind this power of the media to report on its own regulation
lies another clich6 that "media power is political power."39 The media
reports on politicians and delivers political messages, prompting
politicians to trade favorable regulatory treatment for endorsement,
access or favorable presentation8 We shall keep this in mind.
36. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 157 (50th Anniversary ed., Harcourt Brace &
Company 1995) (1946). See also infra notes 308, 309 and accompanying text.
37. Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal Communications Commission No. 03-3388,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18390 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003) (imposing stay and identifying the
issues as 1. local television ownership, 2. local radio ownership, 3. newspaper/broadcast
cross-ownership, 4. radio/television cross-ownership, 5. national television ownership and
6. the dual network rule).
38. 2003 Order, supra note 12, at §74.
39. BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY 25 (2004).
40. Id. at 204 (describing a 1969 letter from Richard E. Berlin, CEO of Hearst
Corporation, to Richard M. Nixon, urging President Nixon to support the 1970 Newspaper
Preservation Act of 1970, which exempted publishing companies from antitrust laws where
one or more of the companies was failing). As I show later in the paper, public choice
theory suggests the same idea by varying the terms and emphases.
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1. The 2003 Order and 2004 Third Circuit Review
The first chapter of this controversy began with the requirement
that the FCC review and justify its ownership rules on a biennial (now
quadrennial) basis set out in §202(h) of the 1996 Act.4 ' The next
chapter started with the FCC's first review of media ownership rules
and finished with Fox I and Sinclair remanding and vacating various
aspects of the 1998 FCC Report and Order.42 Fox I and Sinclair
interpreted the §202(h) review requirement as carrying "with it a
presumption in favor of repealing or modifying the ownership
rules."43 On this view, ownership rules should have been repealed in
1998 unless they were justifiable as necessary for the public interest.
Fox I held that that the FCC justifications for retaining two ownership
rules were insufficient," while Sinclair took issue with the FCC's
exclusion of non-broadcast media from the eight voices exception to
the local television ownership rule.4 My focus is on the third chapter,
opening in June 2003 when the FCC responds to the Fox I and
Sinclair commands to remove or justify ownership regulation on the
basis of marketplace conditions46 and reports on its second §202(h)
41. 1996 Act, supra note 26, §202(h). Originally, §202(h) required the FCC to review
"its rules adopted pursuant to this section and all of its ownership rules biennially as part
of its regulatory reform review under section 11 of the Communications Act of 1934 and
shall determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as the result
of competition. The Commission shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be
no longer in the public interest." In January 2004, Congress changed the review
requirement from a biennial to a quadrennial basis. See Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, §629, 118 Stat. 3, 99 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Appropriations
Act].
42. FCC, 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,058 (May 26,2000).
43. Fox I, supra note 27, at 1033; Sinclair Broadcast Group Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission, 284 F.3d 148, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Sinclair].
44. The D.C. Circuit in Fox I concluded that the 1998 decision to retain the National
Television Station Ownership Rule was "arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA"
on the basis that "the Commission has adduced not a single valid reason to believe the
NTSO Rule is necessary in the public interest, either to safeguard competition or to
enhance diversity" (Fox I, supra note 27, at 1043-44). The court found the FCC's
preference to "wait and see" the competition and diversity effects of retaining the rule
contrary to the deregulatory presumption of §202(h) (Fox I, supra note 27, at 1042). With
respect to the FCC's determination that retaining the cable/broadcast cross-ownership rule
was necessary in the public interest, the Fox I court vacated the rule, finding it a "hopeless
cause" whose retention was arbitrary, capricious and contrary to §202(h) (Fox I, supra
note 27, at 1053).
45. Sinclair, supra note 43, at 165.
46. News Release, FCC, FCC Sets Limits on Media Concentration: Unprecedented
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review of ownership rules. The chapter ends in June 2004, when the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals hands down its judicial review of the
2003 Order.
Most of the controversy related to three of the six rules that were
liberalized.47 First, the 2003 Order would liberalize the National
Television Station Ownership Rule ("NTSO rule"), originally
adopted in 1941,4 by increasing the number of free TV stations that
networks could own.49 At the time of the 2003 Order, the NTSO rule
prevented networks from owning any stations that would give them
access to more than 35% of the national audience. The FCC justified
keeping the cap on the basis that it promoted localism "by allowing a
body of network affiliates to negotiate collectively with the broadcast
networks on network programming decisions. ' However, finding
that 35% "did not strike the right balance of promoting localism and
preserving" free TV,51 the FCC increased the cap to 45% through the
2003 Order. A powerful coalition of small broadcasters and advocates
from diverse platforms vocally challenged the 2003 Order's impact on
the NTSO rule. The coalition was bolstered by bipartisan
Congressional threats through appropriations deliberations.52 This
forced negotiations between the White House and Congress and
resulted in the increase being legislatively set at 39% in January
Public Record Results in Enforceable and Balanced Broadcast Ownership Rules (June 2,
2003) available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-235047AI.pdf
(last visited July 14, 2004).
47. The Politics of Big Media, Turning it Off and Media Madness, ECONOMIST, Sept.
13, 2003, at 14, 55 and 56, respectively.
48. The rule prohibits any entity from controlling television stations the audience
reach of which exceeds 39% of television households in the United States. See 47 C.F.R. §
73.3555(d) (2004) ("No license for a commercial television broadcast station shall be
granted, transferred or assigned to any party (including all parties under common control)
if the grant, transfer or assignment of such license would result in such party or any of its
stockholders, partners, members, officers or directors having a cognizable interest in
television stations which have an aggregate national audience reach exceeding [thirty nine
(39) percent].").
49. In response to the D.C. Circuit in Fox I, supra note 27, the FCC decided to
increase the audience cap from 35% to 45%. 2003 Order, supra note 12, at §499. The FCC
did not repeal or modify the 50 percent discount that applies for UHF stations' audiences
when determining the audience reach. 2003 Order, supra note 12, at §500.
50. FCC, News Release of June 2, 2003, supra note 46.
51. Id.
52. The range within the coalition included the National Rifle Association, Code
Pink: Women for Peace and the Conference of Catholic Bishops. See The Politics of Big
Media, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13,2003, at 14.
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2004."3 This number did not really represent liberalization, however,
because it accommodated those networks that had already been given
exemptions to the cap. 4 In addition, Congress immunized the 39%
cap from the §202(h) review requirement,55 effectively freezing the
NTSO rule in its current form and removing it from the FCC's
liberalization workload. This legislative move also made the NTSO
rule a moot point for the Third Circuit's review.-6
The second controversial reform under the 2003 Order was to
replace cross-media ownership bans with a set of cross-media limits
that applied depending on a market's vulnerability to viewpoint
consolidation, derived from an index calculated similarly to the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") used in antitrust. 7 Under the
reform, in small markets (three or fewer full-power TV stations),
newspaper/broadcast and TV/radio combinations are prohibited. In
medium markets (between four and eight TV stations), there can be
common ownership of a newspaper and either (a) one TV station or
50% of the radio stations that may be commonly owned under the
separate local radio rule or (b) up to 100% of the radio stations
allowed under the local radio rule. In large markets (more than eight
TV stations), cross-ownership is unrestricted.
These cross-media limits replaced the Radio-Television Cross-
Ownership rule, which restricted the common ownership of TV and
radio stations, depending on the size of the market.m More
controversially, however, the cross-media limits replaced the
Newspaper Broadcast Cross-Ownership ban ("NBCO rule") on
common ownership of a daily public newspaper and a full-service TV
station in the same local market. 9 The FCC decided to lift the NBCO
53. 2004 Appropriations Act, supra note 41 (amending § 202(c)(1)(B) of the 1996 Act
to increase the NTSO rule cap from 35% to 39%).
54. It was enough to cover CBS's and Fox's share of national audiences, at 38.8% and
37.8%, respectively, both of which had been exempted from the NTSO cap. See The 4%
Solution, supra note 24.
55. 2004 Appropriations Act, supra note 41.
56. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1 at 52.
57. See 1992 U.S. Department of Justice and FIC Joint Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (April 7, 1992) [hereinafter Horizontal
Guidelines] at §1.51(c) (providing that the HHI is calculated by summing the squares of
the individual market shares of all the participants in the market and that an HHi above
1800 will be viewed as illegal according to the guidelines.) The diversity index used in
applying the cross-media limits are discussed in further detail below.
58. 47 C.F.R § 73.3555(c) (2004).
59. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d) (2004). See also Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240 and
73.636 of the Commission Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and
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ban for three reasons that the Third Circuit found sufficient. 60 First,
"the ban is not necessary to promote competition in local markets
because most advertisers do not view newspapers and television
stations as close substitutes." Second, "the ban undermines localism
by preventing efficient combinations that would allow for the
production of high-quality local news." And third, "there is not
enough evidence to conclude that ownership influences viewpoint to
warrant a blanket cross-ownership ban, thus making it unjustifiable
on diversity grounds ... and moreover, the presence of other media
sources-such as the Internet and cable--compensate for the
viewpoint diversity lost to consolidation.,
61
In determining the small, medium and large market categories
and their respective cross-ownership limits, the FCC used a diversity
index to identify market structures at risk to viewpoint consolidation
and consolidation scenarios likely to threaten viewpoint diversity. The
diversity index was calculated using the same sum of market share-
squared formula as HHI. To determine what market shares to square,
the FCC started by assigning a preference multiple to each media
type based on its assessments of consumers' preferred media types for
obtaining local news. This was multiplied by the number of suppliers
within each media type, which, in turn, was squared. Surveys of
consumers' preferred sources of local news showed that 33.8% of
respondents preferred free TV, 20.2% preferred daily newspapers,
8.6% preferred weekly newspapers, 8.4% preferred radio, 2.3%
preferred cable Internet and 10.2% preferred DSL, dial-up or other
Internet connections.
The selection of media types was the first point of controversy
for liberalization proponents: The FCC excluded cable TV as a source
of local news, but the Third Circuit upheld this exclusion because "of
serious doubts as to the extent that cable provided independent local
news." 62 At the same time, the Third Circuit found that the FCC
should have discounted the Internet as a source of local news because
Television Broadcast Stations, 22 F.C.C.2d 306, §5 (1970); Amendment of Sections 73.34,
73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard,
FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975). The Supreme Court
upheld the NBCO rule as an effective means of promoting the diversity norm of the public
interest. See FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 802
(1978).
60. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 60.
61. Id. at 59-60.
62 Id. at 80.
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many Internet sites are merely supply outlets for newspapers, TV
stations and their repackaged content 63 or are the sites of individuals,
government or other organizations that do not serve the intermediary
function of media outlets.64 A second source of controversy was that,
within each media type, the FCC allocated equal market shares to
each supplier regardless of actually significant variations. This meant
that an ABC TV station and the Dutchess Community College
station had the same share within the TV category, amplifying the
role of the college station as a source of diversity significantly beyond
reality. The FCC justified this by saying that actual market share,
which depends on seasonal programming, is too fluid to be the basis
for regulation. The Third Circuit rejected this and reasoned that the
equal weighting approach was "inconsistent with the Commission's
overall approach to its Diversity Index and also makes unrealistic
assumptions about media outlets' contributions to viewpoint diversity
in local markets." ' The Third Circuit also found inconsistency in the
FCC's use of the diversity index to derive its cross-media limits
because "cross-media limits allow some combinations where the
increases in Diversity Index scores were generally higher than for
other combinations that were not allowed."' 6 Not surprisingly, the
diversity index determination and its role in the design of cross-media
limits were remanded to the FCC. However, the Third Circuit did not
question the legitimacy of the index per se, stating that it does not
"object in principle" 67 to the FCC's use of an HHI-type index to
measure diversity.
The third controversial reform under the 2003 Order was to
allow a single firm to own three stations in markets with 18 or more
TV stations and two stations in markets with 17 or fewer TV
stations.6M This revised limit under the Local Television Ownership
rule ("LTO rule") is subject to a ban on any firm owning more than
one station among the four-largest. 69 Prior to the 2003 Order, the
63. Id. at 85.
64. Id. at 87-88. Compare id. with 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 268-271
(Chief Judge Scirica dissenting on this point, arguing that "interactive possibilities on the
Internet ... permit virtually unlimited viewpoint dissemination from a multitude of
independent 'sources."').
65. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 90.
66. Id. at 98.
67. Id. at 73-74.
68. 2003 Order, supra note 12, at §134.
69. Id. at §186.
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LTO rule allowed a single firm to own two stations if one of the
stations was not among the market's four largest and if the market
had at least eight independent full-power TV stations.7° The Third
Circuit dismissed liberalization proponents' assertions that the LTO
rule duplicates antitrust on the basis that the FCC "ensures that
license transfers serve ... diversity, competition and localism, while
the antitrust authorities have a different purpose: ensuring that
merging companies do not raise prices above competitive levels."71 At
the same time, the Third Circuit dismissed liberalization critics'
counters to the FCC's findings that localism would benefit from
"consumer welfare enhancing efficiencies" following consolidation
under a looser LTO rule. There was sufficient evidence showing that
"commonly owned ... stations are more likely to carry local news
than other stations."72 However, the Third Circuit remanded the
FCC's numerical limits under the revised LTO rule because the FCC
derived these limits from an assumption of equal market shares that
disregarded market actualities.7 Here again, the Third Circuit
dismissed the argument that actual market shares are too fluid to
serve as a regulatory basis and found "the modified rule similarly
unreasonable in allowing levels of concentration to exceed further
[the FCC's] own benchmark for competition (1800)-a glaring
inconsistency between rationale and result."74
A final point of controversy that arises from the Third Circuit's
review is its take on the deregulatory presumption that Fox I and
Sinclair read into the 1996 Act's §202(h) requirement for ownership
rule review:
We do not accept that the "repeal or modify in the public interest"
instruction must . . .operate only as a one-way ratchet, i.e., the
Commission can use the review process only to eliminate then-
extant regulations. For starters, this ignores both "modify" and the
requirement that the Commission act "in the public interest." What
70. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(b) (2004).
71. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 107.
72 Id. at 112, citing Bruce M. Owen et al., Effect of Common Ownership or
Operation on Television News Carriage, Quantity and Quality, in Comments of Fox
Entertainment Group, Inc. et al., MB Docket 02-277 (Jan. 2., 2003).
73. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 120-21 (citing 2003 Order, supra note
12, at §§192-93 and explaining that the FCC determined the limits with the aim of having
six equal-sized competitors in most markets, because an HI score of a six-competitor
market (1667 (6 x (100 / 6)2) would be the 1800 threshold associated with highly
concentrated markets. Triopolies in markets with 18 or more stations and duopolies in
markets of 17 or fewer stations best realized this aim).
74. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 125-26.
2005]
if the Commission reasonably determines that the public interest
calls for a more stringent regulation? Did Congress strip it of the
power to implement that determination? The obvious answer is no,
and it will continue to be so absent clear congressional direction
otherwise ... The Commission is free to regulate or deregulate as
long as its regulations are in the public interest and are supported
by a reasoned analysis.
76
The Third Circuit's decision thereby removes a strong legal
authority for liberalization proponents and opens up opportunities for
liberalization critics to propose new regulatory interventions at
subsequent quadrennial reviews.
Having summarized the 2003 Order and its review by the Third
Circuit, how do the three reforms discussed above relate to localism?
Because they are both concerned with viewpoint diversity and
consolidation, the NBCO and LTO rules relate more to diversity than
to localism, even though the diversity in question is at the local level.
In the case of both rules, the FCC and the Third Circuit found that
localism benefited from their removal or relaxation. Evidence showed
that greater common ownership under the revised LTO rule would
provide the "ability and incentive" to offer an "amount and quality of
local news and public affairs programming" that would be
"responsive to the needs and interests" of local communities. 7
Similarly, evidence showed that newspaper-owned television stations
provide almost 50% more local news and public affairs programming
than other stations. 78 Therefore, preserving the NBCO and LTO rules
can hardly be said to promote localism. In sharp contrast, the sole
reason that the FCC provided for retaining the NTSO rule was
localist:
We have concluded that an audience reach cap of 35% is not
necessary to promote diversity or competition in any relevant
market. We are persuaded, however, that a national cap at some
level is needed to promote localism by preserving the balance of
power between networks and affiliates. We found that affiliates'
incentives are more attuned to their local communities than are
those of networks, which seek to assure that the largest audiences
75. Id. at 49-50.
76. Id. at 135.
77. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 111-12; 2003 Order, supra note 12, at
§164; and Owen, et al., supra note 72.
78. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 61. See also 2003 Order, supra note
12, at §344 (citing Thomas C. Spavins et al., The Measurement of Local Television News
and Public Affairs Programs (Media Ownership Working Group ("MOWG") Study No.
7) at 3 (Sept. 2002) for the finding that newspaper-owned television stations "provide
almost 50% more [local news and public affairs programming] than other stations.").
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possible are watching their programming at the same time. We
conclude from the record that preserving a balance of power
between a network and its affiliates promotes localism, and
accordingly, we will continue to restrict the national audience reach
of station owners.
Because the NTSO rule most closely relates to localism, I focus
on the issues raised by this rule over others. However, given the links
among diversity, competition and localism noted above, the other
media ownership rules, their issues and regulatory and judicial
treatment certainly run through the discussion that follows.
2. Introducing Liberalization Proponents and Critics
I suggest above, and argue throughout this article, that the media
ownership debate is characterized unsurprisingly by an irreconcilable
dichotomy between liberalization proponents and critics. This
dichotomy is reinforced by an institutional divide between the
regulatory and marketplace models of realizing the public interest,
which, in turn, is reinforced by political and academic affiliations with
these models. This polar divide is also reflected in the Third Circuit's
review of the 2003 Order where the petitioning positions are referred
to as Citizen Petitioners (liberalization critics) and Deregulatory
Petitioners (liberalization proponents). 8° What does each side have to
say?
Before Congress intervened in the fate of the NTSO rule, and
within a week of the Third Circuit's stay on the 2003 Order, FCC
chairman Michael Powell made his case for liberalizing the NTSO
rule in the Wall Street Journal:
To survive, free TV must improve its competitive position against
pay television and find a way to innovate and offer personalized
television experiences that today's viewers have come to enjoy and
expect. The future of free television is, at best, uncertain and, at
worst, in peril....
[W]e absolutely need to maintain a viable free television service for
the welfare of our citizens. Free broadcast television remains an
important service for those citizens that cannot afford pay
television . . . and continues to play a vital role in informing the
public during national and local emergencies and in serving the
interests of their local communities....
[B]y setting a slightly revised national television ownership limit,
the FCC will help the networks attract and maintain quality
programming, from the World Series and Olympics to the next
79. 2003 Order, supra note 12, at §578.
80. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 10, 12.
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great TV series like "Everybody Loves Raymond" or "The West
Wing."...
If our efforts do not provide free television with the ability to better
compete in today's vibrant media marketplace, we risk losing its
services for the next 50 years. And that's the way it is.
81
Powell touches on a number of the economic, political and
cultural issues at stake in the media ownership controversy. His
reference to "personalized television experiences" alludes to the
rapidly changing nature of consumer demand for TV. Powell argues
that the economics of free TV require consolidation in the face of pay
TV's increasing role. Powell also addresses the political issue of
universal access for those who cannot afford pay television, which is
increasingly dominating the TV market.
A week after Powell's op/ed piece, William Pike, a citizen from
Wellesley, Massachusetts, responded to Powell in a letter to the
editor:
FCC Chairman Michael Powell's Sept. 11 editorial-page piece
"And That's the Way It Is" is right on about the importance of free
TV. But he's wrong about the solution being easing media
ownership rules. TV stations, despite their adamant denials, are
highly political in both subtle and not-so-subtle in their
manipulation of news and programming to further their political
agendas. Increased ownership will only give them increased power
to those ends. Pay TV, Internet and print media are not alternatives
to many who watch the evening news. And that's the way it is.
82
Pike's critique picks up on the universal access point and,
reminding us that media power is political power, .warns of the
increase in political power that would follow from consolidation of
large media companies. The Michael Powell and William Pike
dialogue introduces the gulf between liberalization proponents and
critics on consolidation, the nerve-center of the NTSO rule
controversy. In the Powell/liberalization proponent view,
consolidation will save local free TV stations, while the
Pike/liberalization critic view sees consolidation as a political threat.
Liberalization proponents and critics seize on political, cultural and
economic arguments for advancing either cause that go well beyond
the Powell and Pike debate. I describe these in Part V. below.
While Chairman Powell and Citizen Pike disagree on the merits
and perils of consolidation, they do agree that regulators should save
81. Michael K. Powell, Editorial, And That's the Way it Is, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2003
at A12 (emphasis added).
82. William Pike, Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2003 at A17.
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free TV from extinction. We will see later in the article how some
liberalization proponents go further than Powell and dismiss the
fundamental importance of free TV.83 Cable has clearly eclipsed free
TV as the primary means of video distribution, and satellite, the
Internet, fiber optic networks and other technologies not yet
deployed or known provide increasing alternatives to cable. Thus,
underlying the prominent disagreement on how we can best preserve
free TV are the questions of why and whether we should preserve
free TV. Liberalization proponents who share this view reject
Michael Powell's contention that we must absolutely maintain free
TV. While this distinction between factions of the liberalization
proponent camp is crucial to understanding the debate on media
ownership, it does not dissolve the entrenched dichotomy between
proponents and critics. As alluded to above, Powell does not share
liberalization critics' fundamental assumption that free TV station
licensees are the embodiments of localism. To see how this
assumption evolved, it is helpful to trace the content of localism back
to its origins.
IV. The Content of Localism
This section is retrospective, exploring the sources of localism
and its role in the history of media regulation. Acknowledging the
importance of localism in American regulatory, constitutional and
media history provides insight into the normative impulse for localism
today.
1. The Sources of Localism
Localism has exerted considerable influence in America beyond
the realm of media regulation. This is most evident in other
regulatory arenas such as antitrust and banking. In addition, localism
has a long history as an American political value that is reflected in
the country's constitutional arrangements and history. This suggests
one possible account for localism as stemming from a localist/centrist
balance that ineluctably animates American political decision-
making. As we will see, the flaw with this account is its failure to
83. Powell may be more properly classified as a moderate liberalization proponent
because he does not express the purist abandonment of the regulations altogether. His
assumption that free TV has to be saved for universal access reasons is inconsistent with a
pro-liberalization argument that there are other ways for insuring universal access, such as
a cable, satellite or fiber optic subsidy.
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explain why localism persists in media ownership regulation, while it
has become irrelevant in other regulatory fields.
A. Localism in Other Areas of Economic Regulation
Antitrust regulation was originally motivated by economic and
political concerns, which overlapped with concerns of localism. This
was most obvious following the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act's
amendments to the Clayton Act, which governs the legality of
horizontal mergers. In Brown Shoe, the first case to come before the
Supreme Court after the amendments, Chief Justice Warren
acknowledged "Congress' desire to promote competition through the
protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses" even though
"higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of
fragmented industries and markets."8' The Court persisted in this
approach in Von's Grocery,8' where a merger was invalidated because
"the grocery business was being concentrated into the hands of fewer
and fewer owners [and] the small companies were continually being
absorbed by the larger firms through mergers." ' The facts of Von's
Grocery presented "exactly the threatening trend toward
concentration which Congress wanted to halt."'
. Localism lost its role in challenging industry consolidation as the
analytical priorities of antitrust law shifted from politics to economics.
This shift crystallized with General Dynamics'88 adoption of a
functional approach that deflated the importance of structural
analysis based on concentration ratios. Nowadays, the Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission have
primary authority over reviewing industry consolidation under the
pre-merger notification regime provided for in the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act.89 The principles that guide these antitrust regulators in their
reviews of horizontal mergers, which are set out in the U.S.
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, 199290 ("Horizontal Guidelines"), follow the
84. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
85. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
86. Id. at 273.
87. Id. at 277.
88. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). This was the last
horizontal merger case decided by the Supreme Court.
89. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90
Stat. 1383; 15 U.S.C.A. § 15, 1311-1314.
90. See generally Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 57.
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General Dynamics functional approach. The Horizontal Guidelines
do not mention either localism or the trend to concentration concerns
that ran through Brown Shoe and Von's Grocery. Instead, the
Horizontal Guidelines focus on the potential for anti-competitive
harm through collusion or monopolistic behavior, once concentration
thresholds that relate to sustainable monopoly pricing have been
overcome. This potential is then balanced against the potential for
new entry into the market, for efficiencies to be realized through the
merger and/or for assets to leave the market as a result of one of the
merging party's business failure. Nowhere do the agencies consider
local ownership as an ideal unto itself. Thus, while antitrust law
historically considered localism as an important value, current
antitrust law ignores it.
Antitrust's original, though substantially abandoned, ideal of
promoting small, local ownership of business is also evident in the
U.S. banking regulatory regime. The 1864 National Bank Act
restricted bank expansion through branching prohibitions and
replicated this atomistic model of the industry in the regulatory
regime by diffusing regulatory power among the states and the
federal government.9 Because of the services they provide, banks
were traditionally thought of as distinctively local businesses.
Philadelphia National Bank 2 highlights this by defining the relevant
geographic market in the case very locally. The Court reasoned that
"the factor of inconvenience localizes banking competition as
effectively as high transportation costs in other industries."
93
However, localism's influence in banking regulation flows from
something deeper than the local nature of the banking business,
which is itself disputable. Localism in banking regulation evolved out
of the "ideology of the local bank"' that prompted, and was
reinforced by, the National Bank Act and the unit banking system
that it conceived. The ideology contends that locally owned banks
would provide the financial lifeblood necessary for their local
communities to progress and succeed by re-investing profits in local
endeavors. In contrast, big-city banks with extensive branch networks
would have no incentive to invest in local development and thus
became viewed as "urban leviathans" seeking "only to siphon capital
91. JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, & RICHARD S. CARNELL,
BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 10-14 (Aspen Law & Business 3d ed. 2001).
92. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963)
93. Id. at 358.
94. See MACEY ET AL., supra note 91, at 13.
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and maximize profits." ' Buttressing the ideology of the local bank
was the fear of bigness. Because of the power associated with
controlling financial streams, concentrating banking business within
one institution would be tantamount to concentrating power over that
community. Excessive concentrations of power invite abuses of
power.
As will become obvious throughout this article, these concerns
underlying localism in banking are very similar to those of localism in
media regulation. Banking and the media are both "special"
industries because they provide the infrastructure that facilitates
commerce. Because of their special status, localism dictates that these
sectors should be controlled at the local level. And, because of the
power associated with their special status, media and banking
institutional growth must be curtailed to avoid concentrations of
banking and media power. When comparing localism in banking and
the media, one could argue that the media are even more distinctive
businesses because, unlike banks, the media play crucial political and
cultural roles. That may be, but as we explore the concept of localism
in media ownership regulation, it is important to keep the history and
future of banking localism in mind.
In particular, it is important to note the way that localism has lost
its footing as a pillar of banking regulation, mimicking the decline of
localism in antitrust described above. The Riegle-Neal Act of 1994
lifted restrictions on interstate branching, which, in effect, liberalized
ownership opportunities and prompted a wave of unprecedented
bank consolidation. From 1980 to 1998, approximately 8,000 bank
mergers occurred, involving about $2.4 trillion in assets. Recently,
consolidation in banking has picked up again.9 The deregulation of
bank ownership and the abandonment of localism in antitrust reveal a
pattern of relegating localism to an ancien regime of regulatory
intervention over ownership. Instead, the ownership of banking and
other sectors are determined by market ordering constrained only by
antitrust's restrictions on consolidation that would harm the market's
pricing mechanism. As recent controversy shows, the media sector is
not immune from this trend to market ordering of ownership. But it is
also clear that the media have not followed (or kept up with) this
trend to the same degree-its ownership structures continue to be
95. Id.
96. David Wells, Gary Silverman & James Politi, Banks lead $70bn M&A spree, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 28,2003 at Al.
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governed by a regulatory model most recently affirmed by the Third
Circuit.9' Having sketched localism's influence in other regulatory
arenas, and having noted localism's decline in antitrust and banking,
we are left to wonder whether the persistent scope and breadth of
localism's influence in media ownership regulation can only be
explained by something more fundamental than an American
predilection for locally owned businesses. This is revealed by the
tenets of political theory that were debated, adopted and rejected in
allocating political power in America.
B. Localism as Political Theory
Localism has been characterized as "an important value in the
distribution of governmental control in the United States" that
promotes "political participation and education among the
citizenry. ' 8 But where did this value come from? Carol Rose provides
a useful guide to localism in American constitutional history, arguing
that there is an American tradition of localism with profound
historical well-springs. 9 Rose takes us back to the 1787-88 debate
between the Federalists, with their monarchical, centralized,
cosmopolitan approach, and the Anti-Federalists, with their
oligarchical, particularistic and parochially privileged approach.1°° The
Federalists' constitutional model would consolidate political power
through direct taxation 1° and enlarge markets through "free exchange
that would be guaranteed by the commerce clause," focusing the
country's efforts on economic progress and wealth generation that
would make the nation powerful.'O In contrast, the Anti-Federalists'
position, rooted in the political culture of the "Ancient Constitution,"
"recognized the special and particularized customary privileges of
provinces, guilds, municipalities, families, ecclesiastical groups, nobles
of varying gradations, assemblies of states, and on and on.""
97. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 12.
98. Philip M. Napoli, Access and Fundamental Principles in Communication Policy,
L. REv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 797, 801 (2002).
99. Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti-
Federalism from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modem Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74,
75 (1989).
100. Id. at 82.
101. Id. at 85.
102- Id. at 76 and 87.
103. Id. at 79.
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Thus, the historical moment of the 1787-88 debate mimicked the
"conflicts between centralizing monarchs and longstanding local
privilege" witnessed in the French Revolution and English civil war.I°4
Even the American Revolution "was in some ways just another in a
long line of revolts of provincial privilege against centralizing royalist
pretensions."'0 The Anti-Federalists argued that "a national,
'consolidated' government would necessarily quell liberty, because a
national government would be too large and its representative bodies
too far removed from the people to reflect their multiform mores and
natures. '16 In the media ownership debate, liberalization critics
modify this argument to criticize consolidation of media and
encourage local control of free TV stations. The idea is that an overly
consolidated media enterprise is too large and too far removed from
the local community to reflect local particularities.
Rose's observations have parallels with the media ownership
debate in other respects. Liberalization critics argue that consolidated
ownership will harm localism because the economics of media
production incentivise programming which appeals to broad,
cosmopolitan markets whose demand may have no correlation with
the parochial tastes of a local market. °7 Similarly, as Rose points out,
consolidated governments mean large electoral districts requiring
candidates to be sufficiently wealthy to gain the necessary fame and
publicity for election-"persons quite dissimilar from and
unrepresentative of those for whom they purportedly" speak.1  In
contrast, the idealized citizen that would stand for election under the
particularistic model of anti-federalism was "the yeoman .. . the
respectable, knowledgeable, frugal, and public-spirited individual,
who acts upon deliberation and cooperation with other citizens of
similarly modest means and independence. ' 'c° This idealized anti-
federalist yeoman provides the prototype for an idealized local
broadcast licensee that shares the parochial sensibilities of his/her
104. Id. at 82.
105. Id. at 81.
106. Id. at 84.
107. See infra notes 273, 414-417 and accompanying text (discussing the need to
amortize the costs of media products over the biggest market possible).
108. Rose, supra note 99, at 90.
109. Rose, supra note 99, at 92.
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neighbors and sets the station programming accordingly, while
investing in local talent and projects. "
Rose argues that the Anti-Federalists did not entirely lose in the
eighteenth century and America did not entirely abandon the
particularistic model, as shown in the recurrent influence of localism
in constitutional doctrine."' Rose contends that the lasting influence
of localism stems, in part, from the unique features of local
government, local community identity, and the opportunities for
"voice" and "exit" that are uniquely available to local citizens.11 2 As I
describe in Part V.2., the uniquely local features of "voice" and "exit"
are the bases on which local communities build their idiosyncratic
cultural identities, in contrast with homogenized national identity.
Rose explains that the "voice" and "exit" features of local
communities serve as the checks against corruption and oppression
that may result from local privileges. Voice and exit are thereby
correlates to the checks within state and federal government that are
absent at the local level.
Both voice and exit are facilitated by the media. The media can
supply the means for local voices to be heard, potentially checking
local oppression and corruption and contributing to the idiosyncratic
identity of the local community. As information sources, the local
media are also agents in the positive and negative advertising that
figures in the "regulatory competition" among local communities
promoted through the "exit" option. This can cut both ways. The
media might be more objective in supplying "voice" and facilitating
the information necessary for "exit" if it were owned remotely.
However, liberalization critics assert that "voice" and "exit" functions
110. See infra notes 358-361 and accompanying text (discussing Licensee Goodmon in
Charlotte, North Carolina).
111. See Rose, supra note 99, at 99 ("Lest it be thought that all American government
has been "consolidated" in principle through the operations of the Federalist Constitution,
and that we are simply awaiting the eventual and inevitable demise of local self-rule, we
should recall that our history reflects a tenacious and continuous countercurrent to most
efforts to centralize local functions. Thus, the later nineteenth century's judicial doctrine
of "Dillon's Rule," which held that municipal powers should be read narrowly, was
answered in the early twentieth century by Euclid v. Ambler Realty, which gave back,
under land use auspices, the local authority supposedly taken away by Dillon's restrictive
reading. Similarly, in the 1970s, the mechanisms of the "Quiet Revolution" in land use
controls, supposedly subjecting local decisions to much greater state control, were just as
quietly redominated by local governments. In these and other instances of stubborn local
particularlism, one sees the evolution of a kind of Anti-Federalist praxis, almost invisible
in an intellectual environment of overwhelming Federalist theory.").
112. Id. at 96-98.
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are better served by locally owned media that have better access to,
and perspective on, the local community. I return to this argument
later in the article."3 At this stage, I want to acknowledge the insights
that Rose's conclusions offer in tracing the lineage of regulatory
localism in antitrust, banking and communications back to politically
particularistic aspirations of anti-federalism, which continue to offer a
counter to the cosmopolitan, federalist model of consolidated political
power.
2. Localism as the Foundation of Broadcast Regulation
To round out my retrospective view of localism's normative
impulse, I now turn from the parentage of regulatory localism to
localism's role as a building block of American communications
regulation. In contrast to Europe and Canada, the early regulatory
stance of American radio avoided concentration of media control in
the state by refusing to give prominence and privilege to a state-
funded public broadcaster. This aversion to state control of media was
reinforced by diffusing regulatory authority among several
bureaucracies, in a spirit similar to banking's diffused regulatory
regime. At the same time, incumbent media suppliers could not enter
the emerging medium of broadcasting, which reflected an American
tendency to contain dominant media suppliers within their
technological categories to promote inter-modal competition:
The Post Office lost its bid to control the telegraph in 1846,
Western Union abandoned the telephone in 1879, and AT&T
withdrew from broadcasting in 1926. In 1913, the federal
government had used antitrust prosecution to separate control of
the telegraph and telephone networks; the year after AT&T sold its
broadcast interests, the 1927 Radio Act barred telegraph and
telephone companies from holding radio licenses if the purpose or
effect would be to "substantially lessen competition or to restrain
commerce." In short, the United States had a checks-and-balances
paradigm for communications just as it did for government itself.!
14
This preference for diffused media control worked in conjunction
with a regulatory stance that favored local stations over national
network entities, establishing the maxim that localism formed the
foundation of American communications regulation."5 This was most
113. See infra notes 361-363 and accompanying text.
114. STARR, supra note 2, at 345-46.
115. ROBERT BRiTr HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM 194-95
(1989).
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evident in initial decisions on how spectrum would be allocated, the
chain broadcasting rules and the cable/DBS must-carry regime.
In deciding between a locally driven versus a nationally driven
model, the initial deliberations on spectrum allocation looked similar
to the Federalist/Anti-Federalist debate on constitutional powers.
Regulators had to choose between a nationally oriented, centralized
source of supply that had clear-channel stations with signals strong
enough to reach remote listeners versus a locally oriented model with
several moderate or low power stations dispersed regionally and
locally."6 In 1927, the Federal Radio Commission ("FRC") rejected
the national model, disregarding an expert committee's
recommendations and lending support to Rose's argument that anti-
federalist localism survived the 18th century. The expert committee
had suggested a split of 50 clear-channel stations, 90 regional stations
and 100 local stations. Instead, the FRC allocated spectrum to only 40
clear-channel stations, which freed up spectrum for more local
stations. 117 Combined with the Communications Act of 1934 ("1934
Act"), this cast localism as the foundation of broadcasting regulation,
a role referred to as recently as the FCC's 2003 Order:
In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress directed the
Commission to "make such distribution of licenses, frequencies,
hours of operation, and power among the several States and
communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable
distribution of radio service to each of the same." In the earliest
government regulation of radio, the Commission embraced
localism. In the Federal Radio Commission's 1927 Report to
Congress, it wrote: "The Commission found it possible to reassign
the allocated stations to frequencies which would serve as many
communities as possible to ensure those communities had at least
one station that would serve as a basis for the development of good
broadcasting to all sections of the country ...... 118
After the localist allocation of spectrum in 1927, the FCC
naturally adopted a localist gloss on the 1934 Act's §307(b). However,
Christopher Yoo has convincingly disputed this gloss. There is no
reference to "local" or "localism" in §307(b)" 9 and the section could
116. STARR, supra note 2, at 349-50. See generally id., for the historical description in
the first half of this paragraph.
117. Id. at 350-51.
118. 2003 Order, supra note 12, at §74.
119. Christopher Yoo, On Television Regulation: The Role of Politics and Policy in
Television Regulation [hereinafter Yoo, Response to Hazlett], 53 EMORY L.J. 255, 264
(2004). See also Communications Act of 1934, §307(b), 47 U.S.C. §307(b) (2004) ("In
considering applications for licenses, and modifications and renewals thereof, when and
insofar as there is demand for the same, the Commission shall make such distribution of
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therefore be interpreted as requiring that each part of the country
receive "an equitable distribution of service," that is national or local
in content and not "that each part of the country receive
programming originating in or tailored to the interests of each local
community.'' As I describe below, 21 this lays the groundwork for the
public choice account of localism provided by Yoo and Thomas
Hazlett.
After the spectrum allocation decision and the localist
interpretation of the 1934 Act founded a particularistic broadcasting
framework on a licensing scheme favoring local owners,l 22 the next
development for localism was the Report on Chain Broadcasting
issued in 19 4 1 .'23 With increasing network power, national
cosmopolitanism was beginning to eclipse FCC-favored local
particularism:
During the 1930s, the networks extended their reach throughout
the country. The NBC-Red, NBC-Blue, and CBS networks grew
from 21 percent to 38 percent of all stations, but these numbers
understate the true picture. NBC and CBS had nearly all of the
high-powered stations, accounting for more than 85 percent of the
nation's nighttime wattage. In 1934, independent broadcasters
created a fourth national network, the Mutual Broadcasting
System, which grew to include a large number of mostly low-power
stations, lagging far behind the leaders in total wattage and
audience share. Partly in response to Mutual, NBC and CBS
tightened their control of affiliated stations, requiring them to sign
five-year (instead of one-year) affiliation contracts that excluded
the use of programming from any other network. 124
The FCC interpreted this shift in power to networks as upsetting
a delicate balance between "local self-expression, whereby matters of
local interest and benefit are brought to the communities served by
broadcast stations" and "access to events of national or regional
interest and to programs of a type which cannot be originated by local
licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and of power among the several States and
communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to
each of the same.").
120. Yoo, Response to Hazlett, supra note 119, at 264.
121. See infra, Part IV.4.
122. TILLINGHAST, supra note 19, at 77 (asserting that the FCC implemented localism
"by favoring license applicants who were familiar with, or residents of, the local service
area and who were knowledgeable about and would cover locally important problems.").
123. FCC, Report on Chain Broadcasting [hereinafter Report on Chain Broadcasting],
Commission Order No. 37, Docket No. 5060 (May 1941).
124. STARR, supra note 2, at 367-68.
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communities. ' ' To redress the imbalance, the chain broadcasting
rules quarantined network power by first limiting network
involvement in programming through affiliation agreements. The new
rules limited the networks' abilities to "preempt prime time" and to
ban "restrictions on affiliates' rights to accept programming from
other networks."' ' Second, the rules limited the vertical integration of
networks with local stations by preventing networks from owning
more than one station in any market and from owning stations in
markets with so few stations that competition would be substantially
restrained.lr This was the earliest incarnation of the NTSO rule.
From a regulatory point of view, a chief concern with a shift in
programming power from licensees to networks was that FCC
jurisdiction was (and is) limited to the licensee and does not apply to
networks.'9 The FCC therefore had to curtail network power to
preserve its regulatory influence. Newton Minow, the chairman of the
Kennedy administration's FCC, offered a less cynical motivation for
the rules, asserting that they gave "radio and network affiliates
greater discretion in their local program schedules, . .. foster[ing]
more local service and mak[ing] American broadcasting more
competitive."' ' With local control, there would be more locally
produced content, 3 resolving the FCC's concerns that existing
"networks enjoyed so much power over stations that they were not
only blocking new networks from developing but also preventing
stations from serving the interests of their local communities. 131
The most striking consequence of the rules was NBC's sale of its
less profitable Blue network to the new American Broadcasting
Company, 32 prompted by the rules' prohibition on licensees to
contract with any network organization that maintains more than one
125. Report on Chain Broadcasting, supra note 123, at 4.
126. TILLINGHAST, supra note 19, at 61. See also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943).
127. Report on Chain Broadcasting, supra note 123, at 68-69. See also STARR, supra
note 2, at 380-81 and Christopher Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the
New Economy [hereinafter Yoo, Vertical Integration], 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 184 (2002)
(describing the effect of the Report on Chain Broadcasting on vertical integration).
128. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2004).
129. TILLINGHAST, supra note 19, at 74 (citing NEWTON INOW AND CRAIG L.
LEMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND 88 (1995)).
130. Report on Chain Broadcasting, supra note 123, at 63,65.
131. STARR, supra note 2, at 381.
132. Id. at 381.
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network. 33  The FCC argued that this would restore "fair
competition."'" The theme of competition certainly ran through the
Report on Chain Broadcasting. Yet, by shackling the networks'
ability to control, and vertically integrate with, local stations, the
Report was clearly also motivated by the normative -impulse of
localism. In NBC v. United States, 35 the Supreme Court affirmed the
chain broadcasting orders and the FCC's view that "local program
service is a vital part of community life" and "a station should be
ready, able, and willing to serve the needs of the local community.
'16
Localism was a counter-balance to the growth of the networks that
the FCC nonetheless recognized as "essential" to the "profitable
operation of stations." The FCC wanted to "increase competition
among networks and to give local stations some independence-in
short, to deny NBC and CBS the nearly complete dominion over
radio they had previously enjoyed." Thus, localism offered the means
to extend "the long-standing American checks-and-balances model of
democratic communications,"1 37 promoting its regulatory siblings,
competition and diversity.
However, historians and critics have downplayed the rules'
localist impact by "noting, for example, that the proportion of radio
stations with network affiliations rose to 95 percent by 1945."'
38
Robert Britt Horwitz follows this interpretive vein, suggesting that
localism merely veiled "the actual practices and consequences of a
commercially organized, national system of network broadcasting.' '3 9
Horwitz dismisses the idealism of a checks-and-balances approach
that coupled localism with the centralized cosmopolitanism of the
network system, arguing that "the combination of the Commission's
conservatism and its commitment to a chimeric localism meant that
many of its well-intentioned policies either had little effect on the
133. Report on Chain Broadcasting, supra note 123, at 72.
134. Id. ("With two out of the four major networks managed by one organization, a
station which affiliates with that organization thereby contributes to the continuance of
the present noncompetitive situation in the network-station market. The reestablishment
of fair competition in this market is contingent upon ending the abuses inherent in dual
network operation; our regulation is a necessary and proper means of reestablishing that
fair competition.").
135. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190.
136. Id. at 203 (citing Report on Chain Broadcasting, supra note 123, at 65).
137. STARR, supra note 2, at 381.
13& Id.
139. HORWITZ, supra note 115, at 194.
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industry, or reinforced the power of the major broadcast players and
the services they provided."'
Localism's qualified role in early communications regulation may
also have been because the localism and diversity norms evolved
through communications regulation in a way that made these public
interest siblings look like identical twins. The diversity norm was first
manifested in the 1953 multiple ownership restrictions limiting
common ownership to seven AM, seven FM and seven TV stations.
This so-called "rule of sevens" was upheld by the Supreme Court. 4'
And, in a later decision,142 the Court found that rules barring cross-
ownership of newspaper and broadcast entities did not offend the
First Amendment because they "enhance[d] the diversity of
information" and were "a reasonable means of promoting the public
interest in diversified mass communications,"'1 43 thus hearkening back
to the seminal Associated Press assumption.' 44
The seemingly infallible logic behind these regulations equated
diversity of ownership with diversity of voices and diversity of
programming.1 45 This followed from the idea that ownership meant
control over the voice: "ownership carries with it the power to select,
to edit, and to choose the methods, manner and emphasis of
presentation.""' In espousing this view, the FCC and the courts
engendered an assumption that ownership mattered to content and
service and that an array of various owners would imply a
commensurate variety of voices. This link between ownership and
140. Id.
141. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
142. F.C.C. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 802 (1978).
143. Id. at 801-02.
144. Id. at 795 (citing Assoc. Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
145. See TILLINGHAST, supra note 19, at 77. ("[T]he Commission believed that
programming diversification was necessary to maximize public service. It also believed
that the greater the number of independent licensee broadcasters, the greater the chances
for achieving the desired diversity; the more concentrated ownership of stations, the
poorer such chances. It therefore adopted rules restricting common ownership of
broadcast stations, and of broadcast stations in combination with other media forms.").
146. See Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240 and 73.636 of Commission's Rules
Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations,
Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1050 (1975); Amendment of Sections 73.35,
73.240 and 73.636 of Commission Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM,
and Television Broadcast Stations, First Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 306, 307 (1970);
F.C.C. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 785; and Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission et al., 497 U.S. at 571 n. 16
(1990).
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content/service applied equally to the principle of localism. In the
same way that diversity of ownership led to diverse voices, local
control of the license would promote the "local voice." Diversity and
localism were thus a combined force in the regulation of media
ownership. The chain broadcasting rules' promotion of localism was
complemented by the diversity norm in the rule of sevens and cross-
ownership rule. Diverse ownership meant less consolidation, which
meant more opportunity for local control, and vice versa.
Following the chain broadcasting rules and diversity-motivated
ownership rules, the next big boost for localist regulation came with
the growth of new technologies. As cable broadcasting grew,
Congress, regulators and the courts perceived a threat to the
economic viability of local free TV stations 47 and therefore required
cable operators to carry all full-power television stations for free.'
4
The regime was copied and applied to satellite with equal vigor.
1 49
These rules were justified by a need to preserve free TV because of its
unique role in advancing localism, a controversial notion that I discuss
in Part V.3.B.
Localism plays a very prominent role in American
communications regulation when we juxtapose the American milieu
against other jurisdictions. Unlike Europe, where "state and nation-
building" drove media policy, and often led "to state monopolies or
147. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. Federal Communications
Commission, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (affirming the FCC's denial of a license on the
basis that importing distant signals would put the local broadcast station out of business,
which would hurt those were unwilling or unable to pay for cable). See also Turner
Broadcasting System v. Federal Communications Commission, 520 U.S. 180, 192 (1997),
citing H.R. Rep. No. 102-628, p.51 (1992) (House Report) for the proposition that the
absence of must-carry "will result in a weakening of the over-the-air television industry
and a reduction in competition").
148. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, §§614 and
615,47 U.S.C. §§ 534,535 (1994).
149. Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 [hereinafter SHVIA], Pub. L.
No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-523. Cf Satellite Broadcasting & Communications
Association v. Federal Communications Commission, 146 F. Supp. 2d 803, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9636 (E.D. Va. 2001) (deciding that the carry-one, carry-all provision of SHVIA
does not violate satellite providers' constitutional rights), affd 275 F.3d 337 (4"' Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002). But see The Satellite Broadcast Communications
Association and Echostar, Brief of Petitioners, On Petition in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for Review from the Federal Communications Commission
(Nos. 01-1151, 01-1271, 01-1272), available at http://www.sbca.com/PublicAffairsdocs/
mustcarryCircuitCourtBrief.pdf (last visited Aug.19, 2004)) (arguing that the "carry one,
carry all" provision in SHVIA supplanted "the editorial prerogatives of satellite carriers in
order to favor one particular kind of broadcast station-small, typically independent local
stations that would not otherwise merit satellite carriage as a matter of viewer demand.").
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other direct state involvement,"15° the FCC and the judiciary were
preoccupied with localism, to insure a decentralized media market
and check the developing network system.15 Like Europe, Canada
also pursued a nationalist media policy, even though it has always had
a lot in common with the United States: Both countries are federal
states with geographically vast and multicultural societies and similar
legal traditions. In comparing the American system with other
jurisdictions, there is an obvious caveat. The United States is the
undisputed media superpower, and, to some extent, many regulatory
regimes, including Canada's, have been constructed in reaction
thereto. But this is irrelevant to the important features that American
localism and Canadian nationalism share. The alleged aim of each
norm is to promote a particular community. 1 12 They also share the
common effect of protectionism. The question then becomes one of
identifying the impulse for this protectionism-is it a legitimate way
of promoting local/national content, a way to preserve an entrenched,
mutually beneficial coalition of broadcasters and regulators, or a
blunt way of imposing a territorial commonality on those who control
the media and the territorial parameters of communities that we hope
to develop through the media?
3. American Localism and Canadian Nationalism
While the localist "image of the broadcaster in the mythic haze of
the small-town Jeffersonian public sphere" '53  drove spectrum
150. STARR, supra note 2, at 389.
151. Id. at 388-391 (describing the unique American approach to nation-building in
communications through a private, commercially driven, de-centralized structure that
allowed concentration of ownership within any mode of communications, with
"intermodal" competition as a check). But see PETER S. GRANT & CHRIS WOOD,
BLOCKBUSTERS AND TRADE WARS, POPULAR CULTURE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 278
(2004)) (pointing out that there has been convergence in the last half of the 20"' century
among European and American perspectives on media ownership concentration and
citing the 1989 Television without Frontiers directive, Article 5, which requires "member
states to "ensure, where practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve
at least 10 percent of their transmission time, excluding the time appointed to news, sports
events, games, advertising, teletext services and teleshopping, or alternately at the
discretion of the Member State, at least 10 percent of their programming budget, for
European works created by producers who are independent of broadcasters.").
152. Featherstone, supra note 8, at 52 ("Could a nation be considered a local
community? If we examine the origins of the term, it refers not only to the modem nation-
state, but also draws on the meaning of "natio," a local community, a domicile family
condition of belonging.").
153. HORWITZ, supra note 115, at 194. See also supra notes 109 and 110 and
accompanying text (discussing the origins of the mythic ideal of the local licensee).
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allocation and restrictions on network growth in the United States,
Canada embarked on a mission to a build a "national consciousness"
through its communications regime.'-" At first, Conservative Prime
Minister R.B. Bennett established a federal commission to both
regulate and operate a broadcaster that produced and distributed
national programming to already existing private stations. "Four
years later, a Liberal government established the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation ("CBC"), modeled after the BBC in that it
received greater autonomy and more ample funding than the earlier
commission."1 5  Taking advantage of the already established private
stations across the country, CBC used affiliation agreements to
"rapidly extend CBC coverage across the nation."'1 56 Soon, the CBC
had a public national network of its own high-power stations, coupled
with affiliations with the majority of low-powered private stations.
157
The rationale behind the nationalist orientation of Canadian
communications regulation is widely known (if not widely accepted)
but merits repeating:
Before 1932, Canadian radio developed along American lines as a
private industry, except that stations in Canada were typically
smaller and weaker enterprises than their American counterparts.
Radio ownership in Canada ran at about half the rate in the United
States, partly because broadcasters outside of Toronto had only
low-power transmitters, putting many Canadians, especially in
sparsely populated areas, beyond the range of any of the country's
stations. In the more densely populated areas, generally close to the
United States, listeners tended to tune in American stations
because of Canadian broadcasters' weak signals, limited schedules,
and relatively unexciting programs.158
The Canadian concept of broadcasting as a means for national
integration and edification was certainly influenced by a similar
approach in Great Britain,15 9 but the unique geographic positioning of
154. Gordon Fearn, The Role of Communications Policy in Modem Culture, in
REFLECTIONS ON CULTURAL POLICY, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 122 (Evan
Alderson, Robin Blaser, and Harold Coward, eds., 1993) (explaining the early
development of communications policy in Canada, including the formation of The
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation ("CBC"), which was created by the 1936 Canadian
Broadcasting Act).
155. STARR, supra note 2, at 361.
156. Feam, supra note 154.
157. STARR, supra note 2, at 361.
15& Id.
159. Id. at 340-41 (describing the BBC's focus on national programming produced in
London and the conception of the BBC "as a force for integrating the nation and elevating
its cultural standards").
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Canada's population to the burgeoning American media market
stoked the fires of the nationalist agenda.
This found expression in legislation inspired by a need for
"Canadian control of broadcasting from Canadian sources, free from
foreign interference or influence." 6° Canadian control would allow
broadcasting to become "the agency by which national consciousness
may be fostered and sustained and national unity still further
strengthened.', 161 As I mention above, "local" and "localist" priorities
are not clearly evident in the American Communications Act. 62 In
contrast, nationalism permeates Canadian communications
legislation. The Canadian Telecommunications Act states that
"telecommunications performs an essential role in the maintenance of
Canada's identity and sovereignty and that the Canadian
telecommunications policy has as its objectives . . . to promote the
ownership and control of Canadian carriers by Canadians."' 63 At the
same time, the Broadcasting Act states that "[i]t is hereby declared as
the broadcasting policy for Canada" that "the Canadian broadcasting
system shall be effectively owned and controlled by Canadians."'
6'
Canada is not unique in regulating foreign ownership of
communications firms. As Peter Grant and Chris Wood observe,
"most countries in the world insist that their free-to-air radio and TV
stations be owned and controlled by their own citizens."' 6' Even the
United States, under section 310 of the Communications Act,'6
regulates foreign ownership of communications firms. However, with
exceptions ostensibly attributed to national security concerns, 67 this
160. Fearn, supra note 154 (quoting Prime Minister R.B. Bennett in Parliament in
1932).
161. Id.
162. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
163. Telecommunications Act [hereinafter Canada's Telecommunications Act], S.C.,
ch. 38, § 7 (1993) (Can.). Cf. id. § 16(3)(b) (prohibiting a foreign investor from owning
more than 20% of a telecommunications common carrier).
164. Broadcasting Act, R.S.C., ch. B-9.01, § 3(1)(a) (1991).
165. GRANT & WOOD, supra note 151, at 237.
166. 47 U.S.C. § 310 (2004) (prohibiting foreign investors from owning more than 20%
of an American radio licensee).
167. See 2001 Patriot Act, Pub. L. 10756, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 382-84 (providing broad
scope for monitoring communications in the interest of national security, which may be
perceived as hard to enforce against foreign-owned carriers). Cf. Hudson Janisch,
Telecommunications in Turmoil: New Legal, Regulatory and Policy Challenges, 37 U.
BRITISH COLUMBIA L. REv. 1, 23-25 (2004) (describing how, even before September 11,
the FCC was unwilling to agree to foreign investment by NT and Deutsche Telekom
until the FBI was comfortable with the security impact; how Hutchison Whampoa's
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foreign ownership cap is "more a matter of form than substance, since
indirect ownership of a radio licensee-that is, ownership through
one or more US companies-is unlimited. In this manner, a foreign
company would, in fact, be able to own up to 100% of any US
supplier of basic telecommunications services. ' 6' In comparison with
Canada's legislative and regulatory emphasis, foreign ownership is
not as prominent an issue in American media regulation. The
nationalist ownership norm is so predominant in Canada that it is the
only OECD nation with foreign ownership restrictions on cable
distribution companies.' 69
Because of the hegemonic role of nationalism, localism has not
played the prominent role in Canadian media ownership debates that
it has in the United States. First, the nationalist influence of the
powerful CBC infrastructure defied the principle of localism. Second,
even for the private stations not affiliated with the CBC, Canada has
no codified ownership regulations comparable to the NTSO rule or
the other rules at issue in the 2003 Order. The only ownership rules in
Canada are the nationalist foreign ownership restrictions described
above. According to some American observers, such as Cheryl
Leanza and Harold Feld, the absence of formal ownership regulations
makes Canada an example of what not to do:
Examples of other Western democracies that do not have
ownership limitations provide object lessons of the danger of
concentrated ownership to democratic discourse. In Canada, for
example, CanWest, which owns more than fourteen metropolitan
daily newspapers, 120 community newspapers, sixteen television
stations, seven networks, and an Internet news portal, ordered all
investment in Global Crossing was blocked by concerns that Global Crossing lines could
become vulnerable to tapping by Chinese government and business; and how such security
concerns could be used as "a smokescreen for protectionism.").
16& MARK CLOUGH, TRADE & TELECOMMUNICATIONS at 90 (2002). But cf J.
GREGORY SIDAK, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1997)
(providing a full-blown analysis and critique of the regulation of foreign investment in
American telecommunications, including its protectionist elements, and, in particular, a
counter to Mark Clough's description of 47 U.S.C., § 310 (Id. at 77-79 and 156-57)).
169. See Paul Corriveau, Regulation of Foreign Ownership of Broadcasting
Distribution Undertakings: A Comparative Study of International Markets, A Study for the
Canadian Cable Television Association 19 (January 20, 2003), available at
www.ccta.ca/english/news-information/news-releases/2003/pdf/26-03-corriveau.pdf (last
visited Aug.19, 2004) ("[A]lone amongst developed countries in the world, Canada
continues to place restrictions on foreign investments in BDU assets. If the Canadian
policy is meant to rest on some form of cultural policy rationale, it is exceedingly tenuous.
International experience with such foreign-investment has demonstrated how culturally
uneventful it has been. Regulators the world over continue to effectively regulate foreign-
owned BDUs as if they were indistinguishable from domestic-owned competitors.").
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of its daily newspapers to carry the same national editorials as of
December 2001 and prohibited editorials or letters to the editors
that contradicted an approved editorial on Palestinian-Israeli
relations. 170
The CanWest example even made its way into the 2003 Order
and the Third Circuit's review as an illustration of the "the peril of
national ownership and corporate centralization of media services''
highlighting the divergent approaches of the two jurisdictions.
Although there were calls in Canada for explicit ownership
guidelines in 1987, they have not been issued.7 2 Instead, a benefits test
has evolved where the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission ("CRTC") assesses license
transfers on a case by case basis. The test recognizes the importance
of local benefits but balances them against "system-wide benefits,
such as research and development, particularly in light of the rapid
pace of change in the broadcasting and cable environments.,
7 1 In
1989, the CRTC acknowledged the importance of "local participation
in ownership" as a factor to consider in reviewing license transfers.
74
Ownership concentration concerns have also figured in historically
important CRTC transfer decisions, most notably the 1978 denial of
Baton Broadcasting's application to acquire CFCF in Montreal. In
denying the application, the CRTC referred to preserving the "local
170. Cheryl Leanza & Harold Feld, More Than "a Toaster with Pictures:" Defending
Media Ownership Limits, 21 CoMM. L. 12, 20 (2003) available at
http://www.mediaaccess.org/ToasterFINAL.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2004, citing Aaron J.
Moore, Ownership: A Chill in Canada, COLUM. J. REv. (2002)). See also GRANT &
WOOD, supra note 151, at 272-73 (discussing the formation of the CanWest-Bell duopoly
formed through CanWest's acquisition of The National Post national newspaper and
Conrad Black's chain of Canadian newspapers and BCE Inc.'s acquisition of CTV Inc.,
Canada's largest private network and The Globe and Mail, the National Post's competitor
in the national newspaper market).
171. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 63.
172. See Final Report, Standing Committee on Communications and Culture
(Gormley Committee), Concentration of Ownership in the Media, available at
http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/esm-ms/prin4_e.cfm#tfbp (last visited Aug. 19,
2004) ("Policies to achieve financial strength in the private sector of the Canadian
broadcasting system must be compatible with a clearly enunciated ownership policy and
guidelines on the limits of ownership. Rules must be established and applied-and be seen
to be applied.").
173. PETER GRANT, ANTHONY KEENLEYSIDE & GRANT BUCHANAN, CANADIAN
BROADCASTING REGULATORY HANDBOOK [hereinafter HANDBOOK] § 293-9 (7th ed.
2004).
174. CRTC, Public Notice CRTC 1989-109 (Sept. 28, 1989) 1, available at
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Notices/1989/PB89-1 0 9.HTM (last visited Aug. 19,
2004). See also HANDBOOK, supra note 173, at §258-3.
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identity" of the stations within the alternative English language TV
service, but the dominant flavor of the reasoning was to promote
diversity of programming from Canadian sources. 75 Behind the
scenes, Qu6bec nationalism was threatening to unravel Canada. As
the threat of Qu6bec separation was cresting, it would have been
politically intolerable from a national unity perspective for a Toronto
corporation to acquire Montreal's largest English-language TV
station.' 76 Canada's relative indifference to localism and localist
ownership rules, drowned out by an overwhelming nationalist pre-
occupation, is transparent in the nationalist mandate that the
Broadcasting Act lays out for the broadcasting system. With this
legislation as its cue, a regulator choosing between a national or local
orientation has to weigh in on the national side of the balance. 77 The
CRTC has recently demonstrated this in its promotion of national
networks and encouragement of consolidation. 178
175. CRTC, Application to transfer effective control of Multiple Access Limited to
Baton Broadcasting Incorporated, Decision CRTC 1978-669 (Oct. 12, 1978) at 4, 5-6.
176. SUSAN GITTINS, CTV: THE TELEVISION WARS 143 (2000); see also id. at 137-47
(describing generally the politics and policies behind the CRTC's decision on Baton's
acquisition of CFCF).
177. See Broadcasting Act, supra note 164, at §3 (1)(d):
[T]he Canadian broadcasting system should:
(i) serve to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and
economic fabric of Canada,
(ii) encourage the development of Canadian expression by providing a wide
range of programming that reflects Canadian attitudes, opinions, ideas,
values and artistic creativity, by displaying Canadian talent in entertainment
programming and by offering information and analysis concerning Canada
and other countries from a Canadian point of view,
(iii) through its programming and the employment opportunities arising out
of its operations, serve the needs and interests, and reflect the circumstances
and aspirations, of Canadian men, women and children, including equal
rights, the linguistic duality and multicultural and multiracial nature of
Canadian society and the special place of aboriginal peoples within that
society, and
(iv) be readily adaptable to scientific and technological change.
This is echoed in the CRTC 2004-2007 3 year Work Plan: "Increased availability of
Canadian content and programming that reflects Canadian creative talent and Canada's
linguistic duality, cultural diversity and social values, as well as its national, regional and
community characteristics." See CRTC, 3-Year Work Plan (2004-2007), available at
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/BACKGRND/plan2004.pdf (last visited Aug. 19,2004).
17& See CRTC, Public Notice CRTC 1998-8, available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/
archive/eng/Notices/1998/PB98-8.htm) (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). ("Over the past two
decades, ownership consolidations and the licensing of new local stations have resulted in
the development of strong, multi-station ownership groups with a presence in most
Canadian provinces and major markets. These groups have come to possess the resources
required to produce high-quality programming or to acquire national rights for the
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Other fields of Canadian economic regulation, such as banking,
are also lukewarm to localism. As I have described, American
banking regulation was historically preoccupied with localism and
branching restrictions, and the atomistic banking market reflected
this. In contrast, Canadian banking regulation has been preoccupied
with Canadian national ownership 79 and the development of a
national banking infrastructure to link the country together."'
Canada's major banks, for most of the past century, have numbered
fewer than ten, and have always carried on business throughout the
country. Reflecting the concentrated, national market, banking
regulatory authority is highly concentrated at the federal level.' 81 This
discussion suggests that the conventional wisdom I describe in my
introduction is correct: the Canadian system exists in reaction to
American dominance and the American system exists as a reflection
of the localist foundation of the country. While there may be truth to
the conventional wisdom in explaining the differences between the
two jurisdictions, my interest is more in the similarities. Remarkably,
the Canadian tendency toward nationalism in banking and
communications and the American tendency towards localism in the
same sectors reveal a strong point of commonality: protectionism.
Ownership rules insulate owners from the threat of takeover and
competitors from more efficient owners entering the market. The
next section looks more closely at the public choice account of
localism as protectionism.
distribution of such programming on a national scale. As a result, their importance and
effectiveness as tools for achieving the programming objectives of the Broadcasting Act
have increased relative to the national networks." (See CRTC, Public Notice CRTC 1998-
8, available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/eng/Notices/1998/PB98-8.htm (last visited Feb.
20,2004)).
179. See R.W. McDowell, R.E. Elliott, D.E. Milner, H.J. Thompson, S.B. Kerr and J.
M. Robinson, Q.C., Canada's New Financial Institutions Legislation: New Ownership
Opportunities in Canada, 2000 C.N.B.L.R. LEXIS 4, 4 (arguing that, although formal
foreign ownership restrictions on Canadian banks have been abolished, the widely-held
rule, which restricts ownership to less than 20 percent of a bank's voting shares, represents
a de facto foreign ownership cap). See also Bank Act, R.S.C., ch.46, § 374(1)(1991).
180. Eric Gouvin, Symposiun" Transcript of Afternoon Presentation, 13 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 449, 454 (1999).
181. M. H. OGILVIE, CANADIAN BANKING LAW 221 (2d Ed. 1998) ("The
administration of the Bank Act, and therefore general supervision over the banking
system in Canada, is the responsibility of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions....
Canada is perhaps the only country in the world to provide for a single regulatory office
for virtually all of its financial institutions."). See also Office of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions Act, R.S.C., ch. 18 (3d Supp.), §§ 1-25 (1985).
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4. A Public Choice Contract: Localism as Protectionism
Localism is the most sacred cow of communications policy. More
sacrifices have been laid at the altar of this beast than at that of any
other in the history of communications regulation.'o2
In the opening pages of this article, I refer to Michael Powell's
commitment to free, local TV. Christopher Yoo 1" and Thomas
Hazlett' 8 provide an account of localism that reinterprets this
commitment as benefiting incumbent licensees, the alleged
embodiments of localism, as opposed to the interests of consumers.
Yoo deconstructs the commitment to free TV into four preferences:
(1) local programming over national programming, (2) free
(advertisement supported) television over pay television, (3)
incumbent television providers over new entrants and emerging
television technologies, and (4) single-channel television technologies
over multi-channel bundles. Yoo traces a long-standing tradition of
protecting the incumbency of free TV station licensees back to the
original influence of localism in communications regulation. First, the
initial spectrum allocation decisions harmed the development of
networks.'8 The licensing mandate that gave the FCC power to
control whose voice was heard was immunized from First
Amendment scrutiny through the spectrum scarcity doctrine.' 6
According to the doctrine, spectrum is the public domain, and,
because of its scarcity, spectrum needs to be managed by a licensing
authority, in order to insure public access to as many voices as
possible.'8 Otherwise, "with everybody on the air, nobody could be
heard."1  While entailing "a degree of governmental control over the
content of speech," the scarcity doctrine provided no guidance on the
182. Robinson, supra note 3, at 938.
183. Christopher Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52
EMORY L.J. 1579 [hereinafter Yoo, Rethinking Free TV] and Yoo, Response to Hazlett,
supra note 119.
184. Hazlett, Response to Yoo, supra note 6.
185. Yoo, Rethinking Free TV, supra note 183, at 1685. Cf. Hazlett, Response to Yoo,
supra note 6, at 244-45 (going one step further back to argue that the "the 1927 formation
of the Federal Radio Commission (predecessor of the FCC) was the result of a pro-cartel
policy initiated by policymakers at the behest of the major commercial broadcasting
stations").
186. Yoo, Response to Hazlett, supra note 119, at 260-64.
187. Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134, 137-38 (1940) (upholding the FCC's authority to oversee a licensing regime that
would not give any right "beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license" and
would be managed according to "public convenience, interest, or necessity.").
188. NBC v. United States, 359 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
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criteria for awarding licenses (and, thus, for regulating content).' 89 As
I describe above,"9 the FCC assigned this role to localism, and the
Supreme Court upheld the FCC's decision. 91 Yet, Yoo properly
reminds us that there is nothing in the legislation that would prevent
the FCC from exercising its discretion to pursue a national model of
"equitable distribution of . . . service" rather than a local one.92
Hazlett critiques the choice as "driven entirely by politics" with "no
philosophical attachment.'193
After spectrum allocation shackled network growth in favor of
local licensees, "renewal expectancy" insured that incumbent
licensees would never lose their privileged positions of stewardship
over the public interest.'94 When marketable technologies surfaced to
compete in video distribution markets, the incumbents were still
preferred. The FCC abandoned its shift to UHF technology because
of the disadvantages this would cause incumbent VHF local
broadcasters.' 9 Protecting the local broadcaster's interest has also
been a clear objective of the FCC's approaches to cable, DBS and
digital broadcasting.' This is most evident in the must-carry regime
applicable to cable and DBS described above. 97 Must-carry protects
free TV broadcasters and "crowds out additional cable networks,
beginning with those serving the smallest audiences." Must-carry
preempts channel capacity and thereby chokes off cable offerings of
localism, such as "locally oriented, all-news channels." Consequently,
"must-carry promotes marginal broadcasters at the expense of
marginal cable channels even though it is the marginal cable channels
that are more likely to provide diverse (including local)
programming. ' 98
On this account of localism's protection of incumbent licensees,
the FCC chose, and continues to choose, localism as the "foundation"
for its public interest mandate because it is the lifeblood of an
alignment of interests among politicians and regulated entities. Under
189. Yoo, Response to Hazlett, supra note 119, at 263.
190. See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
191. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. at 138.
192. 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2004).
193. Hazlett, Response to Yoo, supra note 6, at 244-45.
194. Yoo, Rethinking Free TV, supra note 183, at 1684-85.
195. Id. at 1686.
196. Id at 1688-92.
197. See supra notes 147, 148, 149 and accompanying text.
198. Yoo, Rethinking Free TV, supra note 183, at 1661.
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a localism structure, "regulators and incumbents carve up markets
such that entry barriers imposed by law" and the regulatory moves
described above "guarantee super-competitive returns for privileged
firms (licensees)."' ' The quo that benefits the political source of the
quid has two aspects. First, the deal requires a portion of the super-
competitive profits to be redirected "toward the policymaker's
political objectives,"" such as "additional restrictions on indecent and
violent programming, increased support for children's educational
programming, and the provision of free air time for political
candidates. '"201 Second, with localism as the guide for carving up
markets, each market is "no larger than the size of a congressional
district," ensuring "that candidates could buy advertising time without
paying for audiences who were not voters. ' 22
Localism is thus a public choice contract with a "life of its own,"
generating regulation divorced from consumer welfare and stifling
"emerging wireless networks in order to protect the broadcast
technologies of the 1940s." If we apply Mancur Olson's theory here,
the only way this entrenched alignment of interests can be dissolved is
through a revolution or some comparable source of upheaval:
[T]hose organizations that have secured selective incentives to
maintain themselves will often survive as organizations even if the
collective good they once provided is no longer needed. As the
sociologist Max Weber pointed out long ago, the leader who is
making a living out of an organization may keep it alive even after
its original purpose has disappeared; an organization set up to
represent the drivers of teams of horses, for example, will take on
the task of representing drivers of trucks, an organization set up to
help the veterans of one war will outlive these veterans by
representing veterans of subsequent wars. Selective incentives
make indefinite survival feasible. Thus, those organizations for
collective action, at least for large groups, that can emerge often
take a long time to emerge, but once established they usually
survive until there is a social upheaval or some other form of
violence or instability.'
Despite the narrative of technological revolution over the past
half-century (UHF, cable, DBS, fiber optic), there has been
insufficient momentum to cause the type of upheaval that Olson
199. Hazlett, Response to Yoo, supra note 6, at 234.
200. Yoo, Response to Hazlett, supra note 119, at 265-66; Hazlett, Response to Yoo,
supra note 6, at 237.
201. Yoo, Rethinking Free TV, supra note 183, at 1700.
202. Yoo, Response to Hazlett, supra note 119, at 265.
203. Hazlett, Response to Yoo, supra note 6, at 237.
204. OLSON, supra note 7, at 40.
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contemplates. Amazingly, free TV broadcasters have not faced the
need to re-invent their roles that challenged the teamster
representatives to which Olson refers. Instead, these licensees have
been protected from the technologies that have challenged their
incumbency. According to Hazlett and Yoo, this protection has the
name of localism.
As suggested above, viewed as "protectionism," localism shares
many of the qualities and faults of nationalist ownership restrictions
that protect Canada's communications firms. Like localism, the
Canadian regime has been criticized in recent years. Before the June
2004 re-election of Paul Martin's Liberals,23 the nationalism norm
appeared to be losing ground as the government began reviewing
Canada's foreign ownership restrictions on telecommunications
common carriers.2 Because of the more obvious cultural issues
involved in broadcasting, there has been less movement here. Yet, the
Conservatives have been in favor of liberalizing these restrictions for
some time and called for a reduced CRTC mandate in the recent
election, while the Liberals have been divided between Industry
Canada's push for eliminating ownership limits and Canadian
Heritage's preference for the status quo.2 Public choice rubric might
say that prominent media families would happily sell because it would
mean obtaining a premium price for a business whose chief asset, the
license, was given to them for free."
Despite the governing Liberals' recent policy initiatives that
consider foreign ownership liberalization, the nationalism norm is
205. The victory was qualified in that the Liberals won a minority government. While
the Liberals won the most House of Commons seats of any party, they failed to win a
majority of the seats. This subjects the success of Liberal legislative initiatives to the
support of individual Members of Parliament from various opposition parties.
206. See Industry Canada, Foreign Investment Restrictions Applicable to
Telecommunications Common Carriers, Discussion Paper 2 (Nov. 2002), available at
(http://www.innovationstrategy.gc.ca/gol/innovation/interface.nsf/vssgbasicin02153e.htm 2
(Last visited July 21, 2004)) (soliciting views on whether the current foreign investment
restrictions in the telecommunications sector "remains the best means of achieving the
objectives of strong investment and national economic sovereignty.").
207. Eric Reguly, Why is Harper bent on gutting the CRTC?, THE GLOBE AND MAIL,
June 12,2004, at B2.
208. Id. ("There is no opportunity for other broadcasters to compete for the license
every so often, as is the case in other countries. So scrapping the CRTC would effectively
give the private broadcasters the opportunity for a double win-the first because of the
free license, the second from the opportunity to start an international bidding war.").
Although I am not endeavoring here to apply a public choice analysis to the Canadian
nationalism norm, the point that Eric Reguly makes resonates with this analytical stance.
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pervasively, if passively, supported across partisan lines. 20 With the
minority government requiring the Liberals to seek support from all
parties, imminent reform of communications ownership regulation is
unlikely."1 There is no groundswell support for dismantling the
foreign ownership restrictions and even the Conservatives have been
cautious about their proposals for liberalization. The nationalism
norm itself provides a plausible but disputable account of foreign
ownership restrictions. Cultural sovereignty (particularly in the face
of American cultural imperialism) requires that Canadian media be
controlled by Canadians because Canadians are more reliable than
foreigners in delivering and supporting Canadian culture. It is difficult
to say whether most Canadians actually believe this conventional
wisdom because the topic is obscured from popular political
discourse. The remarkable point for this article's purpose is the
degree of similarity between the conventional wisdom justifying the
nationalism norm and the conventional wisdom that justifies localist
ownership restrictions in American communications. Indeed, Peter
Grant and Chris Wood use the word "local" to describe the
conventional arguments underpinning the Canadian nationalism
norm:
(1) "Local companies are more likely to identify, develop and
promote a diversity of expression by local cultural creators."
(2) "Local companies are more likely to reinvest returns from those
rare successes in the cultural casino in future bets on local talent."
' 21
1
On the basis of this conventional wisdom, can we construct a
plausible consumer welfare justification for localism as
"protectionism ' ' 22 that goes beyond conventional wisdom and dispels
the Yoo/Hazlett public choice account? We have to consider the
premise itself and explore whether locally owned media providers are
necessarily more likely to promote, and re-invest in, local voices.
However, behind the premise that local ownership promotes local
209. Id. ("No country in the West, other than the United States, has an Open Skies
policy in broadcasting. Cultural sovereignty is not on the table. During the Canada-U.S.
free-trade negotiations in the late 1980s, only culture was not open for negotiation. And
that was under a Tory government.").
210. See Patrick Brethour, Big bank mergers may top list of casualties, THE GLOBE
AND MAIL, June 30, 2004 at B12 and B6 (discussing the implications of the election of
Paul Martin's Liberal minority government for various regulated industries, including
financial services, transportation, communications and energy).
211. GRANT & WOOD, supra note 151, at 254.
212. Yoo, Response to Hazlett, supra note 119, at 255. See also Thomas Hazlett,
Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 905 (1997).
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voices lies another premise that local voices require, and are worthy
of, promotion. This should also be scrutinized, but, in doing so, we
return to the broader topic of giving content to the localism norm and
its "deep roots in American political ideology," '213 inviting the risk that
this becomes a tediously circular exercise. (Localism means local
control, which promotes local voices and interests, which is what
localism means.) To dissect the content of localism without getting
trapped in this circle, this section has attempted to trace the roots of
localism through particular manifestations in early communications
regulation, other regulatory venues and the comparative norm of
Canadian nationalism. Another microscope that we can use to
examine the premises behind the localism norm is the debate on
media ownership and the NTSO rule. Referring to political, cultural
and economic perspectives, the article now returns to this debate with
a broader analytic than the technical introduction in Part 111.1. We
will see that, while there is something undoubtedly special about the
media, there is also something special about territory and its role in
the construction of community identity. It is the latter that provides
the missing link in helping us understand the importance of localism
in media ownership regulation and whether it is declining.
V. Politics, Culture and Economics in
Media Ownership Regulation
The media ownership debate is infused with political, cultural
and economic perspectives that parallel the media's concurrent
political, cultural and economic roles as news reporters, entertainers,
and businesses providing shareholder returns. The first thing to note
about the political, cultural and economic perspectives is their
overlap. Political critiques about consolidation's impact on media
diversity and democracy find indispensable support from economic
analysis. Similarly, economic arguments for liberalizing ownership
restrictions are often based on cultural demand shifts intertwined with
technological innovations, such as video on demand ("VOD"), fiber
optic video delivery and others. This overlap is reflected in the way
that the diversity, competition and localism norms inform, and are
informed by, political, cultural and economic perspectives. For
example, diversity requires competition that may be defined
economically. But, diversity also includes political and cultural
213. Yoo, Response to Hazlett, supra note 119, at 273.
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objectives. The political objective asserts that diverse sources and
ideas are "essential to the well-informed political decision making
that underlies a well-functioning democracy.1 The cultural objective
states that "audience access to culturally diverse sources and content"
promotes "greater cultural understanding and social cohesion.
2 15
These political, cultural and economic perspectives on media
ownership coexist with, and are used by, the irreconcilable positions
of liberalization proponents and critics. I begin with political concerns
about universal access and consolidation of media voices. I then
introduce increasing demand for personalized cultural consumption
and its impact on cultural cohesion and development at the national
and local levels. Lastly, I deal with the economic perspective on the
debate. This discussion is more elaborate than the cultural and
political sections because of the controversies that abound within the
economic approach. However, these controversies help balance my
analysis, because they raise potential limits of economic
considerations, re-invoking politics and culture. In this way, we gain a
complete picture of the political, cultural and economic justifications
and criticisms of media ownership regulation.
1. The Political
In his Wall Street Journal letter to the editor,216 William Pike
raises two key political values at stake in the debate on media
ownership regulation. First, broadcast media should be universally
accessible to all citizens. Free, over the air TV provides video
distribution for the small percentage of the population that does not
have access to cable or DBS. As an advertising-supported medium,
free TV involves no subscription fees or discrete transaction
payments for media products. On this view, free TV licensees were
cast in the role of being uniquely capable of providing universal
access to video distribution. Courts and regulators invoked this
universal access role to impose and uphold some of the protectionist
measures that Yoo and Hazlett criticize, such as the cable and DBS
must-carry regime.
While Pike mentions universal access to promote regulation of
broadcast ownership, Powell's op/ed piece uses universal access to
justify consolidation and liberalization. Neither perspective considers
214. Napoli, supra note 98, at 799.
215. Id. at 800.
216. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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Yoo's challenge to "justify why society should subsidize the
consumption of television programming rather than the consumption
of other media."2"7 Nor do they consider the possibility for other
technologies to share or assume local broadcasters' universal access
role. For example, a subsidy scheme comparable to the universal
service regime for wireline telephone could be imposed on cable, the
most pervasive form of video delivery, or DBS.
2 8
The second political value that Pike raises is the unique
educative function that media play in promoting democracy.
Broadcasting is no ordinary business because it is
uniquely pervasive of the American home. Primarily a source of
entertainment, it also supplies news and political analysis. It is in
the performance of the latter functions that more than 90 percent
of the American electorate say they rely on broadcasting as the
source of most of their information about the world. It is that fact
which provides the best evidence of the medium's uniquely
pervasive position in American homes, and it is that fact which
should make us aware of the awesome power of broadcasting to
mold public opinion.
219
Historically, concerns about TV's political influence were
addressed by promoting the "widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources." Conventional
wisdom in communications regulation holds that we promote the
marketplace of ideas with a diversity of voices/media outlets, and we
217. Yoo, Rethinking Free TV, supra note 183, at 1675.
218. Id. at 1676, citing Ross E. Ericksson et al., Targeted and Untargeted Subsidy
Schemes: Evidence from Postdivestiture Efforts to Promote Universal Telephone Service, 41
J.L. & ECON. 477, 481-82 (1998) and Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific
Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 247, 275-77, 354-55 (2003) ("[P]roviding
low-income households with discounts for pay television services in the manner currently
used to promote indigent access to telephone service should promote access to television
far more efficiently than the system of implicit cross-subsidies currently employed, which
effectively lowers the price of television for all households regardless of ability to pay.").
Cf FCC, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, FCC 04-5 16-17 (F.C.C. Jan. 5, 2004) at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-04-5Al.pdf (last visited Aug. 19,
2004) (finding that cable is very close to being universally available, with cable lines
passing an estimated 96.3 percent of all households with at least one television as of year-
end 2002). I am reluctant to venture into the merits and flaws of the telecommunications
universal service regulatory regime. I merely want to point out that, given the
pervasiveness of cable, the "free" aspect of free TV may be an insufficient basis on which
to assume that free TV is uniquely capable of providing universal access to video
distribution.
219. TILLINGHAST, supra note 19, at xvii.
220. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); FC.C. v. National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 802 (1978).
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encourage a diversity of outlets if we require diversity of their
ownership.2'
This conventional wisdom developed from the assumption that
economic power of ownership correlated with political power of
influencing public opinion, which was reinforced by the political
valences of antitrust policy. Prominent antitrust scholars, such as
Robert Pitofsky, point out that, even in an industry without the
media's educative function, ownership concentration can have
antidemocratic consequences. m  However, Pitofsky has also
acknowledged that the political consequences for ownership
concentration are particularly high in the media:
It's important ... that business consolidations not be a barrier to
the free flow of ideas and opinions . . . if you have issues in the
newspaper business, in book publishing, news generally,
entertainment, I think you want to be more careful and thorough in
your investigation than if the very same problems arose in
cosmetics, or lumber, or coal mining. I mean, if somebody
monopolizes the cosmetics fields, they're going to take money out
of consumers' pockets, but the implications for democratic values
are zero. On the other hand, if they monopolize books, you're
talking about implications that go way beyond what the wholesale
price of the books might be.
This sentiment reverberates in critiques2 of NTSO rule
liberalization and the marketplace model of realizing the public
221. Gregory M. Prindle, No Competition: How Radio Consolidation Has Diminished
Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279,
291 (2003).
222. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051-66
(1979) in ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID AND DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS [hereinafter TRADE REGULATION] 7 (Foundation
Press 5th ed. 2003) ("It is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political
values in interpreting the antitrust laws. By 'political values,' I mean, first, a fear that
excessive concentration of economic power will breed antidemocratic political pressures,
and, second, a desire to enhance individual and business freedom by reducing the range
within which private discretion by a few in the economic sphere controls the welfare of all.
A third and overriding political concern is that if the free-market sector of the economy is
allowed to develop under antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the
likely result will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate giants that it wil be
impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive role in economic affairs.").
223. Alec Klein, A Hard Look at Media Mergers, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 29, 2000,
at EO1.
224. See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up On Democracy [hereinafter
Baker, Media Concentration], 54 FLA. L. REv. 839, 917 (2002) (arguing that, even if
antitrust law should be "largely restricted to economic efficiency concerns and
monopolistic power over pricing," generally, "it should not be so limited in the media
arena").
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interest in media. In my section below on economic perspectives, I
return to these critiques.
The political concern about undue concentration of
ownership/political power supports the argument that ownership
should be regulated to preserve diversity. So where does localism fit
in? As noted above, the FCC justifies retaining the NTSO rule as a
means to maintain the balance of power between networks and
affiliates because "affiliates' incentives are more attuned to their local
communities than are those of networks." ' Here, local control
maintains the balance. However, under the NTSO rule and the
diversity theory, local stations could all be owned by various networks
so long as there were sufficient networks to enable a diverse market.2
There is a link missing between the political diversity rationale and
the ideal of promoting local control to counterbalance network power
through the NTSO rule. This missing link lies in the territorial bases
of political institutions.
In the late 1990s, as increasing Internet use spurred on
"communications revolution" rhetoric, Eben Moglen and Pamela S.
Karlan considered the alleged revolution's impact on the role of
territory in political representation.
"Geographic boundaries have served traditionally, and perhaps
intuitively, as the most common basis" for representation because
"there is a spatial dimension to human organization." But one of
the central features of the Internet is that it demonstrates quite
concretely the possibility of organizing human beings in nonspatial
ways, and that it allows human beings to organize themselves,
rather than having an organizational structure imposed on them by
a central authority. As individuals grow comfortable with the idea
that important communities may be entirely nongeographic and
that individuals may affiliate for important purposes along
dimensions that have little or nothing to do with where they live,
they may become both more skeptical of a purely geographic way
of defining political constituencies and more open to election
systems that allow voters to affiliate along dimensions other than
residence.
The traditionally territorial orientation of the electoral process
necessarily privileges localism because it presumes that
communications limitations require political activity to take place
225. 2003 Order, supra note 12, at §578.
226. See supra note 48.
227. Eben Moglen & Pamela S. Karlan, The Soul of A New Political Machine: The
Online, the Color Line and Electronic Democracy, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1089, 1092-93
(2001), citing ELAINE SPITZ, MAJORITY RULE 56(1984).
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within local geographic limits. 2 However, "as we spend greater and
more meaningful portions of our lives in computer-mediated
communications with other people, three pervasive changes occur:
location doesn't matter, our interests determine our communities, and
we do not have to use our feet to vote with them." 29 With everyone
"adjacent to everyone else" as "email, instant messaging, Internet
phone" and other communications technologies defy territorial
boundaries, 230 "locality ceases to have a normative significance: our
neighborhood pub is less likely to contain our friends than a chat
room" and "[a]n accessible Congressman is one who gives us a quick
substantive answer to our email, not someone who comes back to the
district for the weekend and hangs around the mall that we no longer
shop at."231 In the Internet age, geographic localism's role as the
normative guide to commercial and political activities is displaced by
the power of "affinity:"
The network's media allow us to locate others who share our
interests and concerns with ease. Thus, we increasingly occupy the
locality of the like-minded. Nor is our locality in these terms
singular: We are simultaneously part of communities of sea
kayakers, gamelon musicians, ex-Bahai atheists, melanoma
survivors, lukewarm libertarians (not yet ready to eliminate public
libraries and slightly queasy about do-it-yourself howitzer
construction) and shiatsu fanciers. A conclave of the people who
share all our affinities would be more depopulated than a New
Hampshire village meeting on a blizzard evening-in fact, it is
almost guaranteed to be a solo event. But each of the communities
comprising our social context will be vibrant, noisy, and
disputatious.
23 2
In Hazlett's view, these communities of affinity "are every bit as
'local' as communities in space," for "many in a religious community
feel 'closer' to church services of their faith broadcast from across the
country than they would to a broadcast of services of another faith
from just across town." This reveals "a conflict between the divergent
views" of localism 233 which can be alternatively perceived as devoid of
228. Moglen & Karlan, supra note 227, at 1093. Cf. id. at 1094, citing CHARLES R.
BUCKALEW, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 62-63 (1872) (explaining that emerging
democracies in Eastern and Central Europe, Asia and Africa have not adopted the
"United States' exclusive use of winner-take-all, geographically defined single-member
districts to elect" their national legislatures).
229. Moglen & Karlan, supra note 227, at 1098.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1098-99.
232 Id.
233. Hazlett, Response to Yoo, supra note 6, at 248.
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geographic content where communities of affinity replace
communities of space. The Internet revolution allows these
communities of affinity to be represented institutionally in non-
geographic virtual legislative districts and unmediated Internet voting
on public policy issues, replacing the current paradigm of
geographical representative government.3 4
The negative implication here is the potential loss of an
important intermediary function. 235 While "immediate, unmediated
access" has the positive effect of removing the shadow cast by
"anything that falls between the idea and the reality," 6 the "slow and
creaky" process of representative government and media involvement
permits deliberative and mediated decision making that avoids
"quick, certain and wrong" outcomes.23 Moglen and Karlan argue
that an Internet driven dis-intermediated democracy will be
particularly problematic for dis- and under-enfranchised citizens.2
38
This is first because "representative bodies are relatively intimate
groups-at the local level they rarely contain more than two dozen
members."2 39 Second, the fact that legislators have far more voting
opportunities than would the citizenry under any conceivable form of
direct democracy also makes representative democracy potentially
more responsive to minority interests. And finally, voting within
legislative bodies occurs in an institutional setting that increases the
possibilities for deliberation through debates, amendment processes
and mark-ups, and hearings in which representatives participate
actively.24' Yoo is also hesitant to endorse an Internet democracy,
asserting that "the proper way to constitute a political community is
an empirical question," and "to the, extent that geographically
localized interests dominate issues that affect the entire nation, a
policy of [geographic] localism might well make sense." 242 If this is the
case, and, if the media serves an important intermediary function
within this process, this offers an explanation for why "the regulatory
234. Yoo, Response to Hazlett, supra note 119, at 272. (citing Moglen and Karlan,
supra note 227, at 1098.)
235. Moglen & Karlan, supra note 227, at 1105-06.
236. Id. at 1107.
237. Id. at 1113.
23& Id.
239. Moglen & Karlan, supra note 227, at 1111.
240. Id. at 1112.
241. Id.
242. Hazlett, Response to Yoo, supra note 6, at 248.
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apparatus for broadcasting is wedded to a geographic grid . . . not
terribly distinct from that used to define 535 electoral votes."243 This
territorial explanation offers a plausible alternative to the public
choice account provided by Yoo and Hazlett. Cass Sunstein takes
these insights on the media's intermediary function further in the
context of the cultural perspective, to which I now turn.
2. The Cultural
Within the cultural perspective on media ownership, there are
several tensions: local versus cosmopolitan content; local
reinvestment versus centralized redeployment of revenue; the media's
democratic role in educating citizens versus its commercial role in
supplying consumers with what they want; and national culture versus
local culture. TV is the most important venue for cultural expression
in our society, and cultural expression is fundamental to how we form
community:
cultural expression is the essence of how we imagine our way into
the future. Circumstances change. We adapt or perish-one and all.
And neither societies nor individuals adapt without a capacity for
self-discovery, an ability to orient themselves to the forces around
them. That is the irreplaceable function of culture: to exchange our
visions of ourselves and how we fit with others, to help us each
navigate towards our complex hopes, dreams and destinies.
The localism norm builds on this function of culture to assert that
local variations on cultural taste need access to media dissemination
for local community development.
In the early days of broadcasting, African-American hosts, stars
and programming, such as The All-Negro Hour, could gain access to
broadcast at the local level, 245 together with "talk, ethnic nationality
hours, labor news, church services, and vaudeville-type musical
entertainment by hometown, often ethnic talent." However, with the
growth of the networks, there was a shift to more cosmopolitan
entertainment "created for a national audience: comedy and variety
shows with national celebrities, soap operas, westerns and detective
shows, and sports programs."2 The localism norm, as it is used by
liberalization critics, associates networks with a decline of local
cultural expression. Liberalization critics point to studies of how local
243. Id. at 271.
244. GRANT & WOOD, supra note 151, at 20.
245. STARR, supra note 2, at 369-70.
246. Id. at 367, quoting LIZBETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL
WORKERS IN CHICAGO, 1918-1939, 135 (1990).
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news content suffers under chain ownership of newspapers,24' as well
as studies showing how minority owners program for minorities and
local owners program for their local communities.24 Liberalization
critics explain that, with many stations owned by one entity, the
stations are perceived as cash cows that provide resources for
corporate purposes, such as servicing debt, rather than for
reinvestment in local content. This is the basis for assuming that an
owner's location matters to the content of the cultural and political
products of the media. As I discuss in Part V.3.C., this assumption is
controversial and has been undermined with empirical evidence.
TV's role is to concurrently supply commercially viable
entertainment and politically edifying exposure to information and
insight. In his op/ed piece quoted above,29 Michael Powell discusses
the importance of giving consumers what they want, which, he
suggests, is a personalized cultural experience. The trends in demand
for entertainment products display a shift away from situation
comedies, news-magazine shows and other forms of entertainment
during prime-time. There is an accelerating decline in viewership of
prime-time TV by young adults, a crucial segment of the population
for advertisers. The nature of the products demanded is also shifting
towards reality shows and games. This changes the business model of
video entertainment delivery significantly. Reality shows, while
relatively inexpensive to produce, are more exhaustible than situation
comedies, whose syndication provides a substantial future return. At
the same time, games provide no revenue from standard commercials,
while technological innovations such as video on demand (VOD),
personal video recorders (PVR), digital video recorders (DVR) and
time shifting allow viewers to eliminate commercials. These and other
247. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 39, at 195-96, citing Pam Eversole, Consolidation of
Newspapers: What Happens to the Consumer? JOURNALISM QUARTERLY 245 (1971).
Cheryl Leanza and Harold Feld, other prominent liberalization critics who work with the
Media Access Project, a nonprofit public interest law firm that represents consumer and
citizens groups on telecommunications issues, also point to evidence that local ownership
affects the quality of local content production, thus influencing local culture. Leanza and
Feld cite an independent study by the Pew Foundation Project on Excellence in
Journalism (PEJ) as more recent empirical proof of Bagdikian's and their assertion that
concentration harms rather than enhances the production of local news. Leanza & Feld,
supra note 170, at 18.
248. Leanza & Feld, supra note 170, at 19, citing JOEL WALDFOGEL, WHO BENEFITS
WHOM IN LOCAL TELEVISION MARKETS? (2001).
249. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
250. Emily Nelson, As Technology Scatters Viewers, Networks Go Looking for Them,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2003, at Al and A6.
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shifts in demand can be encapsulated in the concept of "personalized
cultural consumption." Because of time constraints and the
fragmentation of tastes, consumers are demanding the ability to
streamline their culture consumption with their tastes and schedules.
The comedian Jerry Seinfeld recently said that he is "definitely
watching less TV, and spending more time on the Internet at night,
because the Internet is... so personal" and he can see things that are
of interest "only to [him]. . . ."21
Personalized cultural consumption may have negative cultural
implications:
Imagine, that is, a system of communications in which each person
has unlimited power of individual design. If people want to watch
news all the time, they would be entirely free to do exactly that. If
they dislike news, and want to watch football in the morning and
situation comedies at night, that would be fine too. If people care
only about America, and want to avoid international issues entirely,
that would be very simple indeed; so too if they care only about
New York ... If people want to restrict themselves to certain points
of view, by limiting themselves to conservatives, moderates,
liberals, vegetarians, or Nazis, that would be entirely feasible with a
simple "point and click." 2
The capacity to control your cultural experience through
unlimited filtering brings with it the comfort of being able to reaffirm
your preexisting knowledge, taste, perspective and opinion. My
discussion of the political perspective shows how this cultural
phenomenon very quickly assumes political form 23 where "affinities"
replace geographies in defining communities. If a citizen can "filter"
her cultural experience, s/he reinforces her personal, professional and
socio-economic associations in a way that binds her to these
associations and fragments society as a whole into these associations.
People are now "exposed to louder echoes of their own voices,
resulting, on occasion, in social fragmentation, misunderstanding, and
sometimes even enmity." Fragmentation thus leads to polarization,
which, in turn, leads to "social cascades," where groups move rapidly
and dramatically towards one or another belief or action.21'
251. Brian Steinberg, The Advertising Report. Creativity, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2004, at
B3.
252. Cass R. Sunstein, The Future of Free Speech, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE
SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA [hereinafter Sunstein, ETERNALLY VIGILANT] 286 (2002).
253. See supra notes 227-243 and accompanying text.
254. Sunstein, ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 252, at 298.
255. Id. at 299.
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While personalized cultural consumption has these negative
implications, cultural products that draw heterogeneous consumers,
such as the final episode of Friends2 or the Super Bowl, have several
positives. First, we may enjoy a media product more if we know that
many others are also enjoying it. (This may be the reason why
announcers mention how many people are sharing the experience of
watching the Super Bowl.) Second, the shared experience may ease
social interaction by providing people with something to
communicate or commonly care about whether or not they have
anything else in common.5 7 This has a third effect of allowing people
who see others as "unfamiliar" for racial, socio-economic or linguistic
reasons "to regard one another as fellow citizens with shared hopes,
goals, and concerns. '' 8
For these reasons, Sunstein advocates a regulatory scheme that
encourages exposure to cultural products that consumers may not
choose on their own and products with heterogenous rather than
idiosyncratic appeal: the "shared cultural experience." A
misinterpretation of Sunstein's shared cultural experience would
accuse it of a totalitarian requirement that we watch what the state
thinks is good for us. Sunstein would respond that his is "hardly a
suggestion that everyone should be required to watch the same
thing." Sunstein's "claim is that a common set of frameworks and
experiences is valuable for a heterogenous society, and that a system
with limitless options.., will compromise the underlying values."' 59 In
addition, any initiatives designed to "provide better programming for
children and better coverage of public issues" to facilitate
"deliberative democracy" would be "subject to democratic control."
'
The link from the shared cultural experience back to ownership
regulation lies in Sunstein casting media outlets as "general interest
intermediaries" in the production of culture that binds heterogeneous
256. See Lisa de Moraes, Friends Finale Watched By 52.5 Million, WASHINGTON POST,
May 7, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8447-
2004May7.html (last visited May 14, 2004) (stating that 52.5 million people watched the
final episode of Friends, the second most highly watched program after the Super Bowl).
257. Sunstein, ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 252, at 301.
25& Id.
259. Sunstein, ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 252, at 302.
260. Sunstein, TV and Public Interest, supra note 1, at 564.
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elements of a diverse society. Through the public forum doctrine,
speakers can gain access to several types of people in public parks.261
However, these geographic locales provide limited access to large
numbers of heterogeneous consumers of culture. In contrast, the
media, particularly TV outlets, have an immense scope of access to
consumers across geographic boundaries and therefore serve as
effective intermediaries. To the extent that new media are based on
filtration mechanisms that personalize cultural consumption, they do
not serve the general interest intermediary function that Sunstein has
in mind. Indeed, as I explain above, the beauty of the Internet is that
it eliminates the role of intermediaries.
Does this intermediary function within the shared cultural
experience offer a plausible rationale for localist protections of free
TV licensees? The problem here is that the intermediary function
seems to be played by TV, whether distributed over the air, cable,
satellite or a phone company's fiber optic network. The medium may
be the message, but the technological tools for deploying the medium
are irrelevant. While TV may be unique, there is nothing to justify
different treatment (i.e., protection) of particular delivery
technologies. Another problem here is that Sunstein's shared cultural
experience is by no means localist; it focuses on the national rather
than local context. His arguments could be effectively used by
liberalization proponents to assert that strong networks are better
able to deliver a shared cultural experience to a heterogenous group
than locally owned stations because such stations face geographic and
relevancy limits comparable to a public park. Yet, Sunstein's concerns
about the loss of intermediaries resemble those described by Moglen
and Karlan in the local context. Internet affinities, and other
manifestations of the "communications revolution" may be replacing
the national and local intermediaries that Sunstein, Moglen and
Kaplan praise. Their parallel critiques coalesce in a dark vision where
democratic and cultural institutions are dominated by personalized
cultural experiences and narrowed political perspectives that
fragment geographic communities into individually determined
affinities.
This dark picture may be the stuff of Orwellian fiction, however.
Even in 2001 (the peak of the communications bubble/revolution),
certain academics concluded that seemingly outdated notions of
261. Sunstein, ETERNALLY VIGILANT, supra note 252, at 290. See also STARR, supra
note 2, at 380.
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territorial orientation, particularly localism, are increasingly
influential in the face of the communications revolution:
Despite postmodern assertions that non-geographic communities
will replace "chats across white picket fences," evidence suggests
that an inherent connection exists between geography and cultural
values. Even on the Internet, activity generally centers around
geographically-based interests. Recent studies of "virtual
communities," for instance, show that most interactions are
between people who are seen in-person at work or at leisure, and
website providers have responded to increased demands for
regional and local focuses. Given the continued importance of
geographic communities, individuals are likely to turn first to their
community's laws for resolution of conflicts that occur in
cyberspace but manifest themselves in real-space. 262
The idea that territorial parameters are still fundamentally
important for cultural development is also evident in my discussion of
the Canadian nationalism norm. But this is not surprising, given that
national sovereignty, by definition, relates to geographic 
confines. 2 6
What then, if anything, is special about local geographic confines and
local cultural development?
Carol Rose contends that the role of local culture is very
different from that of national culture because "[p]ublic life at the
local level is much more idiosyncratic than national public life, and
much less homogenized: it is primarily at the local level that we are
given to wild enthusiasms about sports teams, parades, and bizarre
public art .... "6
Local culture idiosyncracies develop and are sustained because
of the opportunities for "voice" and "exit" uniquely available to local
citizens. In addition to voting, local communities afford voice through
"informal constituent contacts, the PTA meetings, the civic groups'
banging on the door at city hall, the cub reporters' scandal-
mongering, [and] the highly issue-oriented jawboning that is the very
262. David Johnson and David Post, Cyberspace Regulation and the Discourse of State
Sovereignty, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1680, at 1694-95. (analyzing the concept of sovereignty in
the debate on the regulation of the Internet, using the political theory tools of the realist
conception, the representational conception and the postmodern conception and
highlighting "the persistent question about how to balance pluralism and order within a
territorial state").
263. See supra note 11.
264. Rose, supra note 99, at 97.
2 1fl51 AN EARTHY ENIGMA
stuff of local controversy. '" ' Complementing these extra chances to
express one's "voice," one can also "exit:"
There is a reason for the heterogeneity of local communities vis-A-
vis each other: people have a choice about the community in which
they live, in a way that they do not have so much choice about the
state or especially nation in which they are citizens ... the Anti-
Federalists themselves were accustomed to American communities
in which dissatisfied persons could and did exit, in order to form
communities more to their own liking.26
With opportunities for exit and diverse interaction, the local
community provides means for individual self-determination
unavailable at the national level, and more akin to Internet affinities.
Particularistic idiosyncracies that develop through local communities
and Internet affinities exist in tension with the more cosmopolitan
and homogenous shared cultural experience required for a national
community. Yet, the local community, unlike an Internet affinity,
resembles the national community in its territorial definition. As I
suggest above, territorial communities are "imagined." 67 While the
"voice" and "exit" functions contribute to the idiosyncratic nature of
a local community, a shared cultural experience still plays a role in
developing the imagined local community. And this locally shared
cultural experience needs a general interest intermediary, as much as
a national community does. Liberalization critics can pick up the
thread of this argument to claim that free TV licensees are the
obvious candidates for this intermediary role. Their most important
obstacle, which I come to in the next section, is to show why locally
owned licensees are necessarily better able to serve this intermediary
function than licensees otherwise owned. Questions about the
incentives derived from ownership inevitably point us in the direction
of economics, the perspective that I move to now.
3. The Economic
This section shows how economic arguments limit and advance
the political and cultural perspectives, beginning with a discussion of
the economic nature of free TV and media products generally. I then
introduce the tensions between and within the economic, political and
265. Rose, supra note 99, at 96, citing ALBERT HIRSCHMAN EXIT, VOICE AND
LOYALTY (1970) and GERALD FRUG, THE CITY AS A LEGAL CONCEPT, 93 Harv. L. Rev.
1057, 1087 (1980) (asserting local government's capacity in "associational, participatory
self-determination.").
266. Rose, supra note 99, at 97.
267. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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cultural perspectives. In particular, I explore the question of whether
antitrust analysis and its economic precepts are sufficient for
monitoring and promoting the diversity of viewpoints in the media
marketplace; the cultural development associated with media
transactions; and, of course, localism.
A. The Economic Nature of Free TV and Media Products
A media product such as free TV is a public good. Public goods
are characterized by their "lack of excludability," meaning that
"producers cannot restrict the benefits provided by their products
only to those consumers that are willing to'pay for them," and their
"lack of rivalry," 268 meaning that, when I watch the local news, this
will not subtract from my neighbor's ability to consume the local news
nor add to the broadcaster's production cost.269
Free TV's non-rivalry explains several aspects of the TV
business. Because of non-rivalry, my consumption of the local news
does not affect the producer's costs in the same way that my
consumption of burgers will increase the ingredient costs of the
burger-monger (i.e., those costs that vary with output or variable
costs). This results in a unique situation where variable costs do not
affect marginal cost (i.e., the cost of making one more item of output),
"and the sole determinant of marginal cost is the amortization of
fixed costs" among all consumers (i.e., average cost),27 0 In the classic
case, marginal cost is solely determined by variable cost rather than
fixed costs, because fixed costs do not vary with output. In the classic
case, a marginal cost based on variable cost is also an effective way to
determine the price to charge the consumer. But, in the case of media
products, average cost is all that is available. Charging average cost to
media consumers may result in underproduction because some
consumers may not be willing or able to pay the average cost even
though they demand the product and would be willing to pay a price
based on variable rather than fixed cost. 1 As an alternative to
268. Yoo, Rethinking Free TV, supra note 183, at 1594.
269. C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What it Wants [hereinafter Baker, Giving
the Audience], 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 317 (1997) (describing the effect of media products'
lack of rivalry on the producer's ability to charge marginal cost and the underproduction
phenomenon).
270. Yoo, Rethinking Free TV, supra note 183, at 1596. For a description of the various
types of costs mentioned here, see PHILLIP AREEDA AND DONALD F. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 1$ 712-15 (1978) in PITOFSKY, GOLDSCHMID AND WOOD, TRADE
REGULATION, supra note 222, at 866-68.
271. Baker, Giving the Audience, supra note 269.
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charging average cost, a media business can (and does) supplement its
pricing revenue and cover fixed costs through syndication, licensing,
and, in the case of free TV, advertising.2
Average cost will decline as fixed costs are amortized over more
and more people.23 With constantly declining average costs, non-rival
products have "inexhaustible economies of scale" which explains the
fact that media producers typically "seek the broadest market
possible. ' ' 4 As we will see, 275 this feature of media products becomes
fodder for both liberalization critics and proponents. On the one
hand, localist controls can be seen as necessary checks on the
economic incentive to *produce the most cosmopolitan product
possible, while Christopher Yoo argues that such checks actually
destroy economic incentives for local and other special interest
programming.
In addition to free TV's unique costing and related pricing issues,
there are costs associated with free TV itself. From a regulatory point
of view, there are opportunity costs of allocating spectrum to free TV.
This allocation seems inefficient, when cable and DBS offer
pervasive, and technologically preferable, means for video
distribution and free TV broadcasters fail to maximize the use
potential of the spectrum they have been allocated.276 In the
meantime, the opportunity foregone is the development of other
wireless technologies:m The shift to digital television will redress
272. Baker, Giving the Audience, supra note 269, at 328.
273. Yoo, Rethinking Free TV, supra note 183, at 1597.
274. Id.
275. See infra notes 409-417 and accompanying text.
276. Hazlett, Response to Yoo, supra note 6, at 251-52. ("The use of the television
band, which consists of sixty-seven VHF and UHF channels in each of 210 U.S. television
markets, has never been intense. The average market features only about seven stations-
1500 total U.S. stations divided by 210 total U.S. markets. With several alternative multi-
channel systems available to bring local television signals to all who wish to see them,
including incumbent cable and satellite operators and several entrants queuing to be
licensed, the use of terrestrial airwaves to deliver local television signals is very
expensive.").
277. Id. ("The entire bandwidth allocated to all mobile telephone service in the United
States is 189 MHz, and this block manages to provide bandwidth for six national wireless
networks and numerous regional networks, serving over 150 million subscribers who talk
over 600 billion minutes and pay over $80 billion annually. In contrast, broadcast
television is the primary delivery mechanism to just thirteen million households and could
be duplicated (at higher signal quality) by alternative conduits. And yet, government
continues to protect some 402 MHz of prime radio spectrum, thereby blocking alternative
wireless technologies from productively using this resource. This rich bandwidth could
revolutionize multiple industries, from wireless phone service--allowing carriers to offer
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some of this inefficiency. By the end of 2006, digital television will
replace analog transmission,27 8 and, as the "Berlin Switch" has shown,
abandoning analog free TV results in more efficient use of
spectrum. 279 In addition, if we take seriously suggestions that the
spectrum scarcity doctrine propagates a myth about electromagnetic
waves, this opportunity cost may be exaggerated. The myth is that the
waves "bounce off one another if they meet. They do not. Instead,
they travel onwards through other waves forever." As a result,
interference "is not a physical phenomenon, but always and only a
technological problem, the result of dumb radios and dumb antennae
mixing the waves up after receiving them."' 8° As these technologies
improve, the opportunity cost of spectrum allocation could come
down.
Another cost of free TV is advertising. We already know that
free TV is a public good and that advertising provides an alternative
revenue source to cover the producer's fixed costs. But advertising
also causes a nuisance cost that Yoo describes as "an implicit price"
covered by viewers.28' The other problem with advertising is that it
distorts the media consumption transaction by introducing an
"indirect pricing mechanism." Advertising is a function of eyeball
numbers and demographics-it has no relation to the intensity with
which consumers demand media products. With an advertising pricing
mechanism, producers are unable to price-discriminate by charging
more to those who demand a media product more intensely. Without
far better service at significantly reduced cost--to high-speed Internet access ... Because
local television stations may be distributed to viewers via cable, satellite, or other
distribution systems, there is almost no cost incurred to obtain this benefit.").
278. Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 127, at 213, citing 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14)(A)
and (B) (2001) (providing the statutory authority for the deadline).
279. Hazlett, Response to Yoo, supra note 6, at 251-53. ("In August 2003, the city of
Berlin became the first jurisdiction in the world to turn off its analog television broadcasts
... In analog Berlin, households had been able to receive twelve television stations using
twelve television channels. Through the magic of digital multiplexing, more video content
is now able to flow through the bandwidth previously used for analog transmissions, such
that in digital Berlin viewers now receive twenty-seven television stations over the air.
These digital signals use just seven of the original twelve channels once needed for analog
television.").
280. Special Report: Spectrum Policy, On the Same Wavelength, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14,
2004, at 62.
281. Yoo, Rethinking Free TV, supra note 183, at 1630. (Acknowledging the counter
that advertising provides information, which facilitates commercial transactions, Yoo
concludes that "only in the unlikely event that these two effects exactly offset each other
would it be proper to regard advertising-supported television as efficiently priced.")
282. See id. at 1678 for the explanation and quotations that follow.
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this pricing flexibility, a production requires massive audience appeal
to "generate sufficient revenue to cover its fixed costs." By preventing
viewers from expressing their demand through a willingness to pay
more for certain programming, advertising bolsters the preference for
cosmopolitan programming and worsens "the bias against special
interest programs," including local programs:
The empirical evidence suggests that individuals are willing to pay
several times more for programming than are advertisers. As a
result, reliance on advertising support starves programming of
resources. This burden is likely to fall most heavily on
programming strongly preferred by small segments of the audience.
Such minority-taste products are able to survive in most markets by
identifying market niches and charging more for satisfying them.
Advertising support frustrates this mechanism by giving viewers
only one degree of freedom with which to communicate their
desires to programmers: purchasing or non-purchasing.283
Yoo thus shows that the cost of advertising is more fundamental
than the nuisance of watching ads, with implications for localism
itself. Because it exacerbates the economic imperative to amortize
fixed costs over a larger audience, free TV's advertiser intermediated
model and lack of price discrimination forces free TV to produce
more cosmopolitan, rather than local, programming.
In addition to the costs and costing issues described above,
consuming media products like free TV results in several positive and
negative externalities, namely the costs and benefits that derive from
media consumption transactions but have an impact beyond the
circumstances of consumption and/or the consumer or producer. 2 4 At
this point, I describe a catalogue of these externalities;2 in the section
on the regulatory versus marketplace models, I return to this
catalogue to offer my own views of its role in the media ownership
283. Yoo, Response to Hazlett, supra note 119, at 256.
284. Baker, Giving the Audience, supra note 269, at 316.
285. I credit my catalogue here to a list provided and discussed in C. Edwin Baker's
work:
1. Quality of Public Opinion and Political Participation
2. Audience Members' Interactions with Other People
3. Audience Members' Impact on Cultural Products Available to Others
4. Exposing and Deterring Abuses of Power
5. Other Behavioral Responses to the Possibility of Media Exposure
6. Nonpaying Recipients of Information and Media Output
7. Positive Benefits to People or Entities Wanting Their Message Spread
8. Messages' Negative Effects on Those Who Do Not Want the Attention
9. Gain or Loss to Sources
10. Costs Imposed or Benefits Created by Information Gathering Techniques.
Baker, Giving the Audience, supra note 269, at 366-82.
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debate. The first externality is political: consuming the media affects
the way we participate politically and the quality of public opinion
amidst voters. The disincentive of media exposure also checks abuses
of political power, as well as other scandalous behavior, such as white-
collar crime and corporate mismanagement. As Sunstein's thoughts
above suggest, there are also social implications from the media
consumption transaction, because it affects how we interact with
other people, especially those with whom we have little in common.
On the culture side, because of the incentive to realize economies of
scale, the influence of mass-consumer taste may deny our access to
"niche" media products. At the same time, because media products
are public goods, nonpaying consumers can gain access to the good.
The media offer a positive in the form of access to those who want to
disseminate information and a negative to those who don't want
media exposure. This also relates to the privacy costs of news
gathering and the reluctance or willingness of information sources to
come forward to the media. This list of externalities, coupled with the
description above of media products' economic behavior, introduces
the tensions between the economic, political and cultural
perspectives, which I describe in detail in the next sub-section.
B. Economic Answers to Political and Cultural Problems
As I describe above, Citizen William Pike's letter to the editor
notes two political concerns in the debate on media ownership:
universal access and the educative function of media. Michael
Powell's answer on universal access is that liberalization will save free
TV and improve its quality for the small minority who uses it to
receive their video programming. I have suggested that there may be
other economically feasible means for achieving these universal
access ends2 6 that could concurrently avert the costs associated with
free TV described above.
In response to the political concern that the marketplace of ideas
is threatened by media ownership consolidation, liberalization
proponents counter that the past generation has seen a diffusion of
media ownership 2 and that the concentration of economic power
286. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
287. Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 127, at 208 (describing how, in the last
fifteen years, Fox was successfully established as a fourth major television network and
then joined by three other smaller networks-UPN, WB, and Pax TV--and how, in the
last thirty years, there has also been an "explosion of independent television stations that
offer still more programming in direct competition with the broadcast networks.").
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among media companies can be checked by antitrust law.
Competition protected through antitrust enforcement "should
provide enough diversity of viewpoints without the need either for
specific ownership caps or old-fashioned, paternalistic content
rules." m The first step of antitrust analysis in determining whether a
market is concentrated is to properly define the marketY89
Liberalization proponents advocate that the market in which local
broadcasters operate includes well-established cable, DBS, and
similar technologies that the federal legislation terms multichannel
video programming distributors or "MVPDs,"29 as well as the
emerging fiber-optic means of video delivery currently being
deployed in select markets by Baby Bells. 29' This is based on the
proposition that all MVPDs are substitutable for one another.292 Once
the product market is defined, antitrust enforcers use the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index ("HHI") as the touchstone for determining
whether the level of horizontal concentration in a market could
threaten competition. An HHI above 1800 will be viewed as illegal
according to the Horizontal Guidelines.2 From his analysis of HHIs,
Yoo concludes that the market concentration of television networks
does not meet this threshold.294 On this basis, the shift in the balance
of power imposed by the NTSO rule is an unnecessary interference in
the market.
Liberalization critics respond by first challenging the product
market definition employed above. While "proper market definition
288. Turning it Off, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 2003, at 56.
289. I note that the NTSO rule refers to vertical and horizontal aspects of the market.
The NTSO rule prohibits any entity from controlling television stations the audience reach
of which exceeds a percentage of television households in the United States. 47 C.F.R.
§73.3555(d)(2004). As applied to the networks, this is a restriction on vertical integration.
But the benchmark for the regulatory prohibition is the horizontal consideration of a
network's national audience market share. As a result, a complete account of the debate
has to alter in focus from horizontal to vertical concerns.
290. Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 127, at 208.
291. See generally Almar Latour, Verizon Plans to Test a Superfast Fiber Network,
WALL ST. J., May 19, 2004, at D4.
292. See Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 127, at 209 (10 F.C.C.R. 4538, 4540, §10
(1995) (Report and Order) and 4 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2757, §15 (1989) (Report and Order))
(explaining that the FCC has taken this position in eliminating the Chain Broadcasting
Rules' prohibition of "network ownership of certain local broadcast stations" and in
repealing the "two-year limit on network affiliation agreements.").
293. Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 57.
294. Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 127, at 211-12 (finding, as of 2000, an HIl of
1676 among national television networks by audience share and an HHi of 1605 by
revenue share).
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requires the inclusion of products that act as substitutes" and MVPDs
have overtaken free TV as the primary means of delivering TV
programming,2'9  liberalization critics focus on the product
differentiation within these formats as a basis for distinguishing free
TV products from cable, DBS and the Internet. According to Leanza
and Feld, "neither cable networks nor the Internet provide local
news."' 96 Picking up on this point, the Third Circuit agreed with the
FCC's findings that cable and the Internet contribute to a media
market's viewpoint diversity2'9 but concurrently found that neither
provides the same degree of local programming as free TV stations.2
Echoing Sunstein's ideas about the media's intermediary function, the
Third Circuit notes that many Internet sites, for example, do not
provide the "aggregator function (bringing news/information to one
place) as well as [the] distillation function (making a judgment as to
what is interesting, important, entertaining, etc.)" that we associate
with free TV. 299 As Yoo points out, the free TV business model is to
supply the most common denominator of taste and interests. In
contrast, cable and satellite aim to provide tens of specialty channels
that appeal to different groups' unique tastes and interests.3 In
Sunstein's terms, while free TV provides a shared cultural experience
that gives it the quality of a "general interest intermediary," other
technologies provide the means for personalized cultural
consumption. On this basis, liberalization critics could argue that the
personalized cultural experience of existing MVPDs and new media
are not "reasonably interchangeable by consumers 3°1 for the shared
295. Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 127, at 208-09 (Annual Assessment of the
Status of Competition in the Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, FCC 01-
389, slip op. at 10-54, §§15-115 (Jan. 14, 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-pubic/attachmatch/FCC-01-389Al.pdf (last visited Aug.19, 2004)) (finding that
eighty-six percent of U.S. households now receive their television through cable, DBS, or
some other MVPD).
296. Leanza & Feld, supra note 170, at 18 (citing Nightly Business Report: The
Business of Online News (PBS television broadcast, Aug. 4, 2003), available at
www.nightlybusiness.org).
297. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 65.
298 Id. at 80-82 (affirming the FCC's decision to discount cable as a separate media
outlet category for the purpose of determining the diversity index and deriving the cross-
media limits on the basis of doubts in cable's ability to provide independent local news).
See also id. at 84-90 (taking issue with the FCC's failure to discount the Internet as a media
outlet category for the same diversity index and cross-media limits purposes on the basis
of its insufficiency as an independent source of local news.)
299. Id. at 87.
300. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
301. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).
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cultural experience provided by free TV and should therefore be
excluded from the product market under analysis.
Liberalization proponents can effectively counter that free TV
licensees seem to be moving further and further away from their role
as Sunstein's general interest intermediaries. With digital television,
the average household will be able to receive more than seventy over-
the-air broadcast channels,"' ' suggesting that free TV is pursuing the
same degree of specialization as its cable, satellite and new media
brethren.3 3 At the same time certain MVPDs, such as all-local-news
cable programming, are looking more like general interest
intermediaries, at least at the local level. Indeed, cable's public
access obligations provide legislative authority for cable being cast
in the role of general interest intermediary. Liberalization proponents
can thus argue that the relevant media market for antitrust purposes
should include cable, satellite and new media, as well as free TV
broadcasters.
Liberalization critics might also use US v. Microsoft to argue that emerging technologies
should also be excluded, even if they are capable of delivering the shared cultural
experience, because "the test of reasonable interchangeability" requires the relevant
market include "only substitutes that constrain pricing in the reasonably foreseeable
future." United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
302. Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 127, at 213-14.
303. These developments could support the theory that Sunstein's "general interest
intermediary" is vanishing in the age of consumer sovereignty and limitless choices for
personalizing cultural experience. At the same time, it raises the problem of reconciling
Sunstein's critique within the diversity principle. Sunstein suggests that diversity promotes
an individual's exposure to diverse content, rather than an individual's choice among
diverse options. The problem with assigning the role of general interest intermediary to a
particular technology, such as local broadcasters, and thereby privileging the development
of one technology over another, is that we choke off the potential diversity arising through
other technologies, such as the Internet. The Economist characterized the Internet as a
modem-day version of coffee-house networks that spanned Europe in the seventeenth
century. This description may not meet the standards of Sunstein's general interest
intermediary, but it does describe a network that promotes diversity of content, viewpoints
and interests. See The Internet in a Cup, ECONOMIST, Dec.18, 2003, available at
http://www.economist.com/World/europe/displayStory.cfm?story-id=2281736 (last visited
Aug. 19, 2004).
304. Time Warner's NY1 is an example. See also Yoo, Rethinking Free TV, supra note
183, at 1661 (arguing that must-carry threatens "the emergence of locally oriented, all-
news channels on cable by preempting channel capacity available for such services. In
short, must-carry promotes marginal broadcasters at the expense of marginal cable
channels even though it is the marginal cable channels that are more likely to provide
diverse (including local) programming.").
305. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 531 (2004), Pub. L. No.
98-549, § 611, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984), (requiring cable companies to provide access for public,
educational and governmental programming).
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Assuming for a moment that liberalization critics persuade us to
take a narrow view of the product market, Yoo's HHI analysis
appears to underestimate the actual level of concentration. Indeed,
each mode of video delivery looks like a monopoly. First,
broadcasting is a "government-controlled monopoly, and only those
with a government license can broadcast." Second, cable operators
"are monopolies in virtually every market," and "cable viewers who
want a different type of programming have no competitive options if
they do not like the selections available on their cable systems. They
cannot pick and choose to pay for only one or two channels; they
must pay for a whole package in order to receive most channels."
Finally, because of news production economics, very few Internet
websites control the bulk of Internet news distribution.
Liberalization critics could also respond that the increasing
number of media outlets is an illusion because "new" competitors are
owned by incumbent suppliers. The number of voices in the media
marketplace has increased substantially. In New York City, the
largest market in the United States, between 1960 and 2000, the
number of media outlets increased by 107%. This growth has also
taken place in smaller markets. In Altoona, Pennsylvania,7 there was
a 109% increase in the same period. But, the increase in the number
of owners has not been commensurate. For the same periods, the
number of owners increased by 67% in Altoona, while the increase in
New York has been much more substantial at 90%. Altoona is much
smaller, and in this respect a more authentic "local" market than New
York, which is a media capital and cosmopolitan metropolis. Noting
this discrepancy, liberalization critics would argue that local
communities such as Altoona may have twelve new voices3  in the
media marketplace, but, as in Orwell, they are twelve voices saying
the same or similar things because they share ownership (and
editorial governance) with existing voices.&
306. See Leanza & Feld, supra note 170, at 18 for the explanation and quotations that
follow.
307. Altoona, Pennsylvania, ranked 253rd in market size. Scott Roberts, Jane Frenette
& Dione Stems, A Comparison of Media Outlets and Owners for Ten Selected Markets:
1960, 1980, 2000, FCC Media Ownership Working Group (Sept. 2002) at
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/studies.html (see specifically Table 1).
308. Altoona had eleven media outlets in 1960. In 2000, there were twenty-three. Id
309. I am not suggesting that liberalization critics would actually make this argument.
But they might if this anecdotal insight offered from the random selection of Altoona and
New York could be sustained through a statistically relevant sampling. See supra note 36
for the Orwell reference.
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The mismatch between the growth of outlets and owners is most
obvious in radio, where the 1996 Act eliminated the limits on the
number of AM and FM broadcast stations that a single entity could
own nationally (the radio equivalent of the NTSO rule).31° Between
March 1996 and March 2002, the total number of stations increased
by 5.4%, but the number of radio station owners decreased by 34%3
And between 1996 and 2000, the number of owners in each market
declined by three.3 2 Despite all these arguments, liberalization
proponents can come back and say that antitrust will take care of
this-if ownership concentration in the media markets becomes
excessive, this will be revealed in the HHI and further consolidation
will be restricted. Assuming that certain technologies for media
distribution are reasonably interchangeable, the American media
market is competitive according to liberalization proponents. This
approach is based on the balance of checking intra-modal dominance
with inter-modal competition.3"3 Free TV competes with cable, which
competes with DBS, which will all soon be competing with the
Internet and fiber-optic distribution.
Liberalization proponents can combine assertions about the
health of competition in the media marketplace (either inter- or intra-
modal) with pro-competitive justifications for liberalization and
concentration that mimic rule of reason antitrust analysis.314 The first
consequence of liberalizing or eliminating ownership regulation such
as the NTSO rule will be to destroy the protectionism afforded to free
TV. With more media voices joining the consequently liberalized
310. See 1996 Act, supra note 26, at §§202(a)-(b).
311. George Williams & Scott Roberts, Radio Industry Review 2002: Trends in
Ownership, Format, and Finance, MOWG Study No. 11 at 3 (F.C.C. Sept. 2002), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A20.doc (last visited
Aug. 20, 2004).
312. Edward D. Cavanagh, De-Regulation of the Air Waves: Is Antitrust Enough? 17
ST. JOHN'S J.LEGAL COMMENT. 67, 71 (2003).
313. STARR, supra note 2, at 349-50.
314. Although primarily developed out of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§1, which contemplates agreements to restrain trade, in the merger context, rule of reason
has also influenced the application of section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§12-27. A
broad rule of reason test, as outlined by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade
distinguishes between restraints of trade that merely regulate or promote competition and
restraints that may suppress or destroy competition. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231,244 (1918). Pro-competitive justifications for consolidation that lessen
the risk of anti-competitive effect also appear in the Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 57
at §4 and the Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, 1984 Merger
Guidelines [hereinafter Vertical Merger Guidelines], 3.5, reprinted in 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823
(June 29, 1984).
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market, this will intensify competition. As I suggest above, new cable
networks could emerge. Or, there could be an increase in the number
of stations, as there has been in radio since the liberalizing measures
of the 1996 Act."5 This would promote "diversity and localism in
programming as stations seek out specific niche markets to gain the
greatest audience share. 31 6 Even where liberalized ownership
regulations allow a single entity to own many stations in the same
community, programming diversity could increase with the resulting
economies of scope. The owner "would not want to compete with
itself for the same group of listeners" so it would program each of its
various stations according to different tastes.1 7 However, if these
stations were separately owned, they would "compete against each
other within the same format, targeting the same group of
listeners. 31 8 According to this theory, a concentrated market is
preferable to an atomistic market in offering the diverse and
personalized products that consumers want. Setting to one side
Sunstein's concerns about personalizing cultural experience, it is
inconclusive whether this theory has played out in radio markets since
liberalization.3 9 Classical and jazz formats have decreased, prompting
listeners to obtain this programming from the Internet, 32° an imperfect
substitute for radio broadcasting, at least presently. For so-called pay-
for-play, where artists and record labels gain access to airtime by
315. See Williams & Roberts, supra note 311.
316. Prindle, supra note 221, at 297.
317. Id. at 299-300 (Peter 0. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the
Workability of Competition in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q. J. ECON. 194 (1952) and
Benjamin J. Bates & Todd Chambers, The Economic Basis for Radio Deregulation, 12 J.
MEDIA ECONS. 19,24 (YEAR)).
318. Prindle, supra note 221, at 300. Prindle explains:
If there is a monopoly, where the only two stations in a market are owned by the
same entity, and eighty percent of the audience wants to listen to a country music
format and twenty percent wants to listen to a classical music format, the entity
would not want to compete against itself. Thus, one station would have a country
music format and the other station would have a classical music format in order
to reach the most possible listeners . . . [In contrast], if there are only two
separately owned stations in a market where eighty percent of the audience
wants to listen to a country music format and twenty percent wants to listen to a
classical music format, the two stations would have no motivation to have a
classical music format. Sharing the country music format could give each station
forty percent of the listeners in the market, compared to a maximum of twenty
percent of the listeners with a classical music format.
Id. at n.147.
319. Prindle, supra note 221, at 315.
320. Id.
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paying for it, consolidation has raised prices and reduced alternative
options. Consequently, small record labels and new or independent
artists are squeezed out, reducing the potential diversity of the
airwaves.321
Does inter-modal competition mitigate the negative effects of
consolidation in radio? Digital audio radio satellite ("DARS")
"delivers national networks, bundled into one-hundred-channel
packages, in a subscription-based business plan that seeks to compete
with established broadcast licensees-AM and FM radio stations. ' 2
In other words, DARS is completely inconsistent with the
commitments to free, local and single-channel offerings that Yoo
attributes to the current regulatory framework for free TV.33 Because
it offers a way to maximize the economically efficient use of spectrum
and great potential for diverse programming, DARS represents a
compelling inter-modal alternative to an admittedly consolidated
radio market.2 The major problem is that regulation prohibits DARS
from offering local content.32' So any argument about DARS'
potential as inter-modal competition is moot. Radio, it seems, has
been only partially liberalized, with localism shackling DARS' ability
to compete and possibly exacerbating the negatives of consolidation
noted above.
The second pro-competitive justification that liberalization
proponents offer for ownership liberalization turns our attention to
vertical considerations. Liberalization proponents argue that the
economics of video production require vertical integration of
321. Prindle, supra note 221, at 323.
322. Hazlett, Response to Yoo, supra note 6, at 249.
323. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
324. Hazlett, Response to Yoo, supra note 6, at 249. ("'Local' radio stations have for
years delivered generic national programs beamed to stations around the country via
satellite. Direct broadcasts to customers efficiently cut out the middleman and, via digital
technologies, allow customers to expand dramatically the number of programs available.
By introducing subscription services offering bundles, satellite radio operators also have
economic incentives to avoid bunching up product choices at the least common
denominator. Instead of twenty Adult Contemporary, Country Western, or Middle of the
Road formats, DARS operators run a long musical continuum through dozens of
genres.... This is a classic application of the economics of spatial competition.").
325. Id. at 251. Hazlett laments that "this is the 'public interest' policy outcome of
localism. Radio stations enjoy larger audiences and will have less incentive to provide
interesting, original programming of national or local origin, because competitive pressure
will be muted. While there are over 107 million households in the United States, the
largest satellite operator barely has one million subscribers. Incumbents, with help from
regulators, hope that the rules in place limit the damage this competitive entrant will
inflict on 'local' radio audiences." Id. at 251.
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networks and local stations to permit diverse and high-quality
programming.32 6 This is because of the already familiar "large, up-
front fixed costs associated with creating the first copy of television
programs and minimal costs associated with distributing programs to
additional viewers."3 27 If broadcast networks pursue vertical
integration by purchasing local TV stations, this guaranteed network
access to audiences would lower the network's costs.328 Liberalization
proponents assert that, without this access guarantee, there is a risk
that investment in programming may fall below the welfare-
maximizing level.3 29 But this argument seems strange because those
who rely on free TV for video distribution are a negligible share of
the population, which does not offer financial resources sufficient to
induce programming development. The missing link is the "must-
carry" regime under the 1992 Cable Act, which compels cable
operators to carry full-power local station programming. 3 Just as
localism reared its head in shackling DARS' potential as inter-modal
competition for radio, localism pops up unexpectedly again as the
explanation for why networks want free TV stations. In forcing cable
to carry full power local stations, localism preserves the stations'
importance as media suppliers, and prompts networks to covet their
guaranteed access to audiences. Thus, with radio, liberalization critics'
complaints about consolidation make no sense because potential
competitors are shackled with localist regulation, while liberalization
proponents' arguments for vertical integration of free TV make no
sense without the localist regulatory interference.
The third pro-competitive justification for ownership
deregulation and consolidation that liberalization proponents
advocate is the managerial, technical and other efficiencies resulting
from vertical integration of networks and local stations.3 1 The idea is
that efficiencies resulting from integrating a free TV station's
operations with a network improve the station's financial viability and
326. This reverberates in Powell's assertion that TV networks require the flexibility to
consolidate in order to provide quality programming. See supra note 81 and accompanying
text.
327. Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 127, at 213-214.
328. Id. at 214-15.
329. Id.
330. 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (2004).
331. In antitrust analysis, efficiencies have more weight in the vertical context than in
the horizontal context because there is less risk that price and output will be affected at
the vertical level. See Vertical Merger Guidelines, supra note 314, at §4.24.
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competitiveness. This preserves local, remote stations that are
otherwise economically infeasible. This viability rationale motivated
the FCC to abandon that part of the chain broadcasting rules
prohibiting networks from owning small community stations.333
But how do efficiencies benefit media consumers? Productive
efficiencies in free TV would likely resemble the economies of scale
that have been realized through the liberalization and consolidation
of radio ownership. Multiple stations can share resources including
"management and production and programming personnel, as well as
clerical staff. Additionally, bulk discounts on services and supplies as
well as shared advertising, promotions, and technical facilities
decrease the costs of doing business. ' 334 In widget-like manufacturing
endeavors, these productive efficiencies are passed on to consumers
in the form of lower prices. In the case of free TV, prices are paid by
advertisers, not consumers, and benefits to advertisers are too remote
from the public interest to be relevant. Liberalization proponents
could respond that such efficiencies liberate resources for innovation
in, and development of, programming. The FCC's 2003 Order points
out that the "consumer welfare enhancing efficiencies" that result
from local station consolidation eliminate "redundant expenses" and
increase "opportunities for cross-promotion and related
programming," with the effect of improving "local news and public
interest programming.3 35 Radio has shown how such efficiencies
benefit consumers in the form of "improved facilities, stronger
signals, and more expensive talent." 36 There are also potential
economies of scope. A radio conglomerate has "more financial capital
to reinvest in local radio stations and markets than smaller owners." 37
So, efficiencies should promote localism, as well as the competition
and diversity elements of the public interest.
The idea that a more consolidated market will produce greater
innovation is counter-intuitive. To the extent that vertical integration
concentrates ownership at the network level, this raises an issue of
horizontal concentration. Greater horizontal concentration tends to
result in greater market power, which corresponds with greater
influence over price and output. According to classic economic
332. Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 127, at 218.
333. Id.
334. Prindle, supra note 221, at 301-02.
335. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 112.
336. Prindle, supra note 221, at 301-02.
337. Id. at 302.
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theory, a firm with power over price and output has less incentive to
innovate because of the absence of competitive threat. Bringing this
to the communications context, Lemley and Lessig have asserted that,
empirically, competition spurs more creativity than monopoly.3 8 Yoo
challenges this assertion, arguing that "there appears to be little
empirical basis for believing that ... higher levels of innovation are
associated with lower levels of market concentration."33 9 Yoo's point
is that innovation will be lowest at the extremes of perfect
competition and monopoly. This makes economic sense. In perfect
competition, competitors will not have the resources to innovate,
while an oligopolistic market does not give individual competitors the
power to affect price and output unless these competitors are
colluding. As a result, the incentive to innovate can survive a highly
concentrated market.
Radio provides examples of innovation in media markets that
follow ownership liberalization and consolidation. "Voice-tracking"
records programming in central locations such as New York or Los
Angeles and transmits it "throughout the nation as a series of taped
moments that are spliced together to sound as if the disc jockeys were
broadcasting locally." For example, Clear Channel's "Prophet"
"allows disc jockeys to . . . spend a few minutes recording
introductions and other sound bytes, and a computer merges those
sounds with songs, promotional spots, sound effects, and commercials
to create the show." This allows smaller markets to receive otherwise
unaffordable cosmopolitan programming. ° However, liberalization
critics would quickly point out its potential to undermine localism by
offering a uniform radio product manufactured in a major urban
center with standardized inputs. The Third Circuit observed that
"consolidation has also reduced the amount of locally produced radio
338. Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 961 (2001).
339. Yoo, Vertical Integration, supra note 127, at 277. Yoo states that "my own review
of the extensive empirical literature on this question indicates that .. the relationship
between innovation and market structure is more ambiguous . . . While some studies
found that increases in research and development tended to be associated with high
market concentration, other studies came to precisely the opposite conclusion. Still others
argued that the relationship between market concentration and innovation was non-linear.
Under these analyses, innovative activity is at its lowest when the market is either highly
competitive or monopolistic and at its highest at moderate levels of concentration." Id. at
275-76.
340. See Prindle, supra note 221, at 317-18 for this explanation and these quotations
regarding voice-tracking.
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content, as large group-owners often broadcast remotely from
national offices instead of having local employees produce
programming." 34' This chokes off the local "voice" by eliminating the
need for a local disc jockey and reducing other forms of local access
to the medium:
If the show is taped, a listener cannot call a favorite disc jockey and
make a request. Also, local appearances are at a minimum, if at all
... and some worry that "formats will serve the most profitable
demographics only and that syndicated programming will become a
cost-saving mainstay, prompting a decline in localization."'342
This provides ammunition for liberalization critics to claim that
efficiencies and innovation cannot be assumed to promote localism.
But does this cogently lead to the conclusion that we should prohibit
the shift in operational and programming control from the local
station owner's office to the network's executive suite?
C. Owner Identity
Regardless of access, innovation and efficiency justifications for
vertical integration, liberalization critics argue that integration will
harm the public interest value of localism because the increased
network ownership of free TV stations will bolster network power,
allowing the networks to usurp local station owners' control over
programming decisions.343 This is the same concern that motivated the
chain broadcasting rules,3 which resurfaced with a relatively recent
shift in the balance of power from local licensees to networks:
The balance of power began to shift in the early 1990s after
networks were allowed to acquire more local stations. For example,
Viacom, through its ownership of CBS and UPN stations, now
owns 39 stations reaching 39% of the nation's audience, compared
with 10 years ago when it owned six stations reaching just 19%.
As the networks' power grew, they started to cut payments to
locally owned affiliates for carrying their programs and in some
cases even demanded payments from affiliates. Growing
accustomed to the close control they had over the local stations
341. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 162-63 (citing Comments of Future
Music Coalition, MB Docket 02-277, at 13-14 (Nov. 20, 2002)).
342. Prindle, supra note 221, at 318-19.
343. See 2003 Order, supra note 12, at §578 (providing the rationale for balancing the
power of affiliates against networks); and see also NBC v. U.S., 319 U.S. at 224-25
(affirming the chain-broadcasting rules and accepting the FCC's finding that competition
and localism suffer when a local station obtains much of its programming from a national
network).
344. See supra notes 123-131 and accompanying text.
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they own, the networks became more restrictive when negotiating
pre-emption deals.3 5
Through a public choice lens, this shift looks like erosion of the
FCC's jurisdictional authority, which we know is limited to licensees.
But, if liberalization critics depended on a threat to FCC jurisdiction,
this would prove the public choice point: protecting licensees protects
the regulator and other political investments in regulation. Thus,
liberalization critics have to start with a premise that ties the
importance of local control over local stations to benefits for media
consumers, not licensees, replicating the truism that antitrust's
mandate is to protect competition, not competitors.346
Liberalization critics start with the idea that owner identity
matters in realizing the public interest because of the economic stake
that ownership represents. The incentives that flow from this
economic stake, combined with the educative role of media, create
ample opportunities for conflict of interest. Media owners need
advertising revenue to operate, and they are often tied to other
industrial enterprises through conglomerate corporate relationships.
At some point, the media supplier will have to report or offer an
editorial position on an advertiser or related company.347
Disseminating this information or opinion could conflict with or
promote the economic interest of a potential advertiser (potentially
hampering/improving access to advertising revenue) or related
company (potentially harming/improving the financial position of the
conglomerate). Both outcomes affect the financial picture of the
media supplier.
Liberalization proponents have offered several arguments in
response. The strongest counter is the lack of proof on the degree of
influence that ownership has on viewpoint. In its 2003 Order, the FCC
states that "although there is evidence to suggest that ownership
345. Matthew Rose & Joe Flint, Behind Media-Ownership Fight, An Old Power
Struggle is Raging, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15,2003, at Al and A16.
346. Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. at 344.
347. See Ted Turner, Break Up This Band! How government protects big media-and
shuts out upstarts like me, 36 WASH. MONTHLY 30, 34 (2004) ("Disney's boss, after buying
ABC in 1995, was quoted in LA Weekly as saying, "I would prefer ABC not cover
Disney." A few days later, ABC killed a "20/20" story critical of the parent company.").
See also TILLINGHAST, supra note 19, at 161-62 (offering another example of NBC, whose
parent GE "designed, manufactured or supplied parts or maintenance for nearly every
important weapons system employed by the USA during the Gulf War, including the
much-praised Patriot and Tomahawk Cruise Missiles. .. . Few TV viewers ... were aware
of the inherent conflict of interest whenever NBC correspondents hailed the performance
of U.S. weapons.").
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influences viewpoint, the degree to which it does so cannot be
established with any certitude." With an increasingly fragmented and
competitive market, "owners face increasing pressure to differentiate
their products, including by means of differing viewpoints." More
importantly, "other news and informational outlets" are increasingly
available to overcome the risk that "a particular outlet may betray
some bias, particularly in matters that may affect the private or
pecuniary interest of its corporate parent (e.g., such as when an outlet
has an interest in a real estate transaction or is being criticized in an
op-ed)." While there may be anecdotal evidence in this regard, there
is no "pattern of bias in the vast majority of news comment and
coverage where such self-interest is not implicated. Nor, moreover, do
such incidents mean that the public was left uninformed about the
situation by other available media. Therefore, it would seem that the
remedy for any such "bias" is the provision of antagonistic viewpoint
we seek to advance." 48 The Third Circuit affirmed these FCC
findings.349 However, the Third Circuit did not thereby dismiss the risk
of ownership influencing viewpoint: the risk will only be mitigated
with sufficient substitutes in the market.3'5 And, recalling the analysis
above on the substitutability of other media for free TV, the Third
Circuit cites the FCC's findings that Internet and cable are not
complete substitutes for viewpoints provided by free TV. 51
For liberalization critics skeptical about ownership's neutral
impact on viewpoint, liberalization proponents could explain that
content production can be insulated from the owner's profit concerns
through an institutional separation of "church" and "state:"
This prevents the "state," the business arm concerned with profit,
from pressuring the "church," the repository of independent
editorial judgment. The "church" part, relieved of worry about
profits, single-mindedly devotes itself to serving the public interest,
without need to be concerned if a heavy advertiser like Ford Motor
Company is disturbed by reports of defects in its product.
352
348. 2003 Order, supra note 12, at §364. See also infra notes 362, 363 and
accompanying text.
349. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 60.
350. Id. at 66 ("[Tlhe Commission found evidence to undermine the premise that
ownership always influences viewpoint, but it did not find the opposite to be true.").
351. Id. at 66-67, citing Media Ownership Working Group Study No. 3 (finding that
the Internet and cable rank as sources of local news, but they do not outrank newspapers
and broadcast television.).
352. TILLINGHAST, supra note 19, at 37.
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This separation seems problematic in the realm of corporate law,
where businesses are required to be run in the interests of
shareholders, which usually means maximizing profit. The product
(here, editorial and other programming content) is highly relevant to
the profitability of all businesses: if the product is bad, the business
will do poorly and vice versa. This legal fact may be why the
"editorial content of publications and broadcasting is dictated by the
computer printouts on advertising agency desks, not the other way
around."' '353 There is nothing evil about this. It's just ... the way it is.
Scandals in the securities analysis and auditing sectors show how
porous institutional divisions between "church" and "state" can be
when economic interests are involved. Even though they were
"insulated" from the operations of investment banks, research
analysts could not overlook the economic interests of their investment
bank employers when giving buy endorsements to securities that their
employers underwrote, even though they knew they were not worth
buying. Partners at auditing firms were also unable to overlook the
economic interests of the firm's consulting practice when they had to
decide whether to accurately report the financial state of the company
and risk losing valuable consulting revenue. Congress therefore
prohibited auditors from providing certain consulting and other
services to their auditing clients in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 3 4
However, potential conflicts are not as easily eradicated from media
firms, because of the longstanding tradition that they are concurrently
committed to a professional principle of objectivity and the objective
function of profitability. The separation of church and state may be
an institutional fiction, but it may be the only feasible way of
reconciling the media's educative role with the commercial engine
behind American media production. The coexistence of commercial
success and editorial autonomy is captured well by Pulitzer's formula
where "circulation means advertising, and advertising means money,
and money means independence." 355
Liberalization critics maintain that ownership regulation, such as
the NTSO rule, offers the best media equivalent of Sarbanes-Oxley to
mitigate threats to media independence. Ted Turner explains that:
353. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 39, at 225. The fact that corporate law conflicts with the
editorial independence we expect from media enterprises may itself be grounds for
regulation, an idea that I hope to explore in future work.
354. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2004).
355. STARR, supra note 2, at 395.
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[I]f there is a limit to the number of TV stations a corporation can
own, then the chance exists that after all the corporations have
reached this limit, there may still be some stations left over to be
bought and run by independents. A lower limit would encourage
the entry of independents and promote competition. A higher limit• 356
does the opposite.
This is beneficial for localism in Turner's view because "[1]arge
corporations are more profit-focused and risk-averse," killing more
costly local programming in favor of cheaper national programming-
even if these "decisions run counter to local interests and community
values. 357
In contrast, locally based independents will promote a mission
and programming consistent with local interests and values. Consider
as an example the following local station licensee:
Mr. Goodmon, 60 years old, is a third-generation owner who
started working at his family's company, closely held Capitol
Broadcasting, when he was 13. As a locally prominent businessman,
he fits the mold of an old-fashioned, down-home affiliate owner-a
type that was common when most local stations were mom-and-pop
affairs. His company owns the local minor-league baseball team,
the champion Durham Bulls, and he's leading one of Durham's
most significant urban-renewal projects. 358
Although sensitized, to his local community, Mr. Goodmon also
faces potential conflicts of interest under the analysis above,
suggesting that remote owners could be preferable to local ones.
Capitol Broadcasting probably reports on the Durham Bulls and the
potentially controversial urban-renewal project (in which Goodmon
may have a direct or indirect economic stake). The potential for
conflict here is equally acute as when NBC reports on weaponry
manufactured by its parent GE or when ABC chooses not to report
on its parent Disney. On this view, the Bulls and the urban renewal
project become "sacred cows" that are "guaranteed a positive image,"
or are at least "immune to criticism. 3 59 This potential for "local"
356. Turner, supra note 347, at 34.
357. Id. at 32.
358. Rose & Flint, supra note 345.
359. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 39, at 154 ("In the newsrooms of America... 'sacred
cows' . . . frequently include the owners, the owner's family and friends, major advertisers,
and the owner's political causes. Sacred cows in the news run from the gamut from
petunias to presidents. In one northeastern city the sacred cow is the civic flowerbeds
donated by the publisher's spouse; in another city it is an order that any picture of Richard
Nixon must show him smiling."). My references to Capitol Broadcasting and Mr.
Goodmon are merely exemplary. While I do observe a potential for conflict here, I am not
asserting that Goodmon or Capitol Broadcasting is in any actual conflict of interest. My
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conflicts of interest taints liberalization critics' "sacred cow" assertion
that local owners are invariably best able to promote localism and
local diversity because of their connections with the community.
Discounting this potential for conflict, liberalization critics stand
by a characterization of local licensees as the stewards of localism on
the traditional rationale that, if an owner inhabits the license
geography, this will align owner and community interests. If the
licensee resides in the community, s/he will care as much about its
localist integrity as the community members. This resembles the
proposition that tying CEO compensation to firm performance aligns
management and shareholder interests (so long as the CEO cannot
profitably manipulate share price and take advantage of sudden gains
or losses). But is this coincidence of economic interest analogous to
the geographic coincidence of the licensee's address with the territory
covered by his/her license? The idea seems to be that a local owner
will want to improve his/her local quality of life by investing in, or
donating to, local cultural or other endeavors. The idea depends on
giving geographic relationships the same weight as economic ones,
which may or may not withstand sociological inquiry. Economically
speaking, Goodmon will use his control over local media to promote
his sports franchise and renewal project, and he may be more likely to
invest in other "localist" projects that can be effectively marketed
through his TV station. However, these same marketing advantages
and local market demands offer equally powerful incentives for a
remote station owner to invest in such local projects. Why would
Goodmon be any more inclined to pursue these endeavors because of
his geographic location? The philanthropic aspect of it may be more
convincing: Goodmon will probably spend more time investing his
resources in local charitable causes than a remote owner, because his
geography ensures that he will more likely enjoy them or be
recognized for their success. However, this would also be true of local
owners of any industrial enterprise. Yet, antitrust and other areas of
economic regulation, such as banking, have abandoned their
encouragement of local ownership for its own sake. ° Is there
something sufficiently unique about a local community's relationship
with its free TV station that justifies such encouragement of local
media ownership?
intention here is to explore plausible explanations of local licensees' activities and
investments in the local community to challenge the assumption that local owners always
promote the best interests of the local community, without the potential for conflict.
360. See supra Part IV.1.A.
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In answering, liberalization critics take us back to the original
point about the local community's need for its taste and sensibility to
be reflected in free TV station programming. Goodmon's presence in
the geography of the local community enables him to ascertain its
sensibility and to select programming accordingly. 6' Liberalization
critics, such as Ted Turner, would argue that a remote owner of a
large media conglomerate does not have comparable means to
decipher these local sensibilities. But, even if we hypothesize that the
tastes of local owners are identical to those of their local community,
this in no way guarantees that any of the products demanded will be
local. Furthermore, there is no empirical consensus on whether an
owner's identity is at all relevant to programming, reinforcing the lack
of evidence connecting ownership with viewpoint that I noted above:
Multiple studies have concurred that programming differences
related to group ownership are mixed and, even at that, are quite
small. For example, stations owned by larger groups broadcast
slightly fewer minutes per week of all local programming but more
minutes of both local news and public affairs programming.362
... within the commercial sectors of the United States broadcasting
industry, it is very difficult to point to how ownership has been the
cause of specific programming. We cannot say that group-owned
stations are programmed differently than independently owned
stations. We cannot say that stations owned by racial minorities, by
specific ethnic groups, or by a specific gender behave, in aggregate,
differently from one another.363
In the context of foreign versus domestic ownership, Grant and
Wood concur with Ted Turner's finding that, compared with local
owners, "multinational conglomerates make less innovative, more
profit-driven and risk-averse choices" and they "tend to focus on local
creators whose success is already assured, not on the new, unknown
talents who need nourishing and development." 364 Because of the
economies of scale already noted, a foreign owner producing or
acquiring programming in Canada will choose products "less specific
to Canadian audiences and more general in their references" because
361. Rose & Flint, supra note 345.
362. Benjamin M. Compaine, The Impact of Ownership on Content: Does it Matter?,
13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J 755, 770 (1995).
363. Id. at 779. Compaine also notes that "ownership certainly has an effect on
content. The content of public television, with its different "ownership" and strategic
charge from its board of directors, is distinct from the content of commercial television.
We know that the state-owned or controlled broadcasters in Europe created programming
that is distinctive from the United States model" Id.
364. GRANT & WOOD, supra note 151, at 259.
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"those programs could most profitably be added to the multinational
parent's library and reused in third countries at minimal marginal
cost." ' 6 In contrast, "a local owner is far more likely to appreciate
that special un-universality of her native culture than is a
multinational conglomerate in dogged pursuit of its next global hit."
36
Grant and Wood do not provide data supporting this position, which
leaves us with the empirical ambiguity noted above.367 And, even
Grant and Wood are skeptical about the role of ownership in
promoting localist expression. They are comfortable arguing that
"smaller companies in the cultural field-particularly those with
owner-managers in place-have an admirable track record of
supporting local cultural expression, ' 3" agreeing with Ted Turner's
point that the size of the owner matters. However, they are less
certain about the importance of the identity of the owner:
statutory limits on foreign ownership may be of value to the extent
that they preserve a greater number of local gatekeepers able to
bring new cultural expression before their domestic publics. But in
contrast to other available measures, such as content rules,
mandatory expenditure requirements and .. .targeted subsidies,
they are surely not the sharpest or the surest tools in the kit.3
9
Assuming that ownership rules are ineffective, what rules would
liberalization proponents offer as means to ensure localism, diversity
and competition in media markets? The answer is the antitrust
analysis in Part V.3.B. above, its HHI thresholds, as well as access,
efficiency and innovation pro-competitive justifications. But, even if
liberalization critics concede defeat on all antitrust arguments, they
may still have a leg to stand on in response.
D. The Limits of Antitrust
Because of the media's educative influence, liberalization critics
maintain that concentration standards governing ownership issues
should be different for media corporations than for widget makers
and fast-food restaurants. If a voice is removed from the market,
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. With respect to the programming incentives that follow from ownership and
vertical integration, Grant and Wood cite RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES:
CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE (2000) at 296 (describing the incentives for
entertainment firms to integrate vertically) and 324-25 (describing the synergies of
entertainment conglomerates as "probably illusory," offering at best "defensive value"
and requiring "a water-and-oil mixture of creative talents with bureaucratic planners.").
368. GRANT & WOOD, supra note 151, at 262.
369. Id.
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HHIs can tell us the potential effect on price and output functions.
But, we still won't understand the effect on the diversity of viewpoints
and the quality of political debate.30 Voices and viewpoints, rather
than price and output, constitute the nervous system of the
marketplace of ideas. While there is widespread acceptance of the
proposition that a highly concentrated market can still allow price and
output to reach equilibrium, there is no consensus that price and
output equilibrium is a proxy for a healthy marketplace of ideas.
Indeed, antitrust enforcement and doctrine often claim to lack the
measurement tools to decide whether there is sufficient diversity of
voices to insure healthy political debate.3 71 Because ownership rules
and antitrust aim at different concerns, as the Third Circuit pointed
out, 372 antitrust laws may be insufficient safeguards to displace the
traditional regulatory fare of "specific ownership caps. 3 73 If antitrust
were enough, license transfer approvals would not consider diversity
or localism, nor would many transfers be reviewed by any regulatory
authority. The Third Circuit observed that "eighty-five percent of
station mergers . . . since 2000 would not have been subject to
antitrust review because the parties' assets fell below" the
transaction-size thresholds that trigger antitrust review under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act.374
Within the argument about whether or not antitrust analysis
could replace current ownership regulation to safeguard the
marketplace of ideas, there is a subsidiary argument about the proper
boundaries of antitrust. In the United States, the mandate of antitrust
enforcement is set out primarily in the vague prescriptions of the
Sherman Act37' and the vast jurisprudence that interprets these
sections. The doctrinal, historical and academic views of antitrust are
reasonably well settled that antitrust analysis is the domain of
economic efficiency, but there is some controversy about whether
370. See e.g., Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62
U. Prr. L. REv. 503, 517-18 (2001) (arguing that optimal levels of price competition
cannot be a proxy for optimal levels of diversity in independent editorial programming).
371. See GRANT & WOOD, supra note 151, at 291 (describing how, in Canada,
competition authorities have explicitly renounced authority over monitoring editorial
diversity). In 2002, the Competition Commissioner told a parliamentary committee that
"diversity of voices is not an issue of economic competition and, consequently, does not
fall within the purview of the [Competition] Bureau's mandate." Id.
372. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
373. Turning it Off, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13,2003, at 56.
374. See 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 108.
375. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004).
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antitrust can or should be sensitive to political and social
considerations. As I state above, Robert Pitofsky maintains that
advancing democracy is a goal of antitrust policy.3 6 In contrast,
Richard Posner limits the scope of antitrust on the basis that there is
no "justification for using the antitrust laws to attain goals unrelated
or antithetical to efficiency. '  Even Pitofsky concedes, and antitrust
jurisprudence affirms, that, in its analytic approach, antitrust
privileges the economic perspective over the political.37s
The focus on economic efficiency has been evident in radio
merger reviews that have taken place post-liberalization.3 79 Before the
1996 Act, the largest station combinations had less than 65 stations.
'' 0
Following the 1996 Act's liberalization, 38 1 radio has become a highly
concentrated industry, with "10 parent companies ... that dominate
the radio industry and control about two-thirds of both listeners and
radio revenues nationwide." ' Yet, mergers have been approved
383through Hart-Scott-Rodino Act merger reviews at these
concentration levels, implying that they do not violate antitrust
standards.3  Markets are usually defined in radio mergers along local
lines because radio advertising is highly localized. Yet, this does not
address whether ownership changes affect localist concerns with
programming and development, or whether further concentration
affects the editorial diversity required for the marketplace of ideas to
function properly. And antitrust admits that it does not have these
answers.
So, if we accept the controversial idea that ownership is relevant
to diversity and localism, liberalization critics can argue that antitrust
leaves gaping holes in its regulatory capacity "including content
376. Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, supra note 222.
377. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1-2 (2d ed. 2001) in PITOFSKY,
GOLDSCHMID AND WOOD, TRADE REGULATION, supra note 222, at 7.
378. Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, supra note 222.
379. See Cavanagh, supra note 312, at 72 (describing the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division's approach to radio merger cases under the Horizontal Guidelines).
380. Id.
381. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
382. The largest parent, Clear Channel, controls more than 1200 stations. See 2004
Third Circuit Review, supra note 1 at 162, citing Williams & Roberts, supra note 311, at 4;
see also Cavanagh, supra note 312, at 71.
383. Hart-Scott-Rodino Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (premerger
notification and review) (2004).
384. Cavanagh, supra note 312, at 72.
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diversity and the need for local stations to address local concerns."
385
Because it is blind to the owner's identity, including geographic
location, antitrust law is "unlikely to embody the democratic concerns
with assuring maximum numbers of separate owners participating in
the 'marketplace of ideas' or with democratic worries about
concentrated power to influence public opinion ... [which] relate, in
the end, to whom has control over media content and how these
people will use this power."386 Because of the special non-economic
power that accompanies control over a media supplier, regulating
control over the supplier has to take on parameters beyond HHI
levels to include race, gender and geography:
an ideal policy will be concerned with more issues than mere
ownership concentration .... Which groups of people or which
individuals, with relations to various wider societal groups should
exercise control is also important-as implicitly recognized by the
former FCC policy favoring racial diversity in ownership. The
general democratic goal is increased pluralism of sources and
viewpoint as well as of content or subject categories. 
3
K
Regulating media ownership necessarily becomes less threshold
and index based than regulating competition generally-the
marketplace of ideas always functions better with an ever increasing
pluralism of sources and viewpoints. On this basis, liberalization
critics conclude:
Some modest regulation by Congress, which assures that the
channels of mass communications, so vital to our democracy, are
not merged into the hands of two or three media conglomerates,
thereby preserving diversity of content and localism in broadcast
media, is essential. Congress now has a window of opportunity in
which to act; its failure to do so may have a devastating impact on
the market for free ideas. In the meantime, it is both unfair and
unwise to expect that antitrust can provide all the answers.388
In the end, we know that Congress did heed this call by freezing
the NTSO rule's cap at 39%, but this does not stop liberalization
proponents from questioning the fundamental premises of
liberalization critics. I have suggested throughout the article that
empirical evidence provides little guidance on which position is more
385. Id. at 74.
386. Baker, Media Concentration, supra note 224, at 911-19.
387. Id.
388. Cavanagh, supra note 312, at 80. See also Baker, Media Concentration, supra note
224, at 911-19 (arguing that antitrust is incapable of scrutinizing the impact of ownership
changes on editorial diversity and localism, which justifies "more stringent, somewhat
differently focused media-specific rules relating to ownership" monitored and enforced by
a regulatory agency).
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convincing. Not surprisingly, the divide is essentially an ideological
one between a regulatory and marketplace approach to addressing
the public interest in media matters. The next section of the article
examines the economic and philosophical bases for the regulatory and
marketplace models and the models' roles in the debate on the NTSO
rule, media ownership and the political, cultural and economic
perspectives. In trying to get beyond this ideological deadlock, we are
led back to the importance of territorial institutions as a check on the
increasingly un-territorial nature of communications.
VI. The Ideological Dichotomy
1. Consumer Sovereignty Versus Political Sovereignty
At several points in this article, I rehearse the reasons why media
markets are different from other sectors. Perhaps the most important
of these reasons is that media markets trade in speech-this is the
basis for liberalization critics to argue that we cannot take the health
of the classic microeconomics market as a proxy for the health of the
marketplace of ideas. Therein begins a tension between what
Sunstein calls the consumer sovereignty and political sovereignty
approaches to free speech. Consumer sovereignty is the starting point
for the personalized cultural experience where "consumers are
permitted to choose as they wish, subject to the constraints provided
by the price system, and also by their current holdings and
requirements." In contrast, political sovereignty shifts our focus from
the individual to the public domain, where "democratic self-
government" takes the place of consumer's tastes as sovereign.8'
Sunstein traces this dichotomy back to Supreme Court Justices Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis. Holmes' consumer sovereignty
389. CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 45-46 (2001). Sunstein goes on to explain that
this dichotomy can require trading one form of sovereignty for the other: A
commitment to consumer sovereignty may well compromise political sovereignty
if, for example, free consumer choices result in insufficient understanding of
public problems or if they make it difficult to have anything like a shared or
deliberative culture ... If [political sovereignty] is our governing ideal, for
example, we will evaluate the system of free expression partly by seeing whether
it promotes democratic goals. If we care only about consumer sovereignty, the
only question is whether consumers are getting what they want ... [For
example,] if the government takes steps to increase the level of substantive
debate on television or in public culture, it might well be undermining consumer
sovereignty at the same time that it is promoting democratic self-government.
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view treats speech as "part of a great political market, with which
government could not legitimately interfere" while Brandeis claimed
that "unrestricted consumer choice is not an appropriate foundation
for policy in a context where the very formation of preferences, and
the organizing processes of the democratic order, are at stake."39
Consistent with his views of the personalized cultural experience,
Sunstein follows Brandeis' viewpoint, casting the citizen in a role
completely distinct from the consumer acting in the marketplace.
Media "audiences are citizens before they are consumers." '391 Because
of the "large difference between the public interest and what interests
the public, ' '32 the political sovereignty approach dictates that media
policy needs to use regulatory measures that promote deliberated
rather than arbitrary political results, and such measures will include
"unchosen exposures and shared experiences. ' '39 This tension
between consumer and political sovereignty frames one of the
fundamental controversies within the debate on media ownership and
other areas of regulation-the conflict between the marketplace and
regulatory models of realizing the public interest. The debate also
provides the philosophical underpinnings for the views of
liberalization proponents and critics.
2. The Marketplace and Regulatory Models
A high water mark of the regulatory model/political sovereignty
approach to media regulation is the Supreme Court decision in Red
Lion, which upheld the FCC's mandate to ensure a balanced
presentation of "controversial issues of importance and concern to
the public" through the Fairness Doctrine.3 4 The Fairness Doctrine
interfered with giving consumers what they want on the assumption
that consumers/citizens will be insufficiently informed by only one
viewpoint on an issue:
[There is a] human need for information if we are democratically to
make decisions . . . Because selective bites can distort, having all
relevant information can be critically important. When do we have"all"? Unfortunately, there is no litmus test that tells us, but the
more sources of information, the better the chances of access to the
390. Id. at 46-47.
391. GRANT & WOOD, supra note 151, at 171-72.
392. Sunstein, TV and Public Interest, supra note 1, at 501.
393. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM, supra note 389, at 48.
394. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S.
367, 385 (1969).
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needed "all." The fewer outlets we have, the poorer are those
chances.395
The original justification for all broadcasting regulation, including the
Fairness Doctrine, was technological. Justice Frankfurter in NBC v.
US pointed out that, because of limited spectrum, access to the radio
must be regulated. 396 Thus, it was a combination of speech and
technological concerns that gave rise to the regulatory model.
The Fairness Doctrine was abandoned during the ascendance of
the marketplace model. This ascendance was punctuated by the 1996
Act, which adopted a "pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector development
of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and
services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets
to competition. "39' Competition would replace administrative and
regulatory governance of media, in a manner consistent with other
areas of economic regulation, such as airlines, interstate
transportation and energy, to minimize "the inefficiencies inherent in
any regulatory scheme" and to allow "participants to reap the
economic benefits of the free market." 398
In the media sector, the shift to the marketplace model was most
striking in radio. As we have seen, the 1996 Act eliminated the radio
equivalent of the NTSO rule. 39 It was thought that "fewer restrictions
would improve competition, as well as allow companies to benefit
from the efficiencies found with large-scale consolidation. '"4M The shift
to the marketplace model presupposed that antitrust law would
assume jurisdiction over ensuring the competitiveness of the
marketplace that would result,4°1 following liberalization proponent
arguments above about what could happen with free TV.
395. TILLINGHAST, supra note 19, at 150.
396. NBC v. U.S., 319 U.S. at 226 (affirming the chain-broadcasting rules and stating,
"unlike other modes of expression, radio is inherently not available to all. That is its
unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to
governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must
be denied.").
397. 2004 Third Circuit Review, supra note 1, at 18-19 (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-230, at
1-2 (1996)).
398. Cavanagh, supra note 312, at 67.
399. See 1996 Act, supra note 26, at §202(a)-(b) (also allowing any entity to own up to
eight radio stations per market).
400. Prindle, supra note 221, at 296.
401. See 1996 Act, supra note 26, at §601(b)(1) ("[N]othing in this Act or the
amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the
applicability of any of the antitrust laws.").
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The regulatory model, broadly construed to include both content
and ownership regulation, became unattractive for a number of
reasons. First, approaches to spectrum policy changed with Ronald
Coase's argument that "the market was far better than governments
at allocating the scarce resource of electromagnetic spectrum," which
fit with "the Zeitgeist" of associating government intervention with
inefficiency. Government regulation is a poor substitute for private
ordering where the marketplace allocates the resource to its optimal
use, embodied in the party willing to pay the most. A second
unattractive feature of the regulatory model (which contributed to the
Zeitgeist) was its tendency to force the government to determine what
consumers want or should want. By occasionally denying consumers
what they want or telling them what they should have, the regulatory
model runs counter to First Amendment principles (at least per
Justice Holmes) and alarms our sense of justice in a free-market
democracy.""
The regulatory model, like liberalization critics, distinguishes the
media marketplace from other markets, by virtue of the special
attributes of media products, particularly TV.4° As already discussed,
media products are public goods with fixed costs that need to be
amortized over large numbers of viewers. This compels producers to
seek out the widest possible audience, which results in more
cosmopolitan, less local, programming. Alternatively, producers can
generate other revenue through advertising, syndication and
licensing.4 These alternative forms of revenue are all reinforced by
402. Special Report: Spectrum Policy, On the same Wavelength, ECONOMIST, Aug.14,
2004, at 2, 3 (explaining the three approaches to spectrum policy since the beginning of
broadcast regulation). Initially, spectrum scarcity formed the basis of the regulatory model
where the government gave away exclusive privileges of use (for free) to avoid chaos.
Then, efficiency demanded a shift to an auction method, where spectrum was treated as
property to devote its use to the service most demanded. Currently, a third "open
spectrum" approach is emerging where spectrum is treated as the commons, in which
technological ingenuity eradicates the spectrum scarcity misnomer and the FCC acts more
"as a speed cop than as a real-estate agent" Id. at 63.
403. But see Baker, Giving the Audience, supra note 269, at 314 ("Although the First
Amendment ought to restrict purposeful suppression of speech, it should not and has not
restricted structural interventions designed to improve the quality of the press").
404. See Sunstein, TV and Public Interest, supra note 1, at 505-06 ("[T]elevision is no
ordinary commodity, partly because of the collective benefits of good programming, partly
because of the link between television and democracy, and partly because viewers are
more like products offered to advertisers than consumers paying for entertainment on
their own").
405. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
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legal arrangements, such as intellectual property,' and can conflict
with what consumers want or how they get it. Consumer choice is also
constrained by "'gatekeepers,' 'chokepoints' and 'tastemakers"'
deciding "which products get shelf space and which will be excluded
from audience consideration." ' Consumers get what gatekeepers
approve and what "the law encourages, not some 'uncontaminated'
version of" what they want, 4°8 positing the pure consumer
sovereignty/marketplace model as an illusory ideal.
Christopher Yoo has countered that pay television, combined
with price-discrimination, could make the free-market ideal a reality.
If producers can charge more to those who demand a media product
more intensely, the producer could cover its fixed costs without a
massive audience. This would make localist programming more
economically feasible without alternative revenue streams and
regulatory intervention. Best of all, consumers could communicate
what they want, and how much they want it, without advertising and
gate-keeper intermediaries, and in the clearest terms available: their
willingness to pay.4°9 By generating an ever diversifying range of
output that would include localist programming, a pay-
television/price-discrimination model would bring us closer to market
equilibrium. The regulatory approach has the opposite effect. As
explained in Part IV.4., throughout the ages of analog broadcasting,
cable television, DBS, and digital broadcasting, regulatory localism
has protected local free TV licensees410 and prevented networks from
taking advantage of TV's natural economies of scale. 4 ' This causes
the networks' unit costs to increase because they have to amortize
fixed costs over a smaller market, which ultimately causes the
networks to reduce the quantity and diversity of output below
optimal levels.412 Regulatory localism thus has "the paradoxical effect
of reducing the economic viability of programming that appeals to
relatively small audience segments (such as local content)." 413 Localist
406. Baker, Giving the Audience, supra note 269, at 328.
407. GRANT & WOOD, supra note 151, at 51.
408. Baker, Giving the Audience, supra note 269, at 328.
409. See supra notes 282 and 283 and accompanying text.
410. Yoo, Rethinking Free TV, supra note 183, at 1657.
411. Id. at 1658.
412 Id.
413. Id. As the DARS example illustrates (see supra note 325 and accompanying text),
regulatory localism also has the perverse effect of keeping potential inter-modal
competition out of the highly consolidated radio sector.
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and other niche programming will be the first type of output cut
because of their limits in realizing economies of scale.
Taken further, Yoo's theory supports a tendency towards ever-
increasing consolidation and centralization across markets and
national borders, where economies of scale can be truly maximized to
insure sufficient resources for localist and niche programming.
Presumably, this cross-border expansion would bring us even closer
to marketplace equilibrium. Yoo acknowledges that "television
programming will still exhibit a natural tendency toward an
equilibrium level of distribution that is geographically quite broad."
However, "variations in local preferences may allow products
directed at local markets to exist" leading to an equilibrium that
includes local and cosmopolitan output, whose relative proportions
would depend on local versus cosmopolitan demands.4 4 Grant and
Wood are skeptical about multinational media suppliers providing
localist programming, even at Yoo's theoretical equilibrium. They
agree with Yoo about the need to amortize costs over the broadest
possible market.41 ' But they think this leads to overwhelming
incentives for cosmopolitan programs 416 to trump local programs
because local communities and small countries, such as Canada, have
such a limited number of eyeballs over which to amortize fixed
costs. 4" The regulatory model also finds a persuasive flaw in Yoo's
dependence on consumer demand, which takes us back to Sunstein's
key criticism. The media's role should include exposing consumers to
content that they may not want or tailor to their cultural and political
tastes. And it is entirely conceivable that consumers may not want
localist programming. In Canada, for example, the demand for
American media has traditionally outweighed demand for local
equivalents. 4 '8 This illustrates Sunstein's point that a consumer
sovereignty/marketplace model can undermine the political
sovereignty requirement for a shared cultural experience.
414. Yoo, Rethinking Free TV, supra note 183, at 1657-58.
415. GRANT & WOOD, supra note 151, at 55-60.
416. Id. at 109.
417. See e.g., id. at 18-19 ("[Creators of cultural wares in English-speaking Canada
can hope to amortize their costs across the potential audience of, at best, about 23 million
people; in French Canada, barely 7 million. U.S. creators have a potential audience of 300
million. That is reflected in what networks pay for broadcast rights in each country. U.S.
networks typically pay U.S. $1.4 million for an hour of series drama-eight and a half
times what CTV pays for Degrassi.").
418. GIrrINS, supra note 176, at 25.
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The shared cultural experience point is one of the market
externalities from the catalogue I describe above that support and
refute arguments to preserve the regulatory model.4"9 A media market
that only gives consumers what they want may also compromise the
quality of political participation because there is no exposure to
unsolicited points of view. In addition, it will be more difficult for
those who exclusively consume individualized culture to interact
socially with those people who do not share their tastes. Without
some privilege given to political or democracy-enhancing media
production, corruption and/or abuses of power may increase. On the
other hand, the disincentive of media exposure may discipline
political misdemeanor.
Giving consumers what they want will have obvious positive
externalities that would be lost in the regulatory model. Consumer
welfare will obviously be maximized. In addition, if individuals can
explore the viewpoints, texts and means of expression they find
appealing, they can further promote their own self-determination.
But this positive also appears on the regulatory side of the ledger.
Under a regulatory model, certain groups or interests will gain access
to audiences and expression that they may not have under a consumer
sovereignty regime.
There are also externalities affecting the subjects of media. A
regulatory model might be able to restrict unwanted negative media
attention, such as the allegedly unbalanced miniseries "The
Reagans."4" But the marketplace model could respond that concerns
about negative publicity and intrusive information gathering are
addressed in privacy, libel and defamation laws. A regulatory attempt
to mitigate the negative of "unbalanced" media depictions would
result in the bigger negative of chilling free speech.
Another category of externalities involves the relationship
between the producer and consumer of media. If the media
marketplace becomes one in which media consumption is always paid
419. As noted above, supra note 285, my discussion here adds to and elaborates on the
catalogue of media transaction externalities addressed by Baker, Giving the Audience,
supra note 269, at 366.
420. CBS pulled its controversial mini-series, The Reagans, and moved it to its cable
affiliate, Showtime. According to some news reports, the reason was because CBS parent,
Viacom, did not want to offend Congress, which was considering how to proceed on the
NTSO rule. CBS' formal justification invoked the defunct Fairness Doctrine, stating that
The Reagans "does not present a balanced portrayal of the Reagans for CBS and its
audience." See "CBS Pulls 'Reagans' Amid Opposition From Conservatives, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 5,2003, at A3.
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for (unlike free TV), there will be negative and positive externalities
for those who pay and those who do not pay for media dissemination.
Paying for media consumption can eliminate advertising from the
media product (a negative for the advertiser in the absence of
comparable access to audiences but a positive for a consumer who can
watch uninterrupted programming), but it may also harm those that
cannot pay for media consumption. Another negative occurs when an
audience is forced to consume an unwanted product, with no political
benefit. Because of TV's pervasive presence in our lives,4"' it is well-
positioned to provide the shared cultural experience that Sunstein
advocates. Yet, TV's pervasiveness can be a nuisance. An example
here is the 2004 Super Bowl Janet Jackson/Justin Timberlake alleged
wardrobe malfunction. The regulatory model narrowly permits the
government to restrict transmission of such material, if found to be
indecent.
This shows how complicated the interaction is between the
externality catalogue and the regulatory versus marketplace model
dichotomy. On this basis, Baker argues that the dichotomy is
untenable and unhelpful because political sovereignty concerns have
to figure in the answer to the question of what consumers want.'22
Baker asserts that the marketplace model fails without some
influence from the regulatory model because a pure marketplace
approach provides "much too much 'bad' quality content-bad
meaning content that has negative externalities" and much too little
"'quality' content-quality meaning content that has positive
externalities." At the same time, it "is unlikely to reflect people's
arguably more mature or more considered conceptions of the content
they want, especially of the content that relates to the type of people
421. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (asserting the unique
pervasiveness of the broadcast media). See also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744 (1996) (Breyer, J.) (asserting that cable TV
broadcasting is just as pervasive as over-the-air broadcasting). Compare id. with United
States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (highlighting the
capacity with cable to block unwanted channels as a critical distinction between the
pervasiveness of cable and over-the-air broadcasting).
422. Baker, Giving the Audience, supra note 269, at 366. Baker argues that once we
consider the catalogue of externalities, which is often ignored in media policy debates,
regulatory intervention "can be understood as attempting to reduce costs not otherwise
borne by the media, to impose those costs on the media, or to promote provision of
content otherwise inadequately produced because of the media's inability to internalize
the benefits." Regulatory intervention is thus a response to the catalogue of externalities,
"thereby making the media come closer to giving the audience what it wants."
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they want to be," 423 or to the type of local community or nation of
which they want to be a part. Just as the political, cultural and
economic perspectives overlap and complement one another, the
dichotomy between the regulatory and marketplace models has to
dissolve to accommodate the coexistence of citizens and consumers
demanding, as individuals, localities and nations, entertainment,
political information and cultural exposure.
With this in mind, Baker returns to the question of ownership
regulation, arguing that, if our policy is geared towards giving the
audience what it wants, it should also promote giving authority over
media to people who combine a profit motive (economic perspective)
with a sensitivity to community development (cultural perspective)
and awareness of the media's political role (political perspective).
424
The problem is that, even if such enlightened owners exist, would the
marketplace allow them to survive? CBS founder and Chairman,
William S. Paley, proposed "setting aside a given period of time-say,
two hours a week in prime time-for special, high-quality programs
that would appeal to educated, sophisticated tastes more than to the
mass audience," but NBC and ABC were not interested. 425 The most
likely reason is that this concern for producing programming rich in
positive externalities was trumped by the networks' objective function
of airing profit-maximizing mass audience material. With respect to
localism specifically, Baker argues that "local owners may have
commitments to their community as well as to profits,, 426 which, as I
explain above, is possible but not substantiated. Thus, Baker's
attempt to reconcile the regulatory and marketplace models is
inspiring but it brings us back to the circular assumption that local
owners are better for localism because they're local. How do we get
out of this circle?
VII. Conclusion
In Part II of this article, "Localism Today," I note the apparent
public support for localism and localist ownership structures.
Reacting to, and sharing this support, Congress froze the NTSO rule's
cap at 39% for the indefinite future. One possible account of this
423. Id. at 413.
424. Id. at 369.
425. PITOFSKY, GOLDSCHMID AND WOOD, TRADE REGULATION, supra note 222, at
247, quoting W. PALEY, As IT HAPPENED, 275-76 (1979).
426. Baker, Giving the Audience, supra note 269, at 369-70.
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outcome is that Baker is correct (and Congress accepts) that owner
identity and local ownership are inextricably linked with localism and
to concerns about media consolidation and its threat to diversity
within the marketplace of ideas. An alternative account is that the
public suffers from blind comfort with a regulatory model disguising
an entrenched coalition between Congress/regulators and free TV
licensees. On the alternative account, the public interest would
actually be realized under a marketplace model, where optimal
output would give consumers what they want. By surveying
arguments about the media's economic, cultural, and political
importance, this article shows how awkwardly the media fit within a
pure marketplace framework. Unlike an "ordinary" business whose
objective function is simply to maximize profit, the media have
distinct co-existing cultural, political and economic functions.
Acknowledging these coexisting mandates is one of the essential
ingredients in the content of localism, because it is the political and
cultural functions of media that tie it back to the self-determination of
communities. One could argue that all consumption promotes self-
determination in some way, but this ignores the wide consensus on
the unique role that goods traded in the media market (ideas and
expression) play in this process.
This article has also shown that we cannot take for granted the
assumption that ownership identity is highly relevant to content and
the public interest. How then can we justify localist ownership
regulation? We have seen that territory and its role in providing
spatial parameters for imagined communities is the other essential
ingredient in localism's content and the essential discovery of this
article. The almost too-obvious but overlooked importance of
territory gives rise to a value of local ownership for its own sake, even
though current legislation and regulation authorize localist ownership
regulation for the sake of local programming. The lack of consensus
on ownership's influence on programming is no obstacle to an
autonomous and strong impulse for localist ownership regulation,
such as the NTSO rule, that discourages consolidated, remote
ownership in a round about way of preserving the territorial
commonality of the license area and the licensee. Local communities
and nations continue to define their selves and their aspirations
within territorial parameters. The media provide them with the
essential ideas and means of expression to do so. However, because
they are easily moved and reproduced over satellite, cable, Internet,
phone lines and electro-magnetic spectrum, the media defy the
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territorial parameters they are meant to reinforce. It is this
ineluctable tension that continues to drive an impulse to maintain
media control locally through localist/nationalist ownership
restrictions. By territorially circumscribing media ownership (directly
achieved through Canada's foreign ownership restrictions and
indirectly achieved through America's NTSO rule), ownership
regulation confines otherwise territorially disrespectful media. This
tension will only dissolve with a decline in the importance of territory
to the way we determine our local and national selves.
A lingering question is why the NTSO rule became such a
prominent issue in 2003 and why, among all the rules liberalized in
the 2003 Order, Congress chose to intervene on the NTSO rule. One
possibility is that the 2003 media ownership controversy represents a
reaction to the imminent decline of territorially defined communities.
At the dawn of the Internet age, legal scholars Rosemary Coombe
and Thomas Francke argued that we were embarking on a trend to
increasingly construct our identities through cosmopolitan
transnational communities.4 This has obvious implications for
nationhood and for the foreign ownership restrictions at issue in my
discussion of Canadian media ownership regulation. But the
implications are also local because the point is that "cultures can no
longer be considered bounded, insulated, or discretely located in
territorial terms, ' 4 " on either a local or national scale. As alluded to
above,4 9 the beginning of the Internet age brought significant
pressure from a paradoxical "wave of global localism" 43° that
challenged the relevance of territorially determined constituencies,
including the idiosyncratic local communities that Carol Rose
describes. Determining identity focused less and less on territorial
communities and more and more on individuals.
431
427. Rosemary Coombe, The Cultural Life of Things: Anthropological Approaches to
Law and Society in Conditions of Globalization, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L. & POL'Y 791, 794-95
(1995).
428 Id.
429. See supra notes 227-243 and accompanying text.
430. Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law
and Practice, 90 A.J.I.L. 359, 360 (1996).
431. Thomas M. Franck, Community Based on Autonomy, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 41, 64 (1997) ("[T]he twenty-first century, the realities of social interaction, conflict
resolution, economic, scientific, and cultural development, and ecological and resource
management have combined with various facets of the communications revolution to
point us towards a global civil society. In that society are found interactive transnational
factions, passionate value-and-policy discourses and emerging public and private
transactional networks. In short, a community is emerging in which, for the first time,
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The prominence given to the individual through the
"communications revolution" and the consequent pressure on
432territorially defined communities inevitably trickles down to the
regulatory norms that reflect such communities, such as localism and
nationalism in media ownership regulation. The conflict is palpable,
for, as we have seen from the beginning, localist and nationalist
ownership regulations, privilege local and national "selves" over the
individual "self." The controversy on the NTSO rule may be the
smoke from the fires of what my introduction would call a genuine
communications revolution, where technological and social changes
combine. Internet or other technologically determined affinities
among individuals/consumers may be challenging and replacing the
territorial parameters of imagined local and national communities of
citizens. Congress' move to freeze the NTSO rule at 39% may prove
to be an attempt to confine the impact of the revolution. However,
this is likely an overly dramatic depiction. Given the public's reaction
to NTSO rule liberalization in 2003, the persistent health of
geographic localism in politics and the considerable regulatory
attention to media localism through the Localism Task Force and
other venues, the revolution still seems remote. To more precisely
assess where things stand in this regard, in future work, I intend to
look more closely at the same tension, as manifested in nationalist
ownership regulation in Canada.
Localism's role in media ownership regulation is much more than
a rhetorical cipher. Its content is enigmatic but that is because it is
essentially a tension-between the ongoing socio-cultural relevance
of the territorial parameters our communities inhabit versus the
capacity for media products and technologies to defy such territory.
Localist ownership rules, such as the NTSO rule, are meaningful to
ordinary Americans because territorial communities remain
meaningful, and there is comfort in restricting media control within
these communities' territorial parameters. Such comfort may be
entirely false: the NTSO rule may have no impact on local
programming and the needs of local communities, while localism, in
general, may be partly or wholly explained by the public choice
conspiracy theory. However, this diagnosis will be difficult to confirm
individuals are free to choose the components of their identities and to manifest a free
choice of affinities. They are liberated to express associational preferences.").
432. Id.
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absolutely without empirical consensus or an autopsy made possible
through a Mancur Olson-type revolution. This genuine
communications revolution will only come when the fundamental
tension above falls away. For that to happen, territory will have to be
irrelevant to community, a prospect that is currently highly unlikely.
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